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ABSTRACT

Inspired by trends towards increasing attention to peace studies and an emphasis in international relations on placing communication at the center of diplomacy and negotiation, this book presents 13 papers divided into three main sections. The first section contains conceptual selections that address general theory. The second section more clearly presents case studies and examples that lead to praxis. The third section addresses issues of organizational structure, media, and alternative channels of communication for the procurement of peace. Papers in the book are: "Communicating for Peace: Hope and Perspective" (Felipe Korzenny and Susan Douglas Ryan); "Diplomacy: A Special Case for Intergroup Communication" (William B. Gudykunst); "International Negotiations: A Power-and-Trust Relationship" (Fred L. Casmir); "Attitude Formation and International Conflict" (Herbert H. Blumberg); "Intergroup Diplomatic Communication: A Face-Negotiation Perspective" (Stella Ting-Toomey and Mark Cole); "Cultural Orientation of Argument in International Disputes: Negotiating the Law of the Sea" (Gregg B. Walker); "Taoism and the Metaphoric Analysis of International Dispute Mediation" (G. Richard Holt and others); "Deadlock: Israel and Egypt Negotiate" (Raymond Cohen); "Communication, Peace, and Development: A Communitarian Perspective" (Majid Tehranian); "International Organization and Integration Theory: The Case of the International Telecommunication Union" (Jean-Luc Renaud); "The Alternative Media and the Overthrow of the Marcos Regime" (Hernando Gonzalez); "Citizen Power in U.S. Foreign Policy: A Strategy to Communicate Consensus" (Grant Hilliker); and "Addressing the Communication Dimension of Diplomacy and Negotiation: The Intellectual Agenda" (Glen Fisher). (Most chapters provide references.) (RS)

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COMMUNICATING OR PEACE

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DIPLOMACY AND NEGOTIATION

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INTERNATIONAL AND INTERCULTURAL COMMUNICATION ANNUAL
VOLUME XIV

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COMMUNICATING FOR PEACE

DIPLOMACY
AND NEGOTIATION

edited by

Felipe KORZENNY

Stella TING-TOOMEY

with Susan Douglas Ryan



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Preface

I am very happy that Stella Ting-Toomey, Susan Douglas Ryan, and I had the opportunity to edit this volume. Clearly, our hope is to have made a contribution. The theme, however, is so important to us that we believe every and all efforts directed to the achievement of peace are a step in the right direction. Perhaps by "thinking peace" we may make it more likely; just remember the bumper stickers endorsing this idea. It is our belief that the time for the field of communication to assist peace research and practice has arrived. This volume is dedicated to the hope that communication holds for peace.

An edited book like this one is the product of the work of many persons. The editors are the managers; the authors are the creators; the reviewers are the judges. This book owes its existence to these three sets of individuals. Reviewers and authors made the editorial task much simpler than I thought it would be. Their gracious attitudes, professional conduct, and hard work was the leitmotiv of the two years dedicated to this task.

I want to express my deep gratitude to Stella Ting-Toomey, my co-editor, for her continued support, contributions, and hard work. Also, lasting and strongly felt appreciation goes to Susan Douglas Ryan, who was a crucial building block in the structure of this process. Her editorial assistance went far beyond the call of duty and in the process she demonstrated, one more time, that she is a highly professional scholar and administrator.

Many colleagues and friends were of great value in the preparation of this volume. Nancy McDermid, Dean of the School of Humanities at San Francisco State University, allocated scarce resources to facilitate this task. Bill Gudykunst, Fred Casmir, Glen Fisher, and Howard Frederick stand out as having been particularly helpful with hints and ideas. Clearly, the influence and help received from so many other people cannot be fairly acknowledged here in detail, but my thankfulness goes to them as well.

Ann West of Sage Publications provided editorial support, contacts, and ideas, which I feel made this effort easier and more pleasant than expected. Sara Miller McCune, President of Sage, gave bits of valuable input that are reflected in major ways here.

May peace be with you.

—Felipe Korzenny
San Francisco State University

Communicating for Peace: *Hope and Perspective*

FELIPE KORZENNY • SUSAN DOUGLAS RYAN •
San Francisco State University

This chapter provides an overview of the book's focus through an explication of its structure and an explanation of its contents. The three sections address theoretical approaches to diplomacy and negotiation across cultures, theoretical issues affecting practical challenges, and, finally, issues of organizational structure, media, and alternative channels of communication in pursuit of peace. The chapter concludes with a summary of the factors that affect diplomatic and intercultural negotiation as expressed by the authors of this volume.

This topic is particularly difficult as its nature changes so quickly. At the time of this writing thousands of civilians had been murdered on the streets of Beijing after peaceful demonstrations for more liberal policies and perhaps democratic reforms. Concurrently, Mikhail Gorbachev was engaged in carrying out extreme reforms in his political system while opening communication channels with the West and favoring demilitarization and weapon reductions. The Ayatollah Khomeini had just died, and political uncertainty about the future of Iran was a main source of speculation by the press.

While openness appeared to be the trend for the future at the beginning of June 1989, dark shadows of absolutism and barbarian feudalism were the news agenda only a few days later. While Zakharov freely expressed his views against the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in the presence of Mr. Gorbachev, peaceful student demonstrators were being gunned down by the thousands in China. The pace of international conflict, negotiation, and the struggle for peace is indeed too fast.

Yet while the specific instances of social conflict change so rapidly, the attempt to capture the essence of the process for academic discourse is a necessity for the sake of future generations. This book is not about the history of communication for peace, although parts of its content are about episodes of communication efforts for peace. This is a book intended to discuss the process of communication in the pursuit of peace. Diplomacy

and negotiation in this context are seen as conceptual frameworks for the process of communication.

The intention and idea behind this volume can be traced to several origins. One is the increasing attention to peace studies at many institutions in the United States. This trend clearly calls for dedicated attention to the valuable work now being produced that addresses peace issues at its core. Another trend is the current emphasis in international relations on placing communication at the center of attention in diplomacy and negotiation efforts. The science and discipline of communication has produced much theory and research of great potential use by scholars and practitioners of international relations. Further, scholars in the field of communication have increasingly recognized the importance of the application of communication principles for the achievement of peace. Evidence of this latter trend was clearly identified in the theme of the 38th annual conference of the International Communication Association held in New Orleans in 1988: *Communication and Peace: What Can We Offer?*

The present epoch presents multiple opportunities, perhaps too many. Uncertainty consequently increases. The potential for mass annihilation is great, and the struggle for peace is essential. The essence of negotiation, diplomacy, and understanding is communication between humans. These are the trends that inspired this volume.

The chapters of this collection are arranged in three parts. The first part, *Communication Theory for Diplomacy, Negotiation, and Peace*, contains conceptual selections that address general theory, that is, the factors that allow for description, explanation, and prediction of behaviors that may lead to peace. The second part, *Frameworks and Applications to International Negotiation for Peace*, while still theoretical, more clearly presents case studies and examples that more directly lead to praxis. The third and final part, *Communication, Community, Peace, and Development*, addresses issues of organizational structure, media, and alternative channels of communication for the procurement of peace. Almost by logical necessity, issues of development are linked to peace pursuits. The epilogue by distinguished professor-diplomat Glen Fisher is a summary-and-analysis piece that sets an agenda for inquiry into communication and international relations.

Gudykunst's piece (Chapter 2), besides making a unique contribution, serves as a conceptual frame of reference in which available literature on diplomatic communication is reviewed and evaluated. The unique contribution that Gudykunst makes is most valuable in that he places diplomatic communication high on a continuum of intergroup salience, that is, the constituencies or reference groups to which diplomats are likely to report. Gudykunst argues that the locus of control of this type of communication encounter is social in nature. It is clear from his presentation that understand-

ing intergroup factors is crucial for the comprehension of diplomatic communication. Uncertainty reduction, in Gudykunst's theory, necessitates the use of intergroup variables to explain diplomatic communication behavior. His theoretical perspective is heuristic and useful. It should stimulate much thought and research.

Casmir's contribution (Chapter 3) deals with power and trust. This chapter deals with abstractions from praxis and provides an excellent base for the formulation and testing of hypotheses in diplomatic communication. Casmir argues that negotiation is a process of discovery and that trust is likely to lead to complexity reduction. It is at this point that Gudykunst's and Casmir's perspectives seem to complement each other, as trust and complexity changes are mutually explicated by both authors. Complexity, however, is seen from widely diverse perspectives by each of them. Casmir advocates a "third culture" in which the negotiation needs to take place. Without that common context, negotiations are likely to miss each other. That common third culture needs development, and Casmir advocates the need to understand the individual, social, and cultural components likely to influence a conflict resolution episode. This preparatory work consists in the creation of preconditions for success. The preconditions then become that common third culture, which ought to allow for trust and consequent efficiency in communication.

Blumberg (Chapter 4) utilizes some of the same literature bases as Gudykunst, and his use of the concept of integrative complexity is similar to that of Gudykunst and somewhat in contrast to that of Casmir. Clearly, Gudykunst and Blumberg address complexity as a cognitive construct that is supposed to reflect an ample diversity of categories in the assessment of situations. Blumberg's contribution is also the application of a theoretical perspective to the special case of international conflict. Diverse perceptual orientations and the resultant escalation of hostility between and among conflicting parties is the focus of attention. Inaccurate perceptions are hypothesized to be the result of tension, which tends to diminish intellectual resources. The application of McGuire's taxonomy of attitude change to the explanation of spirals of hostility, depending on the magnitude of the conflict, appears to be of particular usefulness in understanding why polarization in conflict occurs. Awareness of these hurdles can be assumed to help parties in conflict better understand the origins of their misunderstandings or to assist mediators in helping the quarreling counterparts. Better still, this theoretical extrapolation from communication to international affairs represents a set of testable hypotheses.

Leading off Part II, the piece by Ting-Toomey and Cole (Chapter 5) constitutes an exemplary application of a theoretical formulation to a case study of great dimensions, the Cuban missile crisis of 1962. Ting-Toomey's

theory of face negotiation is a novel contribution to both intercultural and diplomatic communication. The documented episodes of face honoring and face threatening in which President Kennedy and Premier Khrushchev engaged during that crisis serve as clear examples for the analysis of conflict situations. Content analyses of correspondence, newspaper accounts, and recorded interactions, in following the example of this study, are useful data for face-negotiation analyses. Face-negotiation theory promises to allow the prediction of outcomes in international negotiation.

In his essay (Chapter 6), Walker uncovers and defines styles of argument of different "worlds" while scrutinizing the argumentation trends prevalent at the United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, which took place in Caracas, Venezuela, in 1974. Walker claims that understanding cultural orientations of argument can make an important contribution to the understanding of international negotiation. According to Walker, first-world arguments are procedurally oriented and based on objective proof, fact, and linear logic. He describes second-world arguments as being ruled by principles and procedures, being abstract and general, and being in favor of sovereignty and the right to secrecy. Third-world arguments are characterized by principles and moral appeals and the idea of compensatory justice, in the sense that the weak deserve the most. While Walker is careful to warn against stereotyping, he emphasizes the need for descriptive approaches for the characterization of cultural argumentation styles.

While Walker calls for an understanding of the cultural determinants of argumentation styles, Holt, Chang, and Steingard (Chapter 7) propose a method that allows mediators to actually step outside the traditional cultural orientation of international dispute mediation. The authors employ Lao-tzu's Taoist philosophy as a theoretical framework for resolving what they identify as the "mediator's dilemma," that is, to be engaged in the resolution process, yet at the same time, to maintain objectivity. By applying Lao-tzu's seven naturalistic metaphors, the mediator is able to generate fresh insights into the mediation process. The authors elucidate the technique by applying it to the Organization of American States' mediation of a 1969 border war between Honduras and El Salvador. Although the authors admit that the Taoist approach is not a definitive model for mediation, this chapter contributes a unique perspective to international dispute mediation by providing a comprehensive view of the process.

As with the other chapters in this section, Cohen's essay (Chapter 8) offers a bridge between international relations and intercultural communication perspectives by bringing an intercultural approach to an international relations challenge. Cohen provides an in-depth analysis of the effects of the contrasting cultural and negotiating traditions of the Israelis and Egyptians as they engage in diplomatic negotiation. Cohen also emphasizes the critical

role of the mediator as cultural interpreter in resolving international disputes between such culturally divergent groups. Because of the uniqueness of each instance of international negotiation, however, it seems that many more detailed case study analyses like this one are required to allow generalization. Cohen's contribution to this volume provides a most useful template for future inquiry.

In the introductory chapter of the final section (Chapter 9), Tehranian offers a broad critique of the two perspectives that have dominated development communication policy—the modernization paradigm and the dependency paradigm. His particular concern is their tendency to contribute to social conflict. Tehranian proposes instead a “communitarian” perspective that strives for equitable income distribution, political participation, and national integration. The communitarian strategy provides a paradigm for approaching some of the persistent economic and political challenges in development communication that are expected to create conditions of peace rather than social conflict. Although admitting that the communitarian strategy has not yet gained historical precedence, Tehranian makes a strong case for this alternative development policy that demands further thought and attention.

Some of the theoretical issues of development communication discussed by Tehranian can be seen at work in the case approached by Renaud (Chapter 10). Drawing on integration theory, Renaud's chapter addresses the role of international organizations in communication and development, especially the extent to which they are able to maintain the equilibrium between conflicting goals of states. Renaud uses a functionalist approach to explain how the International Telecommunications Union has successfully integrated nation-states into a global network of interdependence. Renaud's chapter provides a greater sense of understanding of the dynamics at work when international organizations contribute to the struggle for peace through communication and development.

Gonzalez (Chapter 11) investigates the role of the alternative media in social conflict. Gonzalez holds that while mainstream media support the status quo, alternative media communicate a diversity of public opinion. Gonzalez draws on theories of opinion leadership, resource mobilization, and agenda setting to explain the impact of alternative media in the overthrow of the Marcos regime in the Philippines. As new media become more widely diffused throughout the world, they begin to serve an important function in national and international conflicts. Through his analysis of the Philippine uprising, Gonzalez adds to the literature that documents how alternative media in our technological society can serve the purposes of social mobilization.

While Renaud examines the role of international organizations in maintaining global harmony and Gonzalez looks at the alternative media's role in times of social conflict, Hilliker (Chapter 12) analyzes the role of citizen power in the peace process. Hilliker outlines a strategy that optimizes the unique resources of citizens in shaping United States foreign policy. He makes a case for consensus building among communities in broad areas of international agenda setting. In this way, Hilliker claims that citizens can shape foreign policy intentions based on widely shared opinions, attitudes, values, and beliefs and thereby influence official policy actions. He examines the influence of public opinion in the Vietnam War era to illustrate his points. Through the concept of citizen power, Hilliker provides us with another way of looking at diplomacy and negotiation across cultures. This consensus-building perspective among and between the citizens of nations in conflict appears to have great promise.

Taken together, the chapters in this volume represent a diversity of theoretical and methodological approaches to diplomacy and negotiation. In sum, the reader of this volume will obtain an overall perspective that emphasizes the following factors affecting diplomacy and negotiation across cultures:

- Salience of reference groups
- Anxiety
- Power
- Trust
- Perception, mind-sets, and stereotyping
- Hostility escalation
- Face honoring and face threatening
- Cultural argumentation styles
- Mediation philosophy
- Negotiation styles
- Cultural mediation and interpretation
- National development assumptions
- Functional integration
- Media modalities and influence networks
- Citizen participation in international policies

This broad focus suggests a variety of directions for further study which we hope will be fruitful.

An additional theme that underlies each chapter in this volume, however, is the concept of global interdependence. Within many different contexts, the authors discuss a growing interdependence between the world's nations, organizations, groups, and individuals. As a result of our increasing need to share natural resources, to protect our environment, and to trade in new

technological developments, global interdependence is required in order to ensure a peaceful coexistence on the planet.

The conflicts among the world's diverse nations and cultures will inevitably continue—if not in China and the Middle East, in other parts of the globe—as nations, organizations, groups, and individuals continue to struggle to resolve trade agreements, border disputes, arms reduction treaties, or mutually satisfactory forms of government. The unique contribution of the authors of this volume and of the communication field, in general, is to provide theoretical perspectives for understanding the differences between the world's cultures, and, through this understanding, to help determine what will make communication, and interdependence, possible.

I

COMMUNICATION THEORY FOR DIPLOMACY, NEGOTIATION, AND PEACE

Diplomacy

A Special Case of Intergroup Communication

WILLIAM B. GUDYKUNST • California State University,
Fullerton

This chapter summarizes a theory designed to explain the reduction of uncertainty and anxiety in interpersonal and intergroup encounters and how it can be applied to diplomatic communication. It is argued that the theory overcomes one of the major problems facing theorists trying to explain diplomacy (i.e., the level of analysis) and that the theory has heuristic value and explanatory power vis-à-vis diplomacy. At the end of the chapter shortcomings of the current version of the theory are pointed out, and suggestions are made for future elaborations.

At the least, government will have to expand its conception of the relevance of international communication processes to international relations, and thereby direct greater effort toward understanding and managing them. Certainly the communication process cannot simply be taken for granted as a neutral and mechanical aspect of international interaction, nor as of concern only when public relations endeavors are to be conducted. It has to be considered in its own right as a proper *subject* of international relations analysis, and government will have to give more studied attention to conducting . . . international *communication* relations. (Fisher, 1979, pp. 123-124)

As Fisher indicates, communication plays an important role in the conduct of international relations. To date, however, few theories explaining the role of communication in international relations have been proffered. One of the problems faced in any paradigm or theory designed to explain international relations in general and diplomacy in particular is which level of analysis to use.

Berkowitz (1986) points out that the level-of-analysis problem actually involves three distinct issues: the use of aggregate data, defining who the "actors" are, and assessing the relationship between the actors and the systems within which they operate. The major problem with the use of

AUTHOR'S NOTE: *An earlier version of this paper was presented at the First Canberra Conference on International Communication, Canberra, Australia, December 1-4, 1986.*

aggregate data is that these data are often used to draw conclusions about individual behavior; that is, the "ecological fallacy" occurs. This is essentially a methodological, not a theoretical, issue. Defining the actors and their relationship to the systems in which they are embedded, in contrast, is a theoretical issue. Both Singer (1961) and Yalem (1977) concluded that different levels of analysis (e.g., the actor is an individual versus the actor is a state) have advantages in explaining different types of events. Berkowitz, in contrast, argues that it is not this simple. He points out that to assume the actor is a group (e.g., a state, a multinational corporation, a legislative body) implies the group has made a choice from among alternatives that can be predicted. This assumption is problematic, according to Berkowitz, because the prediction depends upon how preferences of members of the group are aggregated.

The theory presented herein proffers a resolution to the level-of-analysis issue by incorporating individual and group level phenomena. The purpose of this chapter is to present a social/ethnolinguistic identity-based theory of communication designed to explain the reduction of anxiety and uncertainty in interpersonal and intergroup encounters and apply it to the study of diplomacy, thereby contributing to the study of diplomatic communication. This theory integrates both the interpersonal and intergroup levels of analysis and, therefore, overcomes one of the major problems facing theorists trying to explain diplomatic communication.

The chapter is developed in four main sections. To provide a framework for the remainder of the chapter, the first section contains the major approaches to theorizing and research on diplomatic communication. Next, interpersonal and intergroup communication are differentiated, and then the analysis is extended through a presentation of a theory of uncertainty and anxiety reduction in interpersonal and intergroup encounters. The fourth section discusses the application of the theory to diplomacy.

DIPLOMATIC COMMUNICATION THEORY

McClelland (1968) pointed out that "no effective theory of communication in international relations has emerged to organize and simplify the facts and locate the various constituting segments of the subject." This conclusion was reiterated more recently by Cioffi-Revilla (1979):

In the past, empirical research on diplomatic communication has focused on areas such as signals exchanged, the perceived meaning of such signals, the operational codes of actors, and limited cross-sectional research on dominant

communication channels. From a theoretical perspective no general framework providing a deep understanding of these and other topics in diplomatic communication currently exists. (p. 257)

Even though a general theory has not emerged, there have been attempts at theorizing, and research has been conducted on diplomatic communication.

Within international relations, several writers have applied either language- or communication-based theories to diplomacy in recent years. Andrews (1979), for example, argues that foreign policy is intentional and rule-governed and therefore, analogous to the use of language. Similarly, Marcus (1984) outlines a semiotic approach to diplomatic communication. Marcus draws heavily on the pragmatic approach to communication (Watzlawick, Beavin, & Jackson, 1968) and speech act theory (Habermas, 1979). Neither of these attempts to apply linguistic models to the study of diplomatic communication, however, proposes systematic theories. Another application of a communication theory is Cioffi-Revilla's (1979) modification of the Shannon-Weaver (1949) communication model, which focuses on diplomatic channels and networks. Cioffi-Revilla's theory allows for the integration of diverse research findings, but there are two problems with his approach. The theory utilized has been rejected by most modern communication theorists, and it does not allow both individuals and nations to be included as actors.

Psychologists also have examined diplomatic communication. Tetlock (1983), for example, isolates five lines of research in political psychology that have been applied to the study of foreign policy: the personality correlates of foreign policy preferences, crisis decision making, groupthink, belief perseverance, and influence tactics/conflict resolution. None of these lines of research, however, has yielded an integrative theory. Recent work by Tetlock (1985), in contrast, has begun to specify the rudiments of a psychological theory of diplomatic communication. He combines the cognitive theory of integrative complexity, which includes dispositional and situational factors, with bargaining and impression management strategies to explain U.S. and USSR foreign policy rhetoric over time. This line of work is promising, but like the international relations approaches, it is limited to one level of analysis.

Communication researchers' analyses of diplomacy have been more limited than the work done in international relations or psychology. Several writers have examined the role of speech and language in diplomacy. Oliver (1950, 1951, 1952), for example, examined the role of ambiguity, technical vocabulary, and cautious phrasing in diplomacy. Others have focused on the

rhetorical dimensions of political situations (Heisy, 1970); the addresses of heads of nations to the United Nations (Prosser, 1970); and the nature of diplomatic reporting (Davidson, 1975). None of this work provides even the rudiments of a theory. The only attempt within the field of communication to develop a model that incorporates diplomacy is Merchant (1977). Unfortunately, he limits diplomatic communication to communication between state actors, ignoring the interpersonal level of analysis present in diplomatic encounters.

Newmark (1979) aptly concluded that "within current communication theory there are no models that adequately embrace the special characteristics of diplomatic communication" (p. 181). The situation, however, has changed in recent years with the emergence of a subfield within communication focusing on intergroup phenomenon (e.g., Gudykunst, 1986a). A communication theory that integrates interpersonal and intergroup levels of analysis can provide the foundation for a theory of diplomatic communication.

DIFFERENTIATING INTERPERSONAL AND INTERGROUP COMMUNICATION

The study of intergroup relations focuses on "relations between members of large-scale social categories, such as nations, races, classes, the sexes, religions, occupations (and perhaps even armies), and so on" (Turner & Giles, 1981, pp. 5-6). Large-scale social categories are social groups. A *social group* can "be defined as two or more individuals who share a common social identification of themselves or . . . perceive themselves to be members of the same social category" (Turner, 1982, p. 15). The largest social group of which individuals perceive themselves to be members is their nation (Emerson, 1960). Turner's conceptualization of social groups is based on "social identification." The total of all social identifications that individuals use to define themselves is their social identity, which is part of their self-concept (Tajfel, 1981).

Tajfel assumes that individuals strive to define themselves vis-à-vis the world in which they live. One of the major cognitive tools used in this process is social categorization, "the ordering of social environment in terms of groupings of persons in a manner which makes sense to the individual" (Tajfel, 1978, p. 61); for example, men and women, blacks and whites, the United States and the Soviet Union. Once individuals become aware of belonging to social groups, their social identity begins to form. Social identity, according to Tajfel (1978) is "that *part* of an individual's self-concept [that] derives from his [or her] knowledge of his [or her] membership

in a social group (or groups) together with the value and emotional significance attached to that membership" (p. 63). When social identity predominates, intergroup behavior occurs. This view is consistent with Sherif's (1966) contention that "whenever individuals belonging to one group interact collectively or individually with another group or its members *in terms of their group identifications*, we have an instance of intergroup behavior" (p. 12). Intergroup behavior, therefore, may include, but is not limited to, interaction between representatives of different nations, black-white encounters, superior-subordinate interactions on the job, physician-patient examinations, teacher-student relationships, Japanese-Korean communication, casual dating relationships, and any other encounter between two or more people where their group memberships influence the way they behave. This conceptualization includes most, if not all, forms of diplomatic communication and foreign policy behavior.

Intergroup behavior differs from nonintergroup behavior in that its locus of control is social, not personal, identity. The differences in social behavior resulting from its locus of control are outlined by Tajfel and Turner (1979) when they describe behavior as varying along a continuum from purely interpersonal to purely intergroup:

At one extreme . . . is the interaction between two or more individuals [that] is *fully* determined by their interpersonal relationships and individual characteristics and not at all affected by various groups or categories to which they respectively belong. The other extreme consists of interactions between two or more individuals (or groups of individuals) [that] are *fully* determined by their respective memberships of various social groups or categories, and not at all affected by the interindividual personal relationships between the people involved. (p. 34)

Tajfel (1978) points out that the purely interpersonal extreme is "absurd" because no instance of it can be found, but some cases (e.g., communication between two lovers) come close. Pure intergroup behavior, in contrast, does exist; for example, an air force bomber crew dropping bombs on an enemy population is "pure" intergroup, while negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union over a new nuclear arms treaty is almost pure intergroup.

Recent conceptualizations suggest that the interpersonal-intergroup continuum oversimplifies the nature of the communication involved. Stephenson (1981), for example, argues:

It is difficult to think of any social situation [that] may not have both intergroup and interpersonal significance. Making love, for example, may seem unambig-

uously interpersonal, yet a consideration of the objectives achieved by James Bond's sexual exploits should prevent our being overly sentimental about performance, even in that sphere. In any interaction with another, our apparent membership of different social groups—be it male, female, young, English, black, or European—is at least a potential allegiance which may be exploited by the other, such that we act in some sense as *representatives* of fellow members of those groups. When our nationality, sex, or occupation becomes salient in the interaction, this does not necessarily obliterate the interpersonal significance of the encounter; indeed it may enhance it. (p. 195)

Stephenson (1981) distinguishes between situations involving high intergroup salience and either low or high interpersonal salience in terms of how negotiations take place. If they are conducted face-to-face, then they involve high interpersonal and high intergroup salience. When negotiations take place over the phone, in contrast, they involve low interpersonal and high intergroup salience. The difference, according to Stephenson, is that in the face-to-face situation negotiators are aware of the interpersonal significance of their behavior, while they are much less aware of it when they negotiate over the phone (see Korzeny, 1978, for an opposing point of view). Communication between nations that takes place using other forms of telecommunication (e.g., computers, teletype, press conferences) also would involve low interpersonal salience.

The remaining two types of encounters typically are viewed as interpersonal. More specifically, encounters involving high interpersonal, low intergroup salience include most interactions between friends, lovers, mates, and so forth. Encounters involving low interpersonal, low intergroup salience encompass a large percentage of encounters between strangers, including strangers on public transportation, interaction between clerk and customer, and other encounters of this nature. Giles and Hewstone (1982) argue these may be encounters "when an individual is inattentive, distracted, fatigued, drugged, etc." (p. 187).

Two conclusions emerge from the preceding analysis: (a) the generative mechanism for intergroup communication is social identity; the generative mechanism for interpersonal communication is personal identity; and (b) interpersonal and intergroup factors are both salient in every encounter to some degree. These assumptions reinforce the need for integration of the two levels of analysis. If both interpersonal and intergroup factors (each having different generative mechanisms) are salient in every encounter, no encounter can be explained adequately with a theory that focuses on interpersonal or intergroup factors exclusively.

A THEORY OF UNCERTAINTY AND ANXIETY REDUCTION IN INTERPERSONAL AND INTERGROUP ENCOUNTERS

Recently, I (Gudykunst, 1988) proposed a theory designed to explain uncertainty and anxiety reduction in interpersonal and intergroup encounters that can be extended to diplomatic communication. The theory integrates uncertainty reduction theory from communication (Berger & Calabrese, 1975) and ethnolinguistic identity theory (Giles & Johnson, 1987) from social psychology, and it incorporates anxiety as the affective reaction to intergroup encounters. The model is general and adaptable to explaining uncertainty reduction in specific contexts. Gudykunst and Hammer (1988), for example, applied the theory to explain the adaptation of strangers in foreign cultural environments. While space does not permit a full explication of the theory, it must be overviewed prior to applying it to diplomatic communication.

Following Berger (1979), the theory begins with the assumption that individuals attempt to reduce uncertainty in initial interactions with strangers when they can provide rewards, behave in a deviant fashion, or may be encountered in future interactions. Uncertainty in this context refers to two phenomena: the ability to accurately predict how others will behave during an encounter and the ability to explain their behavior (Berger & Calabrese, 1975). Uncertainty reduction, therefore, involves the creation of proactive predictions and retroactive explanations about others' behavior. The desire to reduce uncertainty, however, does not stop with initial encounters with strangers. Rather, as Berger (1979) argues, "the communicative processes involved in knowledge generation and the development of understanding are central to the development and disintegration of most . . . relationships" (p. 123).

Berger and Calabrese's (1975) initial formulation of uncertainty reduction theory posited 7 axioms and 21 theorems specifying the interrelations among uncertainty, amount of communication, nonverbal affiliative expressiveness, information seeking, intimacy level of communication content, reciprocity, similarity, and liking. Berger (1979) elaborated the theory by outlining three general strategies individuals use for reducing uncertainty: passive—reactivity search, social comparison, and disinhibition search; active—asking others about the target and environmental structuring; and interactive—interrogation, self-disclosure, and deception detection.

Cross-cultural studies suggest that uncertainty reduction theory generalizes to initial interactions in individualistic and collectivistic cultures (e.g., Gudykunst & Nishida, 1984), as well as to acquaintance, friend, and dating relationships across cultures (Gudykunst, Yang, & Nishida, 1985). Recent

research (Gudykunst & Hammer, 1987) also reveals that the theory can account for black-white differences in initial interactions in the United States. Intercultural research further indicates that uncertainty reduction theory is useful in explaining communication between people from different cultures (e.g., Gudykunst, Chua, & Gray, 1987; Gudykunst, Nishida, & Chua, 1986) and interethnic communication in the United States (Gudykunst, 1986b).

In proposing the theory, I argued that the focus should be on explaining when interpersonal and intergroup factors are salient in reducing uncertainty (a cognitive process) and anxiety (an affective process). I contend that ethnolinguistic identity, expectations, group similarity, shared networks, interpersonal salience, second language competence (or, more generally, communication competence), and personality factors (i.e., self-monitoring, cognitive complexity, and tolerance for ambiguity) affect the reduction of uncertainty and anxiety. Reducing uncertainty and anxiety, in turn, influence interpersonal/intergroup adaptation and effectiveness. The majority of the axioms in the theory are concerned with explaining interpersonal/intergroup communication, but I also incorporate two axioms designed to explain cross-cultural variability in uncertainty and anxiety reduction. The theory is summarized in Table 2.1. The remainder of this chapter is devoted to applying this theory to diplomatic communication.

APPLYING THE THEORY TO DIPLOMATIC COMMUNICATION

Diplomats are individuals who represent their nation in interactions with representatives of other nations. All diplomatic interactions, therefore, involve both intergroup and interpersonal processes. They are intergroup in that the diplomats are representing a group (i.e., their nation). The degree of interpersonal salience varies across diplomatic interactions depending upon the channel of communication used and the relationship between the diplomats involved. If the communication occurs over the phone, through letters, or some other non-face-to-face channel, the interpersonal salience of the encounter is low (see Korzeny, 1978, for an opposing point of view). If the communication occurs face-to-face, in contrast, the interpersonal salience of the encounter is high, the exact level being determined by the intimacy of the relationship between the diplomats. The theory, therefore, allows for including both the individual diplomat and the nation in the analysis. The nation, however, is not an actor in the theory. Rather, the diplomat represents the nation.

The focus on uncertainty is consistent with several recent discussions of diplomatic communication. Many theorists have incorporated the notion of

TABLE 2.1 A Theory of Interpersonal and Intergroup Communication

Assumptions

1. At least one participant in an intergroup encounter is a stranger vis-à-vis the ingroup being approached.
2. Strangers' initial experiences with a new ingroup are experienced as a series of crises; that is, strangers are not cognitively sure of how to behave (i.e., cognitive uncertainty) and they experience the feeling of a lack of security (i.e., anxiety).
3. Uncertainty and anxiety are independent dimensions of intergroup communication.
4. Strangers' behavior takes place at high levels of awareness.
5. Both intergroup and interpersonal factors influence all communication.
6. Strangers overestimate the influence of group membership in explaining the behavior of members of other groups.

Axioms

1. An increase in the strength of strangers' ethnolinguistic identities will produce an increase in their attributional confidence regarding the behavior of members of other groups and an increase in the anxiety they experience when interacting with members of other groups. This axiom holds *only* when members of the outgroup are perceived as "typical" and when ethnic status is activated.
2. An increase in strangers' positive expectations will produce an increase in their attributional confidence regarding the behavior of members of other groups and a decrease in the anxiety they experience when interacting with members of other groups.
3. An increase in the similarity between strangers' ingroups and other groups will produce an increase in their attributional confidence regarding the behavior of members of other groups and a decrease in the anxiety strangers experience when interacting with members of other groups.
4. An increase in the networks strangers share with members of other groups will produce an increase in their attributional confidence regarding the behavior of members of other groups and a decrease in the anxiety strangers experience when interacting with members of other groups.
5. An increase in the interpersonal salience of the relationship strangers form with members of other groups moderates the effect of group dissimilarities and will produce an increase in their attributional confidence regarding the behavior of members of other groups as well as a decrease in the anxiety strangers experience when interacting with members of other groups.
6. An increase in strangers' second language competence will produce an increase in their attributional confidence regarding the behavior of members of other groups and a decrease in the anxiety experienced when interacting with members of other groups.
7. An increase in strangers' self-monitoring will produce an increase in their attributional confidence regarding the behavior of members of other groups and a decrease in the anxiety experienced when interacting with members of other groups.
8. An increase in strangers' cognitive complexity will produce an increase in their attributional confidence regarding the behavior of members of other groups and a decrease in the anxiety experienced when interacting with members of other groups.
9. An increase in strangers' tolerance for ambiguity will produce an increase in their attributional confidence regarding the behavior of members of other groups and a decrease in the anxiety experienced when interacting with members of other groups.

(continued)

Table 2.1 Continued

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10. An increase in strangers' attributional confidence regarding the behavior of members of other groups will produce an increase in their intergroup adaptation and effectiveness.
 11. A decrease in the anxiety strangers experience when interacting with members of other groups will produce an increase in their intergroup adaptation and effectiveness.
 12. An increase in collectivism will produce an increase in the differences in attributional confidence between ingroup and outgroup communication.
 13. An increase in uncertainty avoidance will produce an increase in the anxiety strangers experience when interacting with members of other groups.
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NOTE: Summarized from Gudykunst (1988).

uncertainty in their work on diplomatic communication (e.g., Cioffi-Revilla, 1979, and McClelland, 1961; see also, Holsti, 1976; Phillips & Crain, 1974; Snyder, Bruck, & Sapin, 1962, for views of foreign policy as an information-processing phenomenon). In addition, six of the seven characteristics of the international political environment isolated by Vertzberger (1982) are related closely to the uncertainty construct: deception, content ambiguity, secrecy, nonexistence of information, content inconsistency, and source ambiguity. The focus on uncertainty also is consistent with Steinbruner's (1974) position that diplomacy involves "structural uncertainty." Further, it is compatible with Kissinger's (1979) position that diplomats do not have adequate knowledge of what is happening and, therefore, have to operate in the dark; that is, operate under conditions of uncertainty. The theory, therefore, provides a conceptual foundation for the analysis of diplomacy that is consistent with recent work by international relations scholars studying diplomatic communication.

Before proceeding it should be pointed out that there is more than one type of uncertainty operating in diplomatic communication. There is the uncertainty regarding others' behavior (e.g., predicting future behavior and explaining past behavior) that is the focus of the theory. Closely related is perceived uncertainty in the environment, which is different from perceived uncertainty regarding others' behavior (see Downey & Slocum, 1975, and Weick, 1980, for alternative conceptualizations of uncertainty). There also is the uncertainty the decision maker has regarding whether a particular decision is "correct." This type of uncertainty has not been integrated with the theory to date, but research on decision making under conditions of uncertainty can be integrated (see Kahneman, Slovic, & Tversky, 1982, for research on decision making under conditions of uncertainty). One additional distinction must be made. The theory is concerned with attributional confidence, the confidence individuals have that their predictions are correct. Individuals may be very confident that their predictions are correct and, at the same time, make very inaccurate predictions. The accuracy of predic-

tions is a function of knowledge of the other culture and second language competence (Gudykunst & Kim, 1984).

The theory has several direct implications for diplomatic communication. First, it hypothesizes that ethnolinguistic identity influences attributional confidence (Axiom 1)—the stronger the identity, the greater the attributional confidence. This relationship is consistent with recent research which suggests that individuals who identify strongly with their ingroup are more tolerant of outgroups than those who identify less strongly (e.g., Lambert, Mermigis, & Taylor, 1986). The posited influence of ethnolinguistic identity on attributional confidence may explain why extremely conservative presidents of the United States have made overtures to Communist countries. Presidents Nixon (who opened relations with the People's Republic of China) and Reagan (who negotiated an arms reduction treaty and called the Soviet premier a "friend") identify strongly with the United States, but at the same time made significant advances in relations with the "enemy" during their terms in office. The theory suggests that this was due to their feeling secure in their national social identity; therefore, they were able to make positive overtures to the outgroups.

The theory also suggests that ethnolinguistic identity affects second language competence and expectations (e.g., intergroup attitudes/stereotypes; these are both theorems that can be derived from the theory). This suggests that the ethnolinguistic identities of diplomats and national leaders (e.g., presidents, premiers, and so on) influence their ability to communicate with representatives of other nations in their native language, as well as their attitudes toward and stereotypes of the representatives. If these individuals identify strongly with their nation and make insecure comparisons with other nations (e.g., see another nation's military as stronger), they will tend to have negative attitudes/stereotypes of the other group and not understand their language. The negative attitudes and lack of second language competence, in turn, decrease knowledge of the other group and attributional confidence.

The links from second language competence to knowledge of the other group and attributional confidence (Axiom 6) often are ignored in diplomacy. Many diplomats do not speak the language of the nation to which they are assigned, and few national leaders speak other languages. Rather, both diplomats and leaders rely on translators to communicate with representatives of other nations. Translations can provide semantic meaning, but not pragmatic meaning. Pragmatic meaning, however, is extremely important in diplomacy (e.g., Marcus, 1984). Not being competent in the language of the other nations, therefore, severely limits diplomats' and national leaders' ability to understand other nations and accurately predict the behavior of representatives of those nations.

The theory also predicts that shared communication networks increase positive expectations (a derived theorem) and attributional confidence (Axiom 4). Cioffi-Revilla (1979) argues that diplomatic communication occurs through large, nonrandom networks that are well structured. The possible number of interaction links within the United Nations General Assembly, for example, is a "50-digit" number. It follows that diplomats understand and have the greatest attributional confidence regarding representatives of nations with whom the most networks are shared. This conclusion appears to be supported by research on voting tendencies in the United Nations (e.g., Vincent, 1971).

The location of diplomats or national leaders in international diplomatic networks also may influence their diplomatic communication competence. Kim (1986) recently argued that the more heterogeneous, the more central outgroup members are, and the greater the tie strength with outgroup members is in an individual's networks, the higher the individual's intergroup communication competence.

Communication networks take on increased importance in the study of diplomacy when the changes from classic diplomacy (i.e., representatives of stable governments communicating with each other; e.g., Nicolson, 1962) to the new diplomacy that considers a broader range of communication channels as applicable to the study of diplomacy (e.g., Rossow, 1962) are considered. Sprout and Sprout (1962), for example, isolate 28 different channels that can be used in international political communication. "New diplomacy" advocates recognize that foreign policy decisions are diffuse and that many channels of communication carry diplomatic messages. In addition to traditional diplomatic channels, the sale of wheat and satellites, to name only two examples, can carry diplomatic messages (Davison, 1965). More recently, Fisher (1989) uses the term "public diplomacy" to include the nongovernmental linkages that are involved in the international relations process (also see Fisher, 1972). Nongovernmental linkages involved in international relations include, but are not limited to, multinational corporations, labor groups, religious organizations, service clubs, political parties, professional associations, and ethnic groups. While each of these groups influences diplomatic communication, ethnicity is of critical importance because it can exacerbate international conflicts (Smith, 1985).

Cioffi-Revilla (1979) argues that there are at least three different communication network structures relevant to the study of diplomacy: individual-to-individual, individual-to-group, and individual-to-subgroup. The situation, however, is probably even more complicated because as the model indicates, individuals may be acting as individuals or as representatives of their nation (or subgroup; e.g., multinational corporation) and, in addition, subgroups may be linked to groups and groups may be linked directly to

other groups. Research on communication networks has not been fully integrated into the theory, but the concept of shared networks is included and theoretical work in the area, which can be incorporated, has begun (e.g., Kim, 1986).

The theory also suggests that the degree of similarity between diplomats' nations and other nations influences their knowledge of the other nations and attributional confidence (Axiom 3) in predicting the behavior of the nations' representatives. These linkages allow for integrating the work of Rummel on national attributes. He defines *national attributes* as empirical concepts that are relevant to whole nations that allow for nations to be compared (Rummel, 1966). Rummel argues that the focus should not be on the magnitude of national attributes, but rather it should be on relative distances between nations on the attributes (e.g., Rummel, 1968). Relative distances between nations influence international behavior. Rummel's notion of relative distances is compatible with group similarity (e.g., similarity between nations) as used in the theory proffered herein.

Another relationship posited in the theory that is directly applicable to research on diplomacy is the link between attribute similarity (a concept derivable from Axiom 3) and attributional confidence. This linkage suggests that in order to be confident about their predictions of the behavior of representatives of other nations, diplomats must perceive similarity between themselves and the other representatives. An alternative interpretation is that to accurately predict diplomats' behavior, there must be attribute similarity. There does not appear to be specific research in international relations and/or political psychology on this issue, but this aspect of the model allows for incorporating work on the "mirror-image" (e.g., Bronfenbrenner, 1961; Kennan, 1982). The concept of the mirror-image suggests that other nations have the same image in reverse. In other words, the mirror-image reflects assumed attitude similarity. Research suggests that the mirror-image phenomenon occurs vis-à-vis attitudes toward nuclear war (Mack & Snow, 1986) and war-promoting motives (White, 1984). Additional research is necessary, however, to establish the range of attitudes to which the mirror-image phenomena applies.

According to the theory, interpersonal salience (e.g., attraction, intimacy, or relationship) influences attributional confidence (Axiom 5). Extending these relationships to diplomacy suggests that assigning diplomats to work with one country throughout their career may be advantageous. In order to accurately predict the behavior of representatives of other nations, diplomats need experience in that nation that yields knowledge of the culture and its language, and they should communicate frequently with those representatives. Developing close relationships with diplomats of other nations also increases accuracy of predictions. Many countries, including the United

States, follow a policy of rotating diplomats to different countries throughout their careers so that they do not become too attached to a particular nation or its representatives. The theory suggests that such a policy decreases the ability of members of the diplomatic corps of one nation to predict the behavior of members of the diplomatic corps of another nation.

In addition to the specific implications for diplomatic communication, the theory also allows diverse research findings on diplomatic communication to be integrated. To illustrate, the five lines of research isolated by Tetlock (1983) can be explained by the model or the theories upon which it is based.

Personality correlates of foreign policy preferences research is consistent with intergroup research. Etheredge (1978), for example, discovered that the tendency toward interpersonal dominance of policymakers in the United States is related to taking militaristic positions on international issues. Further, research by McCloskey (1967) and Tetlock (1981) used different methods, but found that isolationist attitudes in leaders is associated with hostility toward foreign nations. These findings are consistent with Axioms 7, 8, and 9 of the theory, as well as research on social categorization that indicates that negative intergroup attitudes lead to discrimination, including hostility, towards members of outgroups (e.g., Tajfel, 1981). The theory further suggests that diplomats who threaten or blame others and have a tendency to be dominant and/or isolationists will have less ability to speak the language and less knowledge of other nations with which they are dealing and less accuracy in predicting the behaviors of representatives of other nations.

Research on crisis decision making, isolated by Tetlock (1981), also is consistent with intergroup research. Driver's (1965) research using the international simulation, for example, revealed that as a crisis intensifies beyond a certain point, perceptions of differences between nations participating in the crisis become smaller, and that violence is more likely if the participants are cognitively simple than if they are cognitively complex. Using content analysis, Suedfeld and Tetlock (1977) found that crises that resulted in a war were more likely when the complexity of international messages produced by national leaders was low than when it was high. These studies suggest that high stress resulting from conflict situations disrupts information processing and leads to simplistic thinking. This is consistent with Stephan and Stephan's (1985) model of intergroup anxiety and Gudykunst's (1988) theory. Stephan and Stephan argue that as intergroup anxiety increases, members of different groups avoid each other, follow interaction norms more closely (e.g., if politeness is a norm, they will be even more polite), simplify information processing, amplify evaluative reactions to outgroups, and increase overreactions to misunderstandings. Research suggests a negative association between complexity of informa-

tion processing and perceived uncertainty; simplistic information processors perceive less uncertainty than complex information processors (Downey, Hellreigel, & Slocum, 1977). Simplistic information processing leads to a reduction in uncertainty (e.g., attributional confidence increases), but the accuracy of the actual predictions made about others' behavior should be lower. Further, Gudykunst and Hammer's (1988) application of the theory suggests that intergroup attitudes (e.g., ethnocentrism and prejudice, as well as isolationism, dominance, etc.) influence the amount of anxiety individuals experience in intergroup encounters.

Groupthink research, the third line of work Tetlock (1983) discusses, is not directly related to diplomatic communication *per se*, but rather has to do with how foreign policy decisions are made. Using case studies, Janis (1982) found that ineffective decisions were, at least in part, a function of intergroup stereotypes and lacked the procedural criteria considered necessary for high-quality decisions (see Janis & Mann, 1977, for a discussion of criteria for high-quality decisions; also see Herek, Janis, & Huth, 1987). Janis's findings are supported by content analyses of policy decisions and laboratory experiments. Tetlock's (1979) content analyses of policymakers' public statements, for example, support Janis's conclusion. He found that victims of groupthink have more simplistic perceptions of foreign policy than decision makers who are not victims of groupthink. Tetlock's research also demonstrates an ingroup bias in the public statements of decision makers. The findings in this line of research are compatible with research on intergroup relations (e.g., Tajfel, 1981) and research on decision making under conditions of uncertainty (e.g., Kahneman et al., 1982), which have not been fully integrated in the model proffered to date.

Research on belief perseverance isolated by Tetlock (1983) also appears consistent with the model. Jervis's (1976) work on misperception, for example, suggests foreign policymakers tend to protect their expectations and prior beliefs by accepting uncritically material that supports their belief and looking for flaws in contradictory arguments. Jervis's conclusions and those of other researchers on misperceptions in international relations (e.g., Holsti, 1967; Vertzberger, 1982) appear to be consistent with intergroup research on social categorization in general (e.g., Wilder, 1986); the ingroup bias (e.g., Brewer, 1979); intergroup attributions (e.g., Hewstone & Jaspars, 1982); and social stereotypes (e.g., Tajfel, 1981), in particular. Recent research indicates that stereotypic beliefs only change when disconfirming information is associated with the group; they do not change when it is associated with members of the group (Rothbart & John, 1985). Rothbart and John go on to suggest that changes in intergroup stereotypes, therefore, are relatively rare. According to the theory, expectations (which includes stereotypes) influence knowledge of and ability to speak the language of

other nations as well as attributional confidence regarding the behavior of representatives of these nations.

The final line of work isolated by Tetlock (1983) focuses on influence tactics and conflict resolution. He argues that "foreign policy is fundamentally social influence: The ultimate objective is to persuade other nations to act in desired ways . . . Policymakers choose those influence strategies most likely to induce other states to act in desired ways" (p. 69). Case studies suggest that firmness on major issues and making concessions lead to acceptable diplomatic solutions to international crises (e.g., Snyder & Diesing, 1977). Leng and Wheeler's (1979) research further indicated that "reciprocity" is the most effective way to avoid being defeated in diplomacy without going to war. This line of research is consistent with the original version of uncertainty reduction theory (Berger & Calabrese, 1975). It suggests that reciprocity leads to reductions in uncertainty. Recent theoretical work (Mugny, Kaiser, Papastamou, & Pérez, 1984) and research (Reicher, 1984) indicate that while social categorization leads to discrimination with respect to the outgroup, those discriminated against can still influence members of the other group. This line of work should offer significant insights if it is extended systematically to diplomatic negotiations.

CONCLUSION

A theory of uncertainty and anxiety reduction in interpersonal and intergroup encounters was summarized and applied to diplomatic communication. The theory, presented in Table 2.1, in combination with the theories upon which it is based (e.g., ethnolinguistic identity theory, social identity theory, uncertainty reduction theory), can integrate diverse research findings on diplomacy. The focus on uncertainty reduction identifies a basic behavioral process that occurs across the subject matter examined in specific disciplines; it thereby offers the possibility of decreasing the fragmentary nature of knowledge in social science (see Fiske [1986] and Lieberman [1985] for discussions of the need for isolating basic behavioral processes).

The theory focuses on the reduction of uncertainty and anxiety, but as was pointed out in the discussion developing the theory, it is necessary to incorporate increases in uncertainty and anxiety in order to fully explain interpersonal and intergroup communication. Planalp and Honeycutt's (1985) intracultural research, for example, indicates that an increase in uncertainty has negative consequences for interpersonal relationships. Soderstrom and Gudykunst's (1987) intercultural study, in contrast, reveals both positive and negative outcomes for interpersonal relationships between members of different cultures following an increase in uncertainty. While

these are potential methodological explanations for the different results of the two studies (e.g., Planalp & Honeycutt gave only negative examples of uncertainty increase, while Sodehani & Gudykunst did not provide examples), another plausible explanation involves differences in intracultural and intercultural relationships. Given findings of these two studies, it appears advisable for future work on the theory to focus on uncertainty and anxiety in general, rather than uncertainty and anxiety reduction in particular. Future theorizing also should integrate and/or examine the relationship of the use of ambiguity in general (Levine, 1985) and strategic ambiguity in particular (Eisenberg, 1984), as well as the role of "second guessing" (Doelger, Hewes, & Graham, 1986) on uncertainty and anxiety. Each of these concepts and the notion of increases in uncertainty appear to be directly relevant to diplomatic communication.

Future research may well reveal that the reason for unsuccessful diplomatic negotiations, and indeed war, may be that the levels of anxiety and uncertainty vis-à-vis the behavior of the representatives of other nations are too high for comfort, as one logical extension of the theory might suggest. In its current form, however, the theory is not a complete explanation of diplomatic communication. The present analysis, therefore, should be viewed as an initial attempt to apply a current communication theory to diplomacy. The theory appears to have heuristic value and explanatory power vis-à-vis diplomacy, but future versions need to integrate additional concepts and research from international relations and political psychology to fully account for the complexity of diplomatic communication.

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International Negotiations A Power-and-Trust Relationship

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Negotiations, especially on the international level, are a complex process that requires consideration not only of the factors contributing to them at the moment, but also cultural and other interrelationships that precede and follow the readily apparent procedures. All negotiations are concerned with power; that is, they are the result of power relationships between negotiation partners. Furthermore, they must take into account the factors that have caused trust or mistrust to develop in the past because of perceptions related to the use of power by one or more of the negotiation partners.

Scholars of human communication have provided important insights into those aspects of negotiation processes that deal with various forms of verbal and nonverbal interactions or exchanges. Their orientations or interests, however, have frequently resulted in the relative neglect of other factors that are at least equally important.

NEGOTIATIONS: SOME DEFINITIONS AND COMPONENTS

While negotiations are undertaken for a variety of reasons, they all center on the idea that two or more parties find themselves "at a distance from one another," which in some way has to be reduced or removed (Gulliver, 1979, p. 81). That aspect of negotiations is generally accepted, understood, and relatively simple. However, when negotiations are studied, one is also reminded of the fact that *power* relationships are an important part of them. Two or more parties may be sufficiently equal in their perceived power status, but must, nevertheless, settle a dispute. On the other hand, one of the parties may represent an entity that is more powerful than the other, but it also needs approval by observers, such as the community, a nation-at-large,

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or possibly even the entire world, for what it seeks to accomplish. The Versailles Treaty, forced upon the defeated German empire, exemplifies the latter category; disarmament negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union in the late 1980s, the former.

What also needs to be kept in mind is the fact that in all negotiations, including international ones, the total process begins much earlier, ends much later, and is much more complex than the layman reading a daily newspaper or watching the evening news on television assumes, or is led to believe. For instance, Walton and McKersie (1965) remind us that incompatible expectations frequently require an approach that includes both pre-negotiation and postnegotiation efforts. In addition, one must not overlook the role individuals play. Their personal foibles, perceptions, and expectations can be another significant component part that is too often overlooked because of the importance of the issues discussed, or the fact that negotiators are identified as representing some entity or organized group, for instance, a government or state. I am reminded of a personal experience, involving the highly experienced Dutch ambassador to UNESCO. Very late one night he stopped me in the hallway of a building in Mexico City, and noting both my tiredness and discouragement after seemingly endless and fruitless hours of haggling, quite unexpectedly decided to change my outlook by telling me a joke. For several days I had heard my country and its policies attacked again and again, concerning both small and large matters. The resulting tension was broken, and I could not help but laugh out loud when he told me the old story about the four drivers, a Russian, a Kenyan, a Mexican, and a Frenchman, who crashed at high speed at an intersection coming from four different directions. In trying to determine responsibility, the question was asked, "Who was at fault?" The answer: "Why, the Americans, of course!" As a result of this brief encounter, the following days of exhausting work could be dealt with much more sanguinely by at least one senior member of the U.S. delegation. Some of the major factors in successful negotiations thus will always be emotional, creative, personal, or even artistic, and they simply cannot be discovered, described, or taught "by the numbers." Before my first international negotiations I read voluminously, both on the theory of the subject and the specific issues involved. Yet, two weeks of observing, listening, and learning from a highly experienced and effective senior career officer in the U.S. State Department proved much more helpful, as we worked together 16 to 18 hours a day.

It is equally important to remember the fact that the real world, the daily events surrounding negotiation processes, frequently impinges on the negotiation in totally unpredictable ways. At the same time that the 1982 UNESCO World Conference was convened in Mexico City, U.S. television broadcast a documentary in which it was suggested the possibility of a

successful insurgency in Mexico, which might topple the government. That possibility seemed to be further supported by a quote attributed to the U.S. ambassador to Mexico, which had been taken out of context from a much more detailed explanation. Within hours after the program was broadcast in the United States, the highly positive and cooperative relationship that had been established between members of the U.S. delegation and their Mexican hosts was severely disrupted. This negative climate continued for days while attempts were made, on the scene, to repair the damage.

Possible outcomes in negotiations simply do not represent a finite set, subject to the laws of mathematics. The factors influencing them also become clearer when one considers dramatic, and often sudden, changes in political situations within such countries as China, which require the total reevaluation of diplomatic or trade relations, and thus great flexibility on the part of human beings. The same holds true in the case of the Soviet Union (as of the summer of 1989) where similar, dramatic change processes may be evolving. (The very fact that it seems necessary to add a date to the latter illustration indicates how important the total ecology of negotiations is, because even by the time this chapter is published, that particular situation may have changed once more.)

It is important, for all the reasons mentioned so far, to emphasize here the complexity of international negotiations. Luhmann (1979), in effect, stresses complexity as a basis for the study of human interactions. "Conditions of increasing social complexity," he calls them, even as he indicates that "man can and must develop more effective ways of reducing complexity" (p. 7). Only if one starts with both of these assumptions can he or she hope to adequately deal with the total process involved in international negotiations. Furthermore, Simons (1974) points out that "persuasive messages in social conflicts [including negotiations] always take on meaning from their social contexts" (p. 200). His insight that a combination of persuasive arguments, constraints, and inducements is necessary is also important to the concepts summarized in this chapter. These intricate and complex interactions between the observable negotiation process and the underlying power, reward, and trust relationships will be further explored in the following pages.

An emphasis on complex interrelationships, rather than on techniques, is certainly not new. Starr and Yngvesson (1975) drew similar conclusions on the basis of previously gained insights, which led them to call for a shift of focus from the dispute to the social process of which it is a part. What is suggested here is that in addition to strategies or tactics employed by negotiators, the concepts of power, trust, time, authority, and social environment require equal concern. All these factors, as well as others not part of this discussion, interact within a setting based on the "intrinsic contradiction

... between conflict and the need for joint action" (Gulliver, 1979, p. 271). It is the resolution of *that* conflict which is the primary purpose of the approach suggested at the conclusion of this chapter.

NEGOTIATIONS: THE PROCESS

As a starting point, Gulliver (1979) provides a cyclical model for the negotiation process, which includes eight overlapping sequences.

Summarily, these phases are (1) the search for an arena for the negotiations; (2) the formulation of an agenda and working definitions of the issues in dispute; (3) preliminary statements of demands and offers and the exploration of the dimensions and limits of the issues, with an emphasis on the differences between the parties; (4) the narrowing of differences, agreements on some issues, and the identification of the more obdurate ones; (5) preliminaries to final bargaining; (6) final bargaining; (7) ritual confirmation of the final outcome; and, in many cases, (8) the implementation of the outcome or arrangements for that. (p. 82)

The process, summarized above, becomes even more meaningful if it is combined with three concepts provided by Goffman (1967, 1974), which identify how individuals confront new situations. On the basis of existing stereotypes or schemata (a), Goffman states, they are capable of active involvement and the modification of their behavior on the basis of their perceptions, which results in change (b). In that process, their personalities have an important influence on their actions (c). In other words, the personal "equipment" negotiators bring to and use in negotiations play a significant role (see also the discussion of field-dependence and -independence by Larson [1978]). Negotiations, it must be concluded, are heavily influenced by both the participants' perceptions and the environment in which they are conducted. If the process outlined by Gulliver (1979) is to be carried out effectively, therefore, one must consider both the specific event — which he sees as an exploratory interaction between parties — and the total framework in which change or modification of perceptions is made possible. At the same time, it is necessary to recall that Luhmann (1979) suggests that, while the complexity of human interactions makes their study difficult, a systematic simplification process is employed by human beings to assist them in coping with the multiplicity of factors that have to be considered (Luhmann, 1979). Of course, the multitude of things that need to be taken into account are much more easily assumed than specifically identified. However, Mead's (1934) insistence that what is being engaged in is "not simply a

matter of abstract ideas, but is a process of putting one's self in the place of the other person's attitude, communicating through significant symbols" (p. 327) helps focus these concerns. An interactionist orientation is suggested here, which involves self, other, and the environment/situation/society in the study of definitional and communicative processes, including negotiations (see Goffman, 1967, and Burke, 1950, among others). The fact that international negotiations include intercultural communication problems as well, and the fact that negotiators have to represent the positions of their government, must not be overlooked either.

Gulliver (1979) argues convincingly that the procedures that have been identified, or which have been taught, do not sufficiently take into account three factors: (a) the fact that few negotiators have the luxury of taking time out to carefully consider available choices while participating in negotiations. Thirty minutes past midnight after 6 or 16 days of almost continuous negotiations, we may discover that even experienced diplomats become too exhausted to deal adequately with "one more possibility" or a subtle change in wording. (b) Negotiators are first of all human beings, thus their assessments and choices change during a negotiation, even when they are expected to represent a nation or state. (c) The process is made cumbersome, or worse, by the complexity of multiple issues (p. 91). Consider the case of an inexperienced U.S. negotiator who proposed, in open session, that a treaty be arranged to protect important cultural artifacts from the ravages of war. Imagine his shock when he was bitterly, even viciously, attacked (and through him his country) for proposing an approach that would "institutionalize war." Only if one understands a long sequence of earlier arguments and events can he or she come close to comprehending this devastating response to a well-meant proposal.

It is little wonder, then, that in many international negotiations, indecisiveness becomes a common response. It is a result of the belief that a wait-and-see attitude can, in the long run, produce better results that are more acceptable to all involved. Unfortunately, when it is finally achieved, what appears to be sudden closure may lead the uninitiated to the unwarranted conclusion that previously some perverse individual or government simply insisted on dragging his or its feet. After all, the solution was quite obvious and simple all along. Often, it is also difficult to identify the real issues considered important by negotiators, or their preferences, on the basis of what they state publicly. Indeed, such public statements may be responsive to the immediate needs of readers, listeners, and viewers—in other words, mass media consumers—rather than of those involved in long-range diplomatic interactions.

Two illustrations will help make this point. The threat of nuclear war has been so keenly felt that by now almost any agreement that helps to reduce it

is welcomed with great joy and relief, as if all problems could now be readily resolved. But is that the most important and desirable *end* negotiators should seek? Instead, is it not the elimination of all nuclear weapons? The ends immediately desired thus may not be ends at all, but only the beginning of another chain of frustrating and sometimes dangerous interactions, extending over a long period of time as we try, step-by-step, to accomplish some distant, final task. Patience and a long-range view are vital to international negotiations, but that is not something appreciated in a society informed by means of 10-second commercials and 30-minute newscasts. The human need to see seemingly endless conflicts resolved may be so great that illusions are created that cannot be sustained in the real world. For instance, success in the case of one specific negotiation does not necessarily signal the easy resolution of other problems existing between the same parties. The Soviet Union and the United States could, for example, reach agreements on cultural exchanges while being unable to mutually agree on ways to stop the arms race.

It may even happen that when two opposite or dichotomous solutions are considered, neither one is acceptable. For many years, Americans were accused of wishing to suppress the legitimate aspirations of Africans when they did not supply them with some of the communication technologies that the latter wanted. However, when both technology and software, or programs, were made available by various agencies in the United States and the West to African governments that requested them, a protest against electronic colonialism resulted. African problems were, and are, not so simple that either response mentioned above could lead to their resolution. New approaches had to be designed so that less passion and more creativity could result. If not totally successful, the International Program for Development Communication (IPDC) represented one model for such efforts.

Gulliver (1979) makes it easier to focus more precisely on the reasons for the challenges faced in international negotiations.

In all this we need to remember that the two parties are in dispute. They want different things and they want them from each other. They are not necessarily reasonable men open to persuasion on the objective facts of the case, especially if more advantages can be gained by persistent unreasonableness. They are much inclined to be apprehensive of each other, mistrustful, and somewhat antagonistic. This is especially the case where something like a zero-sum condition obtains on some issue—what they get, we lose, and vice versa. Interests are then diametrically opposed. In non-zero-sum conditions it is not clear, or may not be for some time, just how cooperation can be beneficial or whether one is being induced to take less than the opponent or less than otherwise might be obtained. Cooperation can be, or can seem to be, at the expense of one's own interests. (p. 117)

If one carefully considers this concise summary, it becomes very evident that the mere description of techniques accomplishes little, because limited resources that have to be shared, real differences in perceptions, as well as human mental processes, are such vital components of the negotiation process.

POWER AND NEGOTIATION

Since the possibility of walking out or ending negotiations must be taken into consideration, some of the possible bases for continuity need to be addressed. After all, negotiators enter the process with preferences and expectations. In effect, they have both maximum and minimum expectations, and they realize that their opponents, or enemies, who are engaged in the process with them, play a significant role in making the realization or achievement of those expectations possible. In other words, expectations are directly related to power. In that connection it is necessary to consider an interesting definition of *power*.

Power has been defined as a capacity or potential to influence others while resisting the influence of others (Michner & Suchner, 1972) and described by De Charms and Muir (1978) as an important motive in human action and interaction. In interaction with other variables (such as affliction, inhibition, and aspects of maturity), according to De Charms and Muir, power can explain a great deal of human behavior. These authors emphasized the motivational aspects in their definition of power, describing it as a *need* to have impact and a *concern* over influencing others. If, as McClelland (1975) believed, all individual and collective human action is related to motives, then power as motive has a very special relevance for understanding and predicting behavior. (Corsini, Vol. 3, 1984, p. 63)

Human beings in interaction, even internationally, thus can be said to have a need to influence. Societal interactions are based on the idea that people cannot leave each other alone. Especially in the contemporary world, such interactions between nations include a concept of power that is often related to armaments and armed conflict. Even so-called neutral nations like Sweden and Switzerland have men and machinery prepared for use in an armed power conflict. One of the few nations in the world that until recently made itself defenseless on purpose, Costa Rica, now is arming itself because of events in that region of Central America.

The concept of power and its use has challenged many individuals simply because it is such a pervasive fact of life. A simple, yet inclusive explanation is provided. "Power is the ability to act, to bring something to completion. .

... There is power in all the areas of existence: in the spiritual, vital, and material areas" (Brugger & Baker, 1974, p. 317). As one looks at negotiations, it becomes clear that they result from the fact that someone's ability to act, or to exercise and maintain power over his or her own affairs, is at times influenced or even controlled by someone else's power and ability to act, and that conflict needs to be resolved.

Nowhere are the intricate and complex processes involved in negotiations more evident than in the interactions between the United States and Canada concerning acid rain. Once upon a time, what was done or happened within the national frontiers of any state was its own affair. "National sovereignty," however, became a very different matter when it was learned that chemical pollution can be carried by winds for hundreds of miles, with total disregard for frontiers or borders. Or, consider the case of East German television viewers who can readily tune in to West German programs, and who may even prefer to do so. National control over media content thus becomes impossible. Indeed, changing perceptions of power and powerlessness are part and parcel of the ongoing redefinitional processes that lead to almost continual international negotiations.

Russell (1938) considered power to be "the fundamental concept in social science" (p. 19) and defined it as "the production of intended effects" (p. 35). Intentionality and planned effects can, indeed, be seen as directly related to both power and negotiations. Of course, as Winter (1973) insists, social power may also be gained on a very sophisticated level, but that requires that a respondent be made to believe that "he really wants to do what you want him to do" (p. 5). The well-known story of Tom Sawyer and his whitewashed fence is only one example of that approach in literature. Another much more frightening and much more sophisticated example is that of propaganda leading to war, which eventually causes people to willingly sacrifice the very lives that previously they strove to preserve.

Berger (1985) presents meaningful insights on power, which are directly related to several of the concepts mentioned earlier in this chapter. He makes it possible to combine a concern with the changing nature of negotiation bases, with the changing needs for interaction between negotiators as they relate to the perception of power.

Blau also discusses four conditions that give rise to social independence and thus reduce the likelihood that one will be subjected to another's power. First, if persons possess strategic resources, they are likely to be more independent. Second, the more alternative sources of supply persons have, the more likely they are to be socially independent. Third, if coercive force can be used to compel suppliers to render services, then dependency will be reduced. Included in this condition is the possibility of forming coalitions to force dispensing of

needed services. Fourth, persons can reduce their needs for various services, thus reducing their dependence upon suppliers.

The four conditions that promote social independence can be employed to delineate four strategies that can be used to acquire and maintain power. First, the power wielder who dispenses valuable services to others must remain indifferent to the services they might be able to provide him or her. Obviously, if power holders were to become dependent upon services offered by others, they become subject to their power. Second, the powerful person must ensure that those who are dependent upon him or her do not have access to alternative sources of supply for their needs and wants. Such alternative sources weaken dependence and thus reduce power. Third, the person who is in the powerful position cannot employ coercive force to obtain their supplies. Thus persons in power positions might take steps to discourage the formation of coalitions among those who are dependent upon them. Finally, power wielders must ensure that the persons who are dependent upon them for their supplies do not change their needs so that the value of their supplies diminishes. Hence persons who are in positions of power may have a vested interest in maintaining the status quo in order to ensure continued dependence upon them. (p. 451)

There seems to be no better way to illustrate most or all of the points made above than to cite the traumatic months when Americans realized how dependent they had become on Arab nations for oil. Loss of power over their own lives was dramatically evident as gasoline became scarce and people had to change shopping, work, and travel habits in order to adjust to long lines and smaller amounts of gasoline available to them. Power, all of a sudden, had little to do with the size of a country, money, or armed might. In effect, Americans had given power quite willingly to others, even as they thought their automobiles made them more independent. Such are the much more subtle interdependencies of the second half of the twentieth century, which are behind international negotiations.

Schelling (1960), thus, is right when he suggests that traditional concepts of what is understood by the term *power* do not adequately consider the realities of contemporary human interactions, when power can often only be defined after "it worked."

"Bargaining power," "bargaining strength," "bargaining skill" suggest that the advantage goes to the powerful, the strong, or the skillful. It does, of course, if those qualities are defined to mean only that negotiations are won by those who win. But, if the terms imply that it is an advantage to be more intelligent or more skilled in debate, or to have more financial resources, more physical strength, more military potency, or more ability to withstand losses, then the term does a disservice. Those qualities are by no means universal advantages in bargaining situations; they often have a contrary value. (p. 22)

POWER AND AUTHORITY

Some people, of course, shudder at the very thought of power. De Jouvenel (1969) probably spoke for many when he indicated that:

Power is authority and makes for more authority. It is force and makes for more force. Or, if a less metaphysical terminology is preferred, ambitious wills, drawn by the lure of Power, expend unceasingly their energies in its behalf that they may bind society in an ever tighter grip and extract from it more of its resources. (p. 157)

It appears, however, that the relationship of power and authority is not quite so simple as posited by de Jouvenel (1969). The power of available nuclear and chemical arms is clear to everyone; their existence and potential are not questioned. However, the authority to use them has to be defended quite separately. Indeed, the actual or imagined use of "yellow rain" or mustard gas in contemporary armed conflicts has been used as a specific reason for international challenges directed against sovereign states. There is clearly a linkage between the two, but they may not be the same. Gandhi used his authority while denying physical power as a legitimate role in his scheme of things. It is for that reason that international negotiations are singularly inadequate when it comes to dealing with spiritual power. They commonly deal only with material matters, though resulting values are frequently asserted.

Pruitt (1981) adds a meaningful extension of the concept of power when he writes that the "perception of power" is a more useful construct than that of "real power" (p. 89). One could use the example of Diogenes's request directed to Alexander the Great to "move out of sun," when the latter was willing to use his power to reward him because of the king's respect for the philosopher. Or one could mention the powerlessness of a materialistic Roman empire to make the threat of death work in its struggles against the otherworld orientation of Christians. I would agree with the conclusion drawn by some, like Cross (1969), who challenge the idea that an analysis of power should be based simply on the idea that it is "synonymous with or descriptive of the outcome" (p. 17). I would challenge all simplistic definitions of power that do not take into consideration the role of the perceiver or respondent as indicated in the two examples. Power cannot simply be exerted. It has to be accepted as meaningful authority if any kind of meaningful or consistent involvement by those considered to be less powerful is sought.

TRUST: BRINGING RELATIONSHIP TO POWER AND NEGOTIATIONS

To avoid inadequate assumptions while relating power to negotiations, it is necessary to include Gulliver's (1979) insistence that negotiation is a "process of discovery" (p. 70). What becomes important, as a result, is to consider what has to be discovered and when and where that process begins. It surely does begin prior to, and certainly does not end with, the actual, limited-in-time negotiation event. It does not depend only on resolving those problems that were discovered prior to the negotiation. It is based as well on the discovery of a mutual, ongoing process in which all partners can continue to engage during and even after the specific negotiations. No wonder Meyer (1960) saw mediators in negotiation processes as having to depend heavily on their "personal power of divination" rather than on their ability to interrelate readily apparent or obvious component parts brought to the negotiations (p. 160). That which is possible in negotiations cannot always be determined on the basis of the component parts identified prior to the process.

What, then, produces successful negotiations? What makes power less threatening? I believe, with Luhmann (1979), that it is *trust*. He speaks of it as an "effective form of complexity reduction" (p. 8). That is exactly so, because trust relates what exists in the present, including power, to that which is expected in the future. As Luhmann puts it, "the formation and consolidation of trust is therefore concerned with the future prospects of what is at any given time the present" (p. 13). Negotiations, conducted at some present moment in time, find their meaning, or ultimate purpose, at some future moment in time. Nothing can assure an ultimate outcome, especially since ever-changing power relationships are involved. Only trust can produce the minimum requirements needed to complete negotiation efforts.

Richardson (1975) describes a practice among the cannibalistic people of New Guinea that illustrates this point. At times, when the exertion of raw physical power led to debilitating and murderous confrontations between tribal groups, their usual "law" of deception, applied during interactions with perceived enemies, had to be changed. It was replaced by trust, which was created when tribes exchanged newborn babies, "peace children," who guaranteed survival in the future as long as they were alive. Each tribe was powerfully constrained by tradition and cultural rules to keep these children alive, and thus to assure peace.

Those who only consider the short-term role of power in negotiations on a situational or "now-in-time" basis need to be informed by Luhmann's (1979) insistence on the long-range impact trust can and must have. Once

more, the imposition of the Versailles Treaty and the use Hitler made of its negative results should be considered in this connection. It is necessary, therefore, to be concerned with much more than techniques, manipulations, or raw power.

Whoever wishes to manipulate the present of others must be able to escape from it to another time. The impossibility of this means that all *manipulation* [emphasis added] runs the risk, evident also within its own present, of becoming expressive and thereby betraying its goal. This can, of course, be obviated to a very large extent through social differentiation, role separation, barriers to communication, and control of information—in short, by social organization. The effect of this will simply be to arouse universal suspicion of manipulation. . . . Trust, therefore, can only be maintained if it finds a form which allows it to live with such suspicion and be immune to it. (p. 14)

Druckman (1977) moves much of what has been discussed so far in general terms into the arena of diplomacy, or international negotiations: "Diplomacy works at the interpersonal level through feelings of liking, trust, attraction, and other personal aspects of the relationship" (p. 378). Druckman also clearly defines vital aspects of that personal, individual role of the diplomat/negotiator.

The diplomat's status and background characteristics must facilitate the building or maintenance of liking, *trust*" [emphasis added], and attraction if he is to perform his role adequately. In fact, diplomats, especially in industrial settings, must frequently rely on affective bonds because they often lack the power or the status to command the attention of others both within and outside their own organizations. (p. 380)

In effect, I feel that Pruitt (1981) is much too cautious, as compared to Luhmann and Druckman, when he concludes that trust can be used.

Power . . . includes the successful use of all competitive tactics as well as the conditions (such as credibility) that allow a bargainer to employ such tactics. It can even include the successful use of coordinative tactics and the conditions (such as the other party's trust) that allow such success. (p. 87)

Success without trust may appear to be momentarily effective because of the use of deception and confusion, or simply because one partner surrenders, but it cannot result in lasting relationships or the intimacy needed for ongoing productive relationships.

With regard to the resolution to the problems posed here, it should be mentioned that simulations, or the approaches suggested by game theorists,

may help clarify that there is a problem, but they can do little more than that. Bartos (1974) understood that very well when he wrote:

Although we found that some predictions were remarkably accurate (at the experimental level), their practical value was relatively small: in order to make those predictions, we had to have information one does not usually have . . . [and] it turns out that to make such predictions possible, we must simplify our conceptions of the process [of negotiations] even more than we have done so far. (p. 273)

Obviously, from all that has been indicated so far, such simplifications cannot adequately describe or identify the complex interrelationships of the many components that have been discussed in this chapter.

POWER, TRUST, AND RELATIONSHIPS

Central to all that has been considered thus far is the underlying idea of a relationship. Power does not relate to trust, or vice versa. Negotiation does not relate to power, or to trust, or to both. Human beings perceive, and human beings relate! Thus, a theory of negotiation based on relationship requires consideration of much more than techniques or an event fixed in time. As Luhmann (1979) indicated, there can only be trust if those involved are familiar with their world and its component parts. Gulliver (1979) showed that negotiation is not merely a process for the settling of disputes, but is a cyclical process of information seeking and information sharing as well. Millar and Rogers (1976) pointed out that human relationships, complex by nature, involve intimacy, control, and trust. Ruesch and Bateson (1951), as well as the Palo Alto Group (Watzlawick, Beavin, & Jackson, 1967), stressed the fact that human interactions are very much a question of relationship.

CREATING RELATIONSHIPS AS A PART OF NEGOTIATIONS

What contributions can intercultural communication scholars make to an understanding of negotiation processes in a world beset by conflicts that must be resolved if mutual survival is to be ensured? What insights have intercultural communication scholars gained that could assist in the development of negotiation approaches based on the concept of relationship? If a successful way is to be found to overcome those destructive tendencies that may be brought to a communication situation, it has to be through an interactive, conscious discovery effort of human beings who strive to create

a basic, mutually acceptable communication subculture. That sub or third culture should not be merely dependent upon the past experience and preconceptions that participants bring to the process. Indeed, whenever successful untrained communicators are discovered in intercultural communication situations, unconscious or subconscious attempts to create a mutually supportive, interactional process can usually be identified. That process is not based on dominance or even compromise, but on respect, understanding, and acceptance. It is, in other words, concerned with more than the past, or even the immediate need for the maintenance of a formal process. It is an attempt to develop a basis for ongoing interactions that can be of mutual benefit.

The model suggested here includes the necessity for identification of the relative field dependence or field independence of negotiators. While everyone has to begin with preconceived stereotypes or schemata that are made necessary by the human condition, it is clear that relatively field-dependent people need, and will actively seek, clues and inputs from their environment. Field-independent individuals, on the other hand, are much more dependent on their own internal frame of reference as they interact with others. No value judgments are implied here. However, it needs to be understood that if field-dependent people are involved in negotiation processes, they will be more open to their environment, while relatively field-independent individuals will be much less dependent upon their environment and more dependent on internal stimuli and processes as they try to "make sense" of their world.

What is being suggested is also a process that begins prior to the actual negotiations. Specific techniques should be allowed to evolve out of early interactions, as well as situational requirements and available human resources. Only then would it seem possible to create preconditions that may result in changing perceptions or expectations, which are deeply rooted in cultural or social backgrounds, while producing mutually acceptable and congruent behavior or results. This must be the first step, one which precedes any actual attempts to resolve specific problems.

The challenge to communication scholars and communication scientists, thus, is to *begin* their work, if it is to lead to effective negotiations, much earlier than has been done in the past. It appears that it is necessary to learn to identify relevant individual, social, or cultural components that should exist or to be developed prior to interpersonal communication situations intended to resolve conflicts, including negotiations. Such efforts require very different assumptions from those that have been used within the simpler reductionist-objectivist framework of the past. The approach suggested here requires the initial acceptance of complexity, and of a variety of possible approaches to negotiations, based on the available resources and

situations. It requires the ability to let specific conditions lead to discovering and developing techniques rather than approaching any given situation with a fixed, preconceived action model already in mind. It thus requires that time be allowed for developing relationships before problems are addressed.

Communication, and especially the negotiation process, does require some concern with situationally appropriate techniques. Just as important, however, must be an ongoing attempt to understand even more adequately those individual, cultural, and social preconditions that shape the total ecosystem in which human interactions, and thus communication, evolve. Only then can communication scholars hope to responsibly assist in the development of truly effective, efficient, and successful human negotiations and the resolution or management of conflicts. The processes involved in the development of effective communication sub or third cultures should be considered as being much more important than the application of culturally predetermined, manipulative techniques whose effective use would have to depend on an insistence that others, who may not be equally prepared for their use, accept their validity as well. The ethical implications of negotiation models based on domination or manipulation need to be considered carefully in a world that needs to establish sound bases for ever more complex interrelationships.

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Attitude Formation and International Conflict

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This chapter is an attempt to apply McGuire's Attitude Review to work summarized by Deutsch and others. The following topics are considered in the context of how to ease international conflict: periods of research on communication and attitude change, definition and structure of attitudes, hurdles that must be overcome before attitudes can change, and theories. Some of the dimensions on which conflicting parties might usefully be judged are: dominance, evaluation, task-orientedness, and integrative complexity. Dominance and negative-evaluation are independent in many contexts but may escalate together in dominant-negative spirals of conflict. Low integrative complexity is associated with crises between countries and with poor decision making. In principle, messages between national representatives may fail to overcome any or all of a dozen hurdles that may block (or distort) communication. Where communication does not get beyond the hurdles, international misperception in an escalating conflict may grow.

The present chapter represents an attempt to connect two rather comprehensive works: Deutsch's (1983, 1986) papers on "The malignant (spiral) process of hostile interaction" — which describe a variety of psychological processes in international conflict — and McGuire's (1985) definitive chapter on attitude research. Making this connection also permits the review of a variety of other relevant materials.

To start, consider two or more countries that might be in conflict (even if their relations have ordinarily been cooperative): the Soviet Union and the United States, for example, or various nations in the Middle East. Imagine that one of the parties, or its leaders, wished to take up one of Deutsch's first recommendations for avoiding spirals of hostility. This recommendation is that "only those military actions that increase the security of both sides

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should be taken; . . . actions that give military superiority to one side or the other should be avoided." Suppose furthermore that the leaders of the country duly prepared a variety of preliminary proposals and communications in keeping with such a goal. In the case of the West and the East, Deutsch gives various examples, among which are: regular cross-party meetings of military leaders and meetings of disarmament experts. In the case of East and West, at least some mutual awareness of the need for *joint* security already actually exists. In any case, using the example of a situation where one party is aiming to increase joint security, the question that the present review addresses is as follows: What hurdles would the party's messages and acts have to overcome in order to affect the attitudes of the other party or parties?

McGuire's synthesis of attitude work covers, among other matters (and in a rather different sequence): periods and input factors, definition and structure, output steps, and theories.

PERIODS OF RESEARCH

According to McGuire, there have been three 20-year phases of attitude research, with each successive phase separated by a fallow decade. The earliest phase (in the 1920s and 1930s) dealt with the measurement and scaling of public opinion. One still sees current papers devoted to documenting and analyzing opinion—for example, the attitudes of various groups of Arabs, Israelis, and others toward issues and parties in the Middle East (see Bibliographic Note).

Communication and attitude change, the subject of the second period (1950s and 1960s), focused on five elements, which McGuire preserves as "input factors": the source of a communication, the message, the medium, the receiver, and the party or subject of the message. To take just one element, source, as an example: attitude change is most effective if the source is seen as expert and trustworthy. Needless to say, the hypothetical party that is trying to build mutual security may find that its messages are viewed with suspicion by others, who may regard the effort as a devious ploy or a public relations maneuver. Two things are required in order to break out of what Deutsch and others call "vicious escalating spirals." De-escalation requires not only an impetus but also a means—for instance, careful diplomatic efforts to be seen as sincere, possibly including a third party to put the suggestions forward (see Zartman & Touval, 1985).

A Systems Approach

The present third phase of attitude research (1980s and projected for the 1990s) emphasizes a systems approach; tracing the effects of a number of

variables that may progressively interact with each other. This is in keeping with some of the dynamic work on international conflict and communication, some of which is described just under the heading "Integrative Complexity." As an example of the kind of question that can be considered using a systems approach: How can one avoid chains of negative simplistic communications?

Deutsch notes that competition elicits competition, that both East and West need to revise the caricature images that they hold of each other's ideologies, and that, according to Milburn, there are "mirror-image aspects in the views of leading Soviet and American analysts." Each side sees the other as monolithic, and those on the ideological right in both countries feel that those in the other country are obstinate, immutable, and untrustworthy in any negotiations. Each party may assume that others will appreciate its own benign intent and infer that others' defensive measures must have aggressive intent (Jervis, 1976).

Such views are consistent with, and indeed go beyond, the "fundamental error of attribution." Even in ordinary circumstances, more distant parties are perceived as being especially in control of their own behavior, with role and other constraints being minimized. ("If *they* are aggressive, it is because they want to be.") In the hypothetical example of a party putting forward sincere, mutually beneficial proposals, the difficulties of gaining acceptance may be magnified by the reciprocal mirror-image attribution of malevolence. ("Our weapons are obviously for our own defense; therefore, their escalation must surely be offensive, so we had better increase our defenses even more.")

Fortunately, reciprocation does not apply just to hostility. Matching of friendliness, too, has been well documented (see, for example, Sorokin, 1968; see also Lichbach & Gurr, 1981).

Reciprocation may be due to a long-term habit or to short-term refocusing. Perception and communication among adversaries may have both static and dynamic aspects. For instance, a static property can be manifest in baseline levels of typically negative, simplistic views and words. Dynamic properties would be reflected in day-to-day fine tuning of reciprocated levels of negativity and simplicity. An example of a systems approach (in research on communication and attitude change), which moreover demonstrates reciprocation, is provided in some recent work on integrative complexity.

Integrative Complexity

Matching can relate not only to amount of friendliness/unfriendliness but also to degree of *integrative complexity*, as Tetlock (1985) has carefully demonstrated. Integrative complexity has to do with whether a situation is

seen and judged simply according to a single standard or according to a variety of criteria. Tetlock found that the complexity of American and Soviet foreign policy statements is a function of other's and own recent complexity — among other variables.

For instance, American complexity today is predicted partly by American complexity last year, partly by Soviet complexity last year, and partly by other variables. Integrative complexity went up at times of cooperative successful negotiations and down during international conflict—that is, during own (and, in the case of American complexity, other's) interventions abroad. More things are taken into account when relations are good.

The complexity of published statements may reflect the parties' actual thinking or impression management or both. But whatever the motivation may be, the fine tuning of complexity in communication is itself clear enough.

In Tetlock's (1985) analyses, variables were entered in both original and time-lagged form, a procedure that is in keeping with a dynamic systems approach. Tetlock's work seems methodologically impeccable and, as he notes, raises as many questions as it answers. More variables are needed, for instance, and more parties than just the United States and the Soviet Union.

One uncertainty is whether the greater complexity that accompanies U.S.-USSR cooperation is associated with the cooperation itself or with cooperation being a less habitual activity (given that the two countries have typically been competitive in the period studied) or with both. A preliminary answer can be extracted from some passages from a recent year of the British parliamentary record—statements by government ministers with respect to British cooperation or sanctions toward various other countries. In some cases the other countries were nations that are typically seen as being "not friendly" toward Britain—and in other cases, friendly. These extracts were then scored by two independent raters for integrative complexity and other variables. The people who rated integrative complexity were different from the judges who provided the lists of countries regarded as friendly or not friendly.

Cooperative acts toward friendly countries were clearly more complex than dealings with nonfriends. Moreover, in contrast with Tetlock's (1985) results, complexity was (nonsignificantly) even lower for cooperative acts toward nonfriends than for uncooperative acts toward them. (The low-habit sample sizes were very small, though, compared with strong-habit ones; out of a total of 57 cases, none involved hostility toward friends and only 7 involved cooperation towards nonfriends.)

The data do indicate that high complexity can be associated with habitual activity—that is, cooperation with friendly others may be both habitual and complex. Moreover, cooperation with nonfriends need not be complex, as

it is in the case of (nonroutine) American-Soviet negotiations. Cooperation can be especially simple even in a nonhabitual context (between non-friends)—for instance, in routine matters such as humanitarian aid or a special anniversary.

Also, within a category, such as *conflict*, there may be individual differences in complexity. In fact this is implicit in Janis's (1985) work showing that, in crises, greater cognitive complexity accompanies better decisions—better for joint welfare as well as for the party concerned.

As Deutsch, too, notes, it is crucial that diverse views be deliberately taken into account (along with the full implications of one's own views—see, for example, Axelrod, 1976; also see Langer, Boshner, & Chanowitz, 1985). Citing Jervis (1976), Deutsch notes that simplistic distortions arise from processes toward self-consistency, and that, moreover, the excessive tension in conflict may itself lead to simplistic attitudes and may reduce the intellectual resources available for discovering new ways of coping with a problem—at a time when solutions are most desperately needed (see Holsti, 1983, pp. 405-406; Levy, 1983; and Smith, 1979; and see also the discussion of *misperception* below). Of course, integrative complexity in decision making is not the same thing as having a complex view of the other party. However, a complex view is one component of a complex decision, and it is plausible (but would need to be tested) that the complexity of various components of a decision would be positively correlated, at least in most contexts.

Unfortunately, because of the multidetermined nature of integrative complexity, it does not necessarily follow that injecting integrative complexity into parties' decision making will lead to better outcomes or longer-lasting solutions. The hypothesis is at least plausible, though, and merits further experimental testing.

As Gergen (1980) points out, the theories that validly account for social science data may vary across time and space. Theories about images among countries in conflict could easily be an example. For instance, integrative complexity could be of general importance, and its association with good decision making might be consistently positive. However, the details of how it relates to degree of conflict between unfriendly countries could vary. One could at least imagine a world in which countries in conflict took extra care to make good "complex" decisions. Indeed, as regards the determinants of complexity, Tetlock (1985) found broad similarities and specific differences (such as in degree of time lag) between the Soviet Union and the United States. In any event, the relations between these particular two countries are of sufficient international importance at present that it is well worth having available even findings that would differ for other nations.

The extent of potential variabilities are worth knowing. Time-bound findings are not strange in the study of international conflict, but it is

essential to remember that findings vary on a continuum from stable to shifting, and that neither seems to predominate. One needs at least to collect some fresh data before drawing conclusions about particular countries and periods.

Questions of generality apply to other findings to be discussed. So do matters of aggregation of views. For Tetlock's (1985) purposes, a nation's views were represented by statements from major representatives of its government. However, public opinions — the views of various groups either within or across national boundaries — may clearly differ from each other and from official policy. This observation brings us back to the question of how a hypothetical cooperative attempt would fare under certain conditions noted by McGuire.

Additional Considerations

In addition to summarizing the various periods of attitude research — with the present phase consisting of a systems approach — McGuire implies that it is only in four different historical centuries (periods of about 100 years) that communication and persuasion have had significant impact in shaping what might be called public policy in a significant part of the world. (The present period is within one of them, the others were Greek from 427 B.C., Roman, and Italian Renaissance.) It follows that, in building a "prediction model," the best ways to aggregate public opinion to predict the effects on national policy will, not surprisingly, differ across time and space. Moreover, the actual aggregation process — e.g., the procedure for electing a government — represents a particularly crucial matter to study in a variety of countries at present.

The hypothetical attempt at cooperation, among competing countries, could — if it really took place — be misinterpreted not only by other countries but also by the constituency in the home country, possibly eliciting domestic forces capable of counteracting its effects. For instance, a lobby might oppose the ratification of a treaty or there might even be opposition to cultural exchange. (Domestic forces include media as well as people and groups; see, for instance, Volgy & Schwarz, 1980.) In a systematic expansion of Tetlock's (1985) work on integrative complexity, one can imagine not only the inclusion of formal changes in administration, which are already among his variables, but also the addition of public attitude variables from various sectors within and across countries.

So far, this review has deliberately not provided definitions of *international conflict* nor of *attitude*. The next section briefly reconsiders *misperception* and *international conflict*, and then the chapter turns to the definition and structure of attitudes.

DEFINING MISPERCEPTION AND INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT

Misperception

Misperception can arise when excess tension reduces intellectual resources. The sequence has been described as follows:

In addition to distortions arising from pressures for self-consistency and dissonance reduction . . . , intensification of conflict may induce stress and tension beyond a moderate optimal level, and this overactivation, in turn, may lead to an impairment of perceptual and cognitive processes in several ways. It may reduce the range of perceived alternatives; it may reduce the time perspective in such a way as to cause a focus on the immediate rather than the overall consequences of the perceived alternatives; it may polarize thought so that percepts will tend to take on a simplistic black or white, for or against, good or evil cast; it may lead to stereotyped responses; it may increase the susceptibility to fear- or hope-inciting rumors; it may increase defensiveness; it may increase the pressures for social conformity. (Deutsch, 1983, p. 13)

How can these problems be remedied? Misjudgments and misperceptions may be reduced by "making explicit the assumptions and evidence [that] underlie one's perceptions and judgments," by bringing in outsiders or "devil's advocates" "to see whether their judgments and perceptions of the situation are in agreement . . . with one's own," and by making various agreements beforehand with one's adversary regarding continued contact and feedback which, in effect, "reduce the chances of malignant misjudgment and misperception during conflict" (Deutsch, 1983, *passim*).

Holsti (1983) points out typical attitude-related characteristics in perceiving international conflict: suspicion, issue escalation (such as an insignificant piece of territory taking on symbolic importance), feelings of urgency to make a decision, a perception of fewer alternative actions open to self than to enemy ("our government has no choice but to respond by military means"), seeing the crisis as a turning point that will somehow solve the problems between the conflicting parties, and exaggerated perceptions of being threatened. Smith's (1979) summary of various authors' work includes Stoessinger's conclusions that the six major wars in this century have been "caused by gross misperceptions" by elites in the countries that started the wars — and lost them. The gross misperceptions include distorted images of self, of adversary, of adversary's intentions, and of the power and security of each side (see Levy, 1983). Parties need to avoid misperceiving not only each other but also the payoff matrices of their situations (Plous, 1985,

1987). For other effective ways of dealing with misperceptions in conflict, see (among many others) Fogg (1985) and Kelman (1975).

International Conflict

For definitions of — and distinctions among — different forms of conflict, see, for example, Holsti (1983, chap. 15) and also Eberwein (1981). Misperception is, of course, only one of the possible contributory causes of conflict and war — and different causes may require different steps for peace (see Quester, 1982, and Singer, 1980).

It should be noted that material being rated for attitude-like dimensions can be: (a) very general, as in Tetlock's (1985) work, where almost any relevant passage can be scored for integrative complexity; (b) specific to the links among a party's cognitions, as in Axelrod's (1976) work on cognitive maps (where one pieces together the structure of a party's implicit views); or (c) specific to parties' impressions of each other (stated impressions can be used to obtain scores on evaluative or other dimensions).

Although this paper dwells on general principles rather than specific international conflicts, it remains crucially important that one be familiar with the rich circumstances of any particular conflicts of concern (see Cronbach, 1982). Subtle changes in an array of multiparty interactions can in principle have marked effects on incentives for cooperation (McGinnis, 1986). For a short, somewhat arbitrary list of papers that have emphasized attitudes or views regarding particular conflicts, see the Bibliographic Note. Sometimes the study of a particular conflict provides what may well be a general finding. For instance, in studying the 1914 international conflict, Holsti found "that the variation in perception of hostility among foreign policy leaders could be accounted for by their definitions of that situation" (Stebbins, 1986, p. 149).

The present chapter provides a general review of certain approaches to the study of communication in international conflict. However, the definition of *international conflict* — that is, how a paper is framed — can have a profound effect on what is covered. Smith (1979), citing Kohler and Alcock, notes that international structural violence attributable to deprivation, maldistribution of resources, and social inequities has caused more deaths than any projected (armed) violence short of an actual U.S.-USSR nuclear war. Like much research on international conflict itself, the present chapter does not deal with structural violence, but this is certainly not to say that it should be ignored! In addition to considering the explicit properties of misperception in international and internal conflict, parties attempting conciliation should be sensitive to hidden injustices and deal with them.

So far this chapter has considered attitude research in different periods and, in particular, has discussed work on integrative complexity in conflict situations as being an important example of the current systems approach. It then stepped back to consider the definition and analysis of *misperception* and of *international conflict*. It now turns to the definition of attitudes themselves and discusses how problems of definition might affect parties who are attempting to communicate with their potential adversaries.

DEFINITION AND STRUCTURE OF ATTITUDES

In considering how a communication may affect attitudes, one needs to know not only the content of a message but also the dimensions along which an attitude is likely to vary. Otherwise, it will be unclear how best to measure changes.

Attitudes has been defined in at least 500 ways, McGuire notes. He goes on to report that, after examining 200 multidefinitonal studies—that is, studies using more than one definition—he found that in 70% of those studies the different definitions were associated with different results! This is a sobering finding, and there is no obvious reason why international attitudes should be exempt from it. He concludes that there are substantial uncertainties even with a fairly noncontentious definition, namely that an *attitude* is a mediating process whereby objects of thought are located on dimensions of judgment. But what are the dimensions? For a full picture, one needs of course to read McGuire's chapter, but one feature is this: If one has a mixture of measures of feelings and behaviors toward an object (or a party), the correlations across modes are as great as those within modes. That is, attitudes are manifest as much in behavior as they are in expressed feelings. Thus the study of attitudes in international conflict could include all behavior related to international conflict.

Notwithstanding this, it has seemed sensible in the present chapter to dwell mainly on dimensions with a cognitive/emotional component. However, a purely evaluative dimension (positive and negative regard among parties) represents too narrow a focus. Integrative complexity has already been discussed. What other dimensions are probably worth considering? The work of Peabody and others seems to strike a good balance between completeness and parsimony.

Given the work of Peabody (1984; Peabody & Goldberg, 1986) on implicit personality-trait structures and of Hare, Kritzer, and Blumberg (1979) on social interaction, likely candidates for major independent dimensions are dominance, positive-negative evaluation, and the three dimensions (separately or in combination) of task-orientedness, unemotionality, and

conformity/authoritarianism. To evaluate these latter dimensions in an international context, the first challenge would probably be to get reliable ratings of various relevant entities on these dimensions.

Yet another property, intelligence/creativity, is typically taken as one or more separate dimensions—perhaps akin to integrative complexity. (However, creativity and complexity may sometimes go with low conformity/authoritarianism, and intelligence as such may be largely separate.)

It is not just parties and messages that can be rated on these dimensions but also, for instance, courses of action and elements in decision matrices.

Even reliable, valid ratings do not necessarily have a straightforward interpretation. For dominance or perceived dominance, in an international context, one kind of index would have to do with a country's power both in general and in comparison with specific adversaries. Some of the work in international conflict takes account of whether adversaries are, or are not, major powers. In the case of nonmajor powers, one needs to take account of international alliances and the power of allies. In one extreme case, if a minor entity is viewed as being heavily linked with a major power, both might be held in very similar regard and addressed accordingly by others. (See the brief discussion of multiparty arrangements, which follows the next paragraph.)

What ratings would one assign to the parties in a malignant spiral and what might be learned from such ratings? At present this is largely a matter of speculation, but the typical profile would probably be a curious one. It would appear that dominant/submissive and negative/positive—which vary independently in many interpersonal contexts—may escalate together in dominant-negative spirals of conflict. To look further along the list of dimensions, in most contexts, the tripartite task-serious-conforming characteristic would be expected to form one, two, or three largely independent traits (sometimes depending on how many factors an investigator extracts in a factor analysis). They might change together or separately. What one would not expect is for the middle part to flip over, so that task-emotional-conforming escalate together. Yet it would appear that this is what in fact may happen in an increasing conflict. The overall combination of dominant-negative-task-emotional-conforming may be particularly impervious to intervention, perhaps sometimes being associated with what Janis (1982) has called "groupthink." Much conflict research is, of course, concerned with augmenting adaptive outcomes by affecting one or more dimensions of the combination. The matter is complicated, not least because: (a) in forming national policies, actors', and sometimes raters', impressions are aggregated across events and people, and (b) the same behavior—and the same words—may be seen differently by actors, adversaries, and third-party audiences. However, the complexity is not so great as to preclude further study. The

number of independent dimensions typically remains small enough for mediators and researchers to pay some attention to all of them.

Multiparty Arrangements

Moore (1979; see also Moore & Heskin, 1983) has confirmed that triads tend to be balanced not only when the three parties are individual people (a finding previously established) but also when the parties are countries participating in international conflict. In five different conflicts studied, countries tended to polarize into two camps, with positive bonds within camps and negative bonds between them. According to other authors (for example Van de Vliert, 1981) the initiation or course of conflict may be affected when real-world balance fails to match cognitively consistent expectations—for example, when expected alliances fail to materialize or, alternatively, parties receive support from unexpected quarters.

Some existing intergroup research on balance deals with affective bonds. One might wonder about the real and perceived configurations for dimensions other than positive-negative, such as *dominance* (hierarchies within camps? any pattern between camps?), *task-social* (social activity within camps but rare between them, lest one “fraternize with the enemy”?), *serious-expressive* and *conforming-nonconforming* (same as for task-social?).

OUTPUT STAGES

Regardless of the dimensions one is mainly concerned with, an attitude will truly be changed only if 12 hurdles are crossed. The number 12 is slightly arbitrary and represents McGuire's expansion of an earlier 5-stage information-processing paradigm. One might imagine (or hope?) that perhaps only 2 or 3 of the hurdles would be particularly relevant in international conflict. Empirically this might indeed turn out to be the case, however in principle all 12 seem potentially important.

Recall the question of how a nation could communicate to its adversaries a desire for increased joint security. First of all, its messages would require exposure. Its views would have to be present in the environment of the other party or parties. Then the other party (the receiver) would have to pay attention, be interested, and understand the content. Receivers also have to form related cognitions—that is, code the proposals in a sensible way. They have to acquire skills regarding how they actually might implement the proposals, and they have to agree with the communication. Assuming that this much has taken place—in other words an incipient attitude change has

occurred — the new positions must be stored, retrieved, and used as a basis for making decisions and for actions. Finally, ongoing action must preserve and consolidate the new state, which (in the case of the example) is the newfound cooperation.

Sometimes progression through the stages can be very quick and out of sequence — for instance, the receiver might know or decide on long-term reactions even before the message is understood (McGuire, 1985, citing Zajonc and others). Also, of course, one may receive more communications (perhaps elicited by one's reaction to the earlier received communication) before the fuller effects of the first communication are clear.

The 12 stages are more than speculative hypotheses. Even with regard to large parties or an international context, the stages in a communication-processing path may be viewed as a checklist to represent as much a documented description as a theory. How might an effort toward cooperative security fare along this path? To take just one known source of misperception, Deutsch notes that an action or statement by one's competitor is likely to be seen as less favorable and benevolent than the same action if taken by self. How might this distortion affect the impact of a communication for cooperative effort? If one could not measure the effects at each of the 12 stages, then in the first instance perhaps one could take every third or fourth stage to see the extent to which the communication passes through each broad band.

Most research on attitude change measures the impact of particular real (or experimental) communications. With regard to international conflict, however — particularly in the present exercise — there is a need to speculate about the effects of missing messages. What might be the effects of possible efforts toward solidarity that have not necessarily taken place? Some of the communications that take place in periods of cooperative negotiations (in Tetlock's [1985] classification) may approximate such messages.

Table 4.1 summarizes some educated guesses (based largely on the present review and material, by McGuire and others, cited herein, particularly including work on cognitive consistency and attribution) about the possible effects of holding an exaggerated view of an adversary's malevolence. At almost every step it is at least plausible that the distorted perception would dampen the effects of the communication. In some cases, such as paying attention to a strong adversary, an exaggerated perception of malevolence might actually increase the effects but in a potentially counterproductive way. Times do change, however, and if parties learn to allow for distortion — perhaps in part via social science findings becoming part of a common lore — then misperception might diminish, and not only would communications become more positive but they also would be more likely to have their intended effect on attitudes.

TABLE 4.1 Possible Distortions in Amount of Attitude Change in Intended Direction: Plausible Effects of Exaggerated Malevolence

<i>McGuire's output step</i>	Is the step more or less likely to occur?	
	<i>Mild adversaries or different others</i>	<i>More extreme adversaries</i>
Exposure	?	Same or more likely (surveillance of other)
Attention	?	More likely
Liking, interest	?	Less liking, same or more interest
Understanding	Damped	More likely? (e.g., U.S. study of USSR) but with unintended values and linkages
Coding	Less likely (lacks referents)	More likely, but not as intended
Skills	Less likely (insufficient effort)	?
Agreement	Less likely	Much less likely
Storing/retrieval	(See right)	Physically same (formal records) but practical problem over successive government administra- tion possibly exacerbated by controversial content
Use for decisions	Less likely	Much less likely
Use for action	Less likely	Much less likely
Consolidation	(See right)	Possibly transient unless manifest in formal agreements or treaties

Curle (1986) provides discussion and examples of when and how a mediator may help in resolving malignant spirals by facilitating communication and accurate perception, among other things. As might often be the case with contemporary examples, some of his accounts are generalized in order to honor confidentiality. (See also, for example, work noted by White, 1986, p. 160.)

THEORIES

As if the mainly empirical contribution were not enough, McGuire also charts 16 classes of theories. They are not mutually exclusive nor necessar-

ily separated by sharp demarcations. Many researchers—including some in the field of international relations—devote years, or even decades, to work that falls mainly into 1 or 2 or 3 of the cells. This is not the place for a detailed review—McGuire provides that—but it is worth noting the four binary dimensions (or rather, dimensions rendered as binary) that generate the 16 cells. What are the possible implications for attitudes in international conflict?

Criteria for the first two dimensions relate to the presumed initiating force for people: (a) Are people striving toward stability or toward growth (*growth* being a more positive term than *conflict* or *change*)? and (b) Do they strive actively or reactively—that is, are the items on a party's agenda more self-initiated programs (searching for improvements) or mainly responses to external events (e.g., a coalition that disbands after a disaster has been averted)? Consistency theories, for instance, imply active stability, whereas a utilitarian problem-solving approach indicates reactive growth. The remaining two criteria relate to whether goals are cognitive or affective/emotional, and whether they are internal (to the individual or party) or concern external reality. For example, most consistency and problem-solving theories emphasize internal cognitions, but contagion theories (e.g., social facilitation) work in an affective external/reality domain—one can actually observe the enthusiastic spread of some behaviors.

Quite simply, theories in all of the cells could relate to attitude formation in international conflict. The cells could become a checklist of driving forces worthy of attention.

Utility models, if broadly based, apparently transcend cell boundaries (see, for example, Bueno de Mesquita, 1985; Harrison & McCallum, 1983; Kelley, 1984). Tetlock's (1985) work on integrative complexity crosses cell boundaries in the sense that he includes variables such as the presence of conflict or of cooperative negotiation (which relate to both stability and growth) and he uses both internal and external inputs (complexity of previous own and other's communications).

Deutsch's malignant spiral process also seems to cover more than one cell, dealing both with reactive emotional stability and with active cognitive processes (which moreover affect external reality). The "malignant spiral" itself seems, on balance, to emphasize emotional reactive efforts directed, ironically, toward stability in parties' thoughts/cognitions and feelings/emotions. The solutions to the malignant process appear to relate mainly to active (and some reactive) growth. However, mutual security has to do with stability as well as with growth. Moreover, one of the main goals is external as well as cognitive—improved thinking and feeling in an interactive real world.

BIBLIOGRAPHIC NOTE

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As regards the psychology of peace and of preventing nuclear war, White (1986) has collected major contributions of social scientists, and Wollman (1985) has edited a practical handbook (see also, Fiske, 1987). Sears (1987) gives an overview of research in political psychology, including communication in international conflict.

See Whiteside (1984) for an excellent review of bibliographic sources, which can be used for ongoing research on attitudes related to international conflict. (See also, for example, Appendix A of Coplin, 1980.)

The present topic is comparatively difficult to research because relevant materials, even if defined narrowly, are located in most indexes under diverse subject headings. In addition to checking items that had been recommended to me personally, or which I had come across in other contexts, I consulted runs of particular journals and various abstracts and indexes for 1980 to 1985/87 (earlier than that in the case of *Psychological Abstracts* and *American Political Science Documents*). Sources were consulted in hard-copy or on-line versions under the multiple presence of the following (or various other) terms: *attitude/view*, *(inter)nation*, *conflict/war*. The following sources were checked (searching for the key words in subject indexes, title, and/or abstract text): *Peace Research Abstracts Journal*, *Psychological Abstracts*, *Social Sciences Citation Index* and other sources noted by Whiteside (1984) (especially *International Political Science Abstracts* [Paris] and *ABC POL SCI*).

For more detailed information on specific countries — or for topics with a focus different from the present one — the aforementioned sources could, of course, be rechecked. Also, the *National Union Catalog* subject indexes show about 1900 apparently relevant or marginally relevant books and other monographs (for 1980-1986) under headings beginning with the words *atomic*, *disarmament*, *nuclear*, and *peace*. However, to check these systematically was beyond the scope of the present search.

Items Relating to Specific Countries

The Middle East is even more heavily represented in the following list than one might expect, for reasons which are not clear to me, apart from traditions of research. The following list represents a brief, somewhat arbitrary selection of items which appear, in whole or large part, especially to bear on attitudes in particular international contexts. This list is meant simply as a sampler of specific work.

Middle East: Amir, Ben Ari, Bizman, and Rivner, 1982; Aronson, 1979; Assadi, 1982; de Boer, 1983; Dutter and Seliktar, 1979; Goldmann, 1975; Inbar and Yuchtman-Yaar, 1985; Kaplowitz, 1976, 1982; Lewis, 1979; Lipset, 1978; Nakhleh, 1975; Seliktar, 1984; Whetten, 1978.

U.S.-Soviet: Bialer, 1985; Feshbach and White, 1986; Herrmann, 1985a, 1985b; White, 1984.

Other: Bert, 1975; Cottam, 1985; Dutter, 1985; Farrar, 1983 (article deals with various European countries); Fisher, 1980; Lall, 1981; Levi and Tetlock, 1980; Listhaug, 1986; Loh, 1975; McAllister and Rose, 1983; Starr and Most, 1983; Urquhart, 1987 (details of the roles of the United Nations in a variety of settings); Veblen and Bigler, 1976.

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II

FRAMEWORKS AND APPLICATIONS TO INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATION FOR PEACE

Intergroup Diplomatic Communication A Face-Negotiation Perspective

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This chapter explicates a model of diplomatic face-negotiation. Specifically, face-negotiation maintenance is viewed as including two processes: face-threatening and face-honoring. Factors that influence the face-threatening and face-honoring processes are discussed, and the face-negotiation perspective is applied to the analysis of an international conflict case study: the Cuban missile crisis.

Intergroup diplomatic communication is a natural by-product of the highly interdependent nature of today's world communities. Guided by a mixed-motive orientation, intergroup diplomacy takes on additional significance and intricacies in the arena of world politics. According to Cioffi-Revilla (1979), *diplomacy* is defined as the "conduct of foreign relations by means of political actions, whether verbal or physical, [and it] is an important form of communication among actors [or actresses] in the international system" (p. 209). Commenting on the concept of intergroup diplomatic communication, Gudykunst (1990) elaborates: "Diplomats are individuals who represent their nation in interactions with representatives of other nations. All diplomatic interactions, therefore, involve both intergroup and interpersonal processes. They are intergroup in that the diplomats are representing a group (i.e., their nation). The degree of interpersonal salience varies across diplomatic interactions depending upon the channel of communication used and the relationship between the diplomats involved."

This chapter is concerned with explaining intergroup diplomatic communication (i.e., interaction between diplomats who represent their respective groups) from a *face-negotiation* perspective. The emphasis of the chapter will be on explicating a model of diplomatic face-negotiation (see Gudykunst, 1990, for a discussion of the intergroup factors of diplomatic negotiation). Overall, this chapter argues that the need for basic *face-main-*

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tenance, that of keeping a civilized front or image in order to achieve a minimum level of effective social functioning, serves as one of the critical motivational bases for why diplomats engage in different face-negotiation maneuvers. As Brown (1977) pointed out insightfully:

Among the most troublesome kinds of problems that arise in negotiation are the intangible issues related to loss of face. In some instances, protecting against loss of face becomes so central an issue that it swamps the importance of the tangible issues at stake and generates intense conflicts that can impede progress toward agreement and increase substantially the costs of conflict resolution. (p. 275)

Diplomatic negotiation is a multifaceted, multilayered, multilateral process between two or more parties that represent the interests of their respective constituencies. While the discussion of tangible issues such as territorial rights, boundaries, and tangible scarce resources represents the substantive level of verbal, or written, diplomatic exchange, intangible issues such as national reputation, status, pride, honor, power, dignity, and face often reflect the hidden dimensions of the overt negotiation process (see, for example, the work of Alexandroff, 1981; Brown, 1977; Cohen, 1987a, 1987b; Fisher, 1980; Rubin, 1980; and Schelling, 1960). These hidden dimensions sometimes assert a stronger sociopolitical influence on the negotiation table than does the discussion of the tangible issues. The subtle face-negotiation proposals and concessions of international diplomacy are oftentimes critical in the attainment of peace or, conversely, in the inducement to war.

Overall, the purpose of this chapter is twofold: (a) to develop a face-negotiation perspective concerning intergroup diplomatic communication, and (b) to apply the perspective toward an understanding of the specific diplomatic interchanges in the Cuban missile crisis.

A FACE-NEGOTIATION PERSPECTIVE

In analyzing the logic of international diplomacy, Alexandroff (1981) classifies existing research into three camps: the historical approach, the social science approaches, and major quantitative projects on diplomacy. The face-negotiation perspective can be viewed as a social science (or sociopsychological communication) approach in examining the patterns of international diplomacy.

Face, in the context of the face-negotiation perspective, is defined generally as the projected image of one's self (or one's national identity or image)

in a public negotiation situation. More specifically, face is conceptualized as the interaction between the degree of threats or considerations one party offers to another party, and the degree of claim for a sense of self-respect (or demand for respect toward one's national image) put forth by the other party in a given situation (Brown, 1977; Brown & Levinson, 1978, 1987; Goffman, 1955, 1967; Ho, 1976; Hu, 1944; Katriel, 1986; Lim, 1988; Ting-Toomey, 1985, 1988; Yutang, 1968).

Recently, Ting-Toomey (1988) developed a face-negotiation theory to account for conflict style differences and similarities across a set of individualistic and collectivistic cultures. In a nutshell, the face-negotiation theory assumes that: (a) members in all cultures try to maintain and negotiate face in all communication situations; (b) the concept of face is especially problematic in uncertainty situations when the situated identities of the interactants are called into question; (c) conflict, as a class of uncertainty situations, demands active face-work management by both conflict parties; (d) conflict parties, in a conflict situation, will engage in two types of face-work management: self-face concern and mutual-face concern, and negative-face maintenance (control need) and positive-face maintenance (affiliative-inclusion need); and (e) the cultural variability dimension of individualism-collectivism will influence members' selection of one set of conflict styles (such as avoidance style and obliging style) over others (such as confrontational style and solution-oriented style). Based on the dimensions of self-face concern and mutual-face concern, and negative-face maintenance and positive-face maintenance, 12 theoretical propositions were developed to account for the relationship between cultural variability and conflict styles (see Table 5.1 for a summary of the theory).

While Ting-Toomey's (1988) basic assumptions of face-negotiation theory establish the preconditions for conflict face-management, Brown's (1977) face-saving model appears to complement Ting-Toomey's theory on a macro level of analysis concerning international conflicts and negotiation processes. The five critical points (out of seven) of his model are summarized as follows:

- (1) Face-maintenance motives are commonplace in negotiation . . . ; (2) Threats to face may be experienced as a result of a variety of events occurring in negotiation; (3) Face-saving and face-restoration efforts may take a variety of different forms, including verbal and larger-scale actions; (4) Face-saving and face-restoration efforts may be regulated by: (a) the behavior of the opposing party and the involvement of other salient referents, such as constituencies and other types of audiences; [and] (b) the availability of appropriate mechanisms and the costs of using them for these purposes; (5) A wide range of salient referents may become "targets" of face-maintenance efforts. (Brown, 1977, p. 295)

TABLE 5.1 A Summary of Ting-Toomey's (1988) Theory

Propositions

1. Members of individualistic cultures would tend to express a greater degree of self-face maintenance in a conflict situation than members of collectivistic cultures.
2. Members of collectivistic cultures would tend to express a greater degree of mutual-face or other-face maintenance than members of individualistic cultures.
3. Members of individualistic cultures would tend to use more autonomy-preserving strategies (negative-face need) in managing conflict than members of collectivistic cultures.
4. Members of collectivistic cultures would tend to use more approval-seeking strategies (positive-face need) in managing conflict than members of individualistic cultures.
5. Members of individualistic cultures would tend to use more self-concern positive-face and self-concern negative-face suprastrategies than members of collectivistic cultures.
6. Members of collectivistic cultures would tend to use more other-concern positive-face and other-concern negative-face suprastrategies than members of individualistic cultures.
7. Members of individualistic cultures would tend to use a greater degree of direct face-negotiation strategies than members of collectivistic cultures.
8. Members of collectivistic cultures would tend to use a greater degree of indirect face-negotiation strategies than members of individualistic cultures.
9. Members of individualistic cultures would tend to use more dominating or controlling strategies to manage conflict than members of collectivistic cultures.
10. Members of collectivistic cultures would tend to use more obliging or smoothing strategies to manage conflict than members of individualistic cultures.
11. Members of individualistic cultures would use a greater degree of solution-oriented conflict style than members of collectivistic cultures.
12. Members of collectivistic cultures would use a greater degree of avoidance-oriented conflict style than members of individualistic cultures.

The construct *face-maintenance* refers to "the desire to project an image of capability and strength, or conversely to avoid projecting an image of incapability, weakness, or foolishness," and furthermore, "[face-maintenance] is a culturally induced motive that is heightened by threats to face, and that such threats are likely to result in attempts to either save or restore lost face" (Brown, 1977, p. 276). The rest of Brown's model details the fundamental reasons for face-maintenance in negotiation. He argues that face enters as a salient bargaining feature in historical cases such as the 1951 Korean cease-fire negotiations at Kaesong and Panmunjom, the 1972 Paris-Vietnam peace talks, and the continuing Middle East truce negotiations (p. 276). Cohen (1987b) also argues convincingly that intangible resources such as power and face and different low-context and high-context communication styles affect Egyptian-American diplomatic relations. Cross-cultural ethnographic work (e.g., Katriel, 1986; Yang, 1945); discourse analytic work (e.g., Blum-Kulka & Olshtain, 1984; Brown & Levinson, 1987;

Matsumoto, 1988; Scollon & Scollon, 1981); psychological experimental work (e.g., Brown, 1970; Modigliani, 1971; Rubin & Brown, 1975); and international-intercultural work (e.g., Cohen, 1987a; Triandis, Brislin, & Hui, 1988) provide strong interpretive and empirical evidence that the construct of *face* has both universal and cultural variability dimensions.

A close examination of the seminal work by Brown (1977) and Rubin and Brown (1975) on face-maintenance in negotiation indicates that the construct *face-maintenance* is cast primarily as an offensive-defensive basis for action. Their key proposition states: "When a bargainer perceives a contending other to be unjustly demanding, resistant, or punishing (either as a result of excessive demands, insufficient concessions, or inhibiting movement toward what he [or she] considers to be his [or her] proper share of available outcomes), intangible issues related to the anticipated or actual loss of honor, public image, face, and self-esteem are likely to emerge" (Rubin & Brown, 1975, p. 132). Two possible types of action constitute the basic *face-threatening process*: face-saving and face-restoration. *Face-saving*, for Brown (1977), refers to "*anticipating and preventive [actions]. [italics added]*". It is thus future-oriented and offensive. It reflects actions designed to hide, soften, ward off, prevent, or block the future disclosure of information and to control the occurrence of future events that one expects will foster an appearance of weakness or vulnerability, particularly when it is presumed that such events will impair one's image or the image of those whom one represents" (pp. 278-279). Conversely, *face-restoration* is designed to "repair damaged or lost face. It is post facto; it occurs in response to events that have already transpired. Thus, it is past-oriented and defensive. It reflects actions designed to reestablish or reassert one's capability and/or strength after one feels they have been damaged" (Brown, 1977, p. 281).

While Brown's (1977) face-saving model provides numerous fruitful insights into the intricate process of diplomatic communication, the model tends to emphasize the negative or the defensive aspects of negotiation to the exclusion of the more positive aspects of face-negotiation, namely, the *face-honoring* aspect of negotiation. While the face-saving or face-threatening model is reflective of a high self-face concern and a low other-face concern perspective, the face-honoring process is reflective of a mutual-face concern attitude. Since political negotiation contains multifaceted kaleidoscopic bargaining activities, the bargaining process itself oftentimes swings dialectically from a high self-face defensive mode to a high mutual-face-honoring mode, and vice versa. Moreover, a mutual-face-honoring mode may be used in conjunction with other-face-threatening strategies, and a self-face defensive mode may accompany mutual-face-giving behaviors. International diplomatic cases such as the Sino-British Hong Kong case, the Middle East peace talks, the Camp David accords, and, finally, the Cuban

missile crisis serve as examples of the dualistic tensions that oftentimes coexist in international-intercultural negotiation processes.

Overall, the *face-honoring process* can be defined as (a) when one or both negotiating parties perceive the contending other as making overt, positive overtures to respect, validate, or honor the face or image that the other party represents, and (b) the process contains actions or concessions that are equitable (the implicit distributive justice norm) in the eyes of the negotiation parties who are serving as representatives of their respective constituencies. After analyzing 20 international dispute cases, Leng and Wheeler (1979) concluded that: "the effectiveness of the [influence strategies] approach has a lot to do with the role played by reciprocity as a norm of equitable exchange in international politics and human relations generally, and the face-saving [and face-giving] component(s) of a properly timed unilateral [and/or bilateral] concession" (p. 681). The "firm-but-fair" approach (Leng & Wheeler, 1979) or the "firm-but-cooperative-and-conciliatory" approach (Kaplowitz, 1984) reflect the underlying tenor of the face-honoring process.

In fact, according to Baroja (1966), the word *honor*—*honos, honoris*—has "many meanings in classical Latin. It is associated with the ideas of respect, esteem, and prestige, and connected with the existence of public dignities and offices, and with rewards, ornaments, and clothes [that] elevate their bearer above the rest of the community" (pp. 82-32). To honor someone's face is to validate and respect his or her claim for a sense of self-respect or pride in a public negotiation situation. To honor someone's face also means not to back the opponent into a corner without leaving him or her room to recover or restore any sense of face loss. The face-honoring process, of course, also entails cultural-universal and cultural-specific dimensions. As Peristiany (1966), in commenting on the values of honor and shame in all cultures, summarizes:

All societies have rules of conduct, indeed the terms *society* and *social regulations* are coterminous. All societies sanction their rules of conduct. . . . Honour and shame are social evaluations and thus participate of the nature of social sanctions. Honour and shame are two poles of an evaluation. They are the reflection of the social personality in the mirror of social ideals. (p. 9)

Pitt-Rivers (1966), in commenting on the cultural-specific characteristics of honor, argues convincingly:

The notion of honour is something more than a means of expressing approval or disapproval. It possesses a general structure [that] is seen in the institutions and customary evaluations which are particular to a given culture. We might

liken it to the concept of magic in the sense that, while its principles can be detected anywhere, they are clothed in conceptions [that] are not exactly equivalent from one place to another. (p. 21)

The face-honoring process and the face-threatening process go hand-in-hand with one another. While face-threatening actions may trigger international crisis, chaos, and conflicts, it takes face-honoring activities to de-escalate and diffuse the intense conflict situations.

Two possible types of action can be derived from this face-honoring process: face-assertion and face-giving. While *face-assertion acts* refer to the honorable level of declaration in terms of what one wants and what one is willing to concede with respect to mutual-face concern, *face-giving acts* refer to verbal or diplomatic actions of enhancing the target's claim for a sense of self-respect or image, especially in the eyes of salient referents and in the context of national face. The ongoing analysis, thus, extends Brown's (1977) face-saving model in two directions: (a) viewing diplomatic communication as entailing both face-threatening and face-honoring processes; and (b) seeing that the face-honoring process consists of two possible components: face-assertion acts and face-giving acts. Figure 5.1 illustrates the newly developed framework of face-negotiation in diplomatic communication.

Cultural variability factors, *situational* factors, *interaction event constraint* factors, *personality* factors, and the *perceived and actual communication exchanges* between the intergroup negotiators all work simultaneously to influence the face-negotiation process. Cultural variability dimensions such as individualism-collectivism and low-context and high-context influence the focus of attention negotiators give to the face-threatening or face-honoring processes (Cohen, 1987a, 1987b; Ting-Toomey, 1985, 1988). For example, while negotiators from individualistic cultures may tend to engage in more face-threatening exchanges than face-honoring exchanges, negotiators from collectivistic cultures may be more likely to engage in relatively more face-honoring proposals and counterproposals than face-threatening devices. The concept of *honorable reciprocity* also varies from one set of cultures to the next. Further, while diplomats of low-context cultures may tend to engage in more direct verbal demands and blunt refusals, diplomats of high-context cultures may tend to engage in more indirect verbal requests and hedging behaviors (Hall, 1983; Ting-Toomey, 1985). In addition, the relative power base of the two nations' cultures and the degree of third-party support may assert a strong influence on the international bargaining process.

Situationally, the normative rules and the normative expectations of the situation would also have a decisive influence on how negotiators carry out



FIGURE 5.1: A framework of face-maintenance on diplomatic communication.

their diplomatic relations in the international arena. The diplomats in an intergroup negotiation situation have to worry about three types of face-presentation in an international/bargaining situation. These three types of face-presentation are: first, the diplomat's own face in the context (or eyes) of his or her own constituency, group, or nation; secondly, the national face that the diplomat represents in relationship to the contending other; and, finally, the national face that he or she gains or loses in the context of world politics. At each level, intergroup negotiators can learn to threaten or honor the opponent's face, the national face, or, with global implication, the international face of a country (particularly in reference to first world, second world, or third world perceptions). In addition, the working environment of the diplomats will assert a critical influence on the diplomatic negotiation process (Fisher, 1989).

Interaction event constraint factors, which include time-space constraints, perceptual constraints, language signal constraints, and available cost-and-reward constraints will also impact the success or failure of the negotiation event. The timing of an honorable reciprocity exchange, the salience of accurate calculations or miscalculations, and the critical role of precise meaning-equivalent message translation will frame the context of effective or ineffective negotiation process. In particular, when Brown (1977) discusses the face-threatening process, he proposes that three kinds of costs (evaluation costs, status costs, and vulnerability costs) enter into the equation as regulators of a threat response event. *Evaluation costs* refer to the "image losses that a negotiator supposes he [or she] may incur in the eyes of a salient referent as a result of engaging in specific actions" (Brown, 1977, p. 289). *Status costs* refer to the degree to which "a negotiator's actions (or inactions) may place him [or her] in a position of inferiority to the opposing party" (p. 290). Finally, *vulnerability costs* refer to the "risk that one's own

actions may elicit damaging responses from the opposing party or may have other adverse consequences" (p. 291).

Costs are constantly being assessed and reevaluated in terms of the "monitoring and feedback functions" of salient referents in the negotiation process (Brown, 1977, p. 289). Extending these three concepts into the face-honoring process of international diplomacy, it can be predicted that patterns of a face-threatening process will transform into a face-honoring process when: (a) the estimated rewards of image or credibility gain in the eyes of the salient referents outweigh the evaluation costs; (b) the positional rewards of the group or nation outweigh the status costs; and (c) the vulnerability costs (e.g., nuclear war) are extremely high for either one or both parties, and/or that (d) the reward of honoring the opponent's request for certain concessions is met equally (symmetrical or homeomorphic reciprocity) or equivalently (parallel or heteromorphic reciprocity) by similar resource or concession exchanges (see the work of Gouldner on reciprocity, 1960).

Finally, both personality factors and the perceived/actual communication factors also assert a strong influence on the intergroup communication process. The individuals' level of tolerance for face-threat or the demand for face-respect, their threshold level for ambiguity versus closure, the perceptive accuracy or miscalculation of the reward-cost alternative mixed formula (see, for example, the work of Jervis, 1976) by the diplomats, and the different international negotiation styles (see, for example, the work of Fisher, 1980) of the diplomats — all contribute to the tapestries of intergroup face-negotiation bargaining processes.

In summary, this section has: (a) presented a framework of basic face-maintenance in diplomatic communication, (b) identified some of the general factors that influence the diplomatic face-negotiation process, and (c) isolated four key conditions that move the face-threatening process to a face-honoring process. In one sense, verbal or military acts of face-saving, face-defending, face-restoration, face-assertion, and face-giving are all interlocked in a contingent-response framework. When a nation or a representative of a nation threatens the face of another nation, it activates the spiraling process of face-saving and face-giving behavior. If the negotiators are busy defending their own rights and their own (or national) pride, then self-concern face-saving and face-restoration orientation will be the predominant mode of diplomatic exchange. If the negotiators assume a mutual-concern bilateral attitude, then face-assertion and face-giving will be the predominant mode of exchange. Face-threatening induces face-threatening acts, while "honour felt becomes honour claimed and honour claimed becomes honour paid" (Pitt-Rivers, 1966, p. 22).

In the following section, the face-negotiation framework is applied to an analysis of an international case study, the Cuban missile crisis. The reasons for selecting the Cuban missile crisis for analysis were as follows: (a) the case represents an intensive conflict situation with clear temporal boundaries (it lasted 13 days), (b) public information is readily available on the case, and (c) the key players of the case actually used the word *face* (or equivalent terms) to interpret the critical events of the crisis. Resources about the case are drawn from Robert Kennedy's (1969) *Thirteen Days: A Memoir of the Cuban Missile Crisis*; Nikita Khrushchev's (1970) *Khrushchev Remembers*; the 1987 Harvard University Conference on the Cuban missile crisis (Garthoff, 1988); Anatolii Gromyko's (1973) *Through Russian Eyes: President Kennedy's 1036 Days*; and William Medland's (1988) *The Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962: Needless or Necessary*.

APPLICATION OF THE FACE-NEGOTIATION PERSPECTIVE

The Cuban Missile Crisis

The Cuban missile crisis serves as an excellent case-study example in which two superpowers, the Soviet Union and the United States, came close to nuclear holocaust in the span of 13 days of diplomatic negotiations. In that 13-day period, negotiations involved the discussion of both tangible and intangible resource exchange. *Face*, one of the elusive, intangible resources, was actively being negotiated among the diplomats who represented the Soviet Union and the United States. In order to facilitate a coherent analysis of the crisis, a synopsis of the crisis will be presented here.

On October 16 (Tuesday), 1962, U.S. intelligence photos showed compelling evidence that Soviet nuclear missiles were being installed in Cuba. President John F. Kennedy convened a group of high-ranking government officials, to be called the Executive Committee of the National Security Council (ExComm) for a special meeting. ExComm was charged to come up with a set of specific recommendations to manage the crisis constructively. Almost from the beginning, members of ExComm fell into three main categories: the hawks (the invaders), the doves (the traders), and the owls (the persuaders) (Blight, Nye, & Welch, 1987). The primary U.S. diplomatic representatives included Robert Kennedy, the U.S. Attorney General, and Robert McNamara, the U.S. Secretary of Defense. The chief Soviet diplomatic players included Andrei Gromyko, the Soviet foreign minister; Anatoly Dobrynin, the Soviet ambassador to the United States; and Aleksandr Fomin, a Soviet embassy counselor.

On October 17 (Wednesday), the Joint Chiefs of Staff (the hawk group) were unanimous in calling for an immediate military attack on Cuba. Robert

McNamara and others (the owl group) called for a naval blockade of Cuba on the grounds that it allowed for a flexible response and would not result in thousands of deaths of Cuban civilians. On October 18 (Thursday), President Kennedy met with Andrei Gromyko, who was accompanied by Anatoly Dobrynin—a meeting that had been scheduled prior to knowledge of the missiles. Gromyko assured President Kennedy that the assistance being provided to Cuba “pursued solely the purpose of contributing to the defense capabilities of Cuba” and he emphasized that the “Soviet Union would never become involved in rendering such [offensive military] assistance to Cuba” (cited in Medland, 1988, p. 6). On October 20 (Saturday), ExComm reconvened and presented President Kennedy with three recommendations: (a) attack Cuba, (b) remove U.S. missiles from Turkey and Italy in exchange for a removal of missiles from Cuba, or (c) form a 500-mile naval blockade around Cuba. President Kennedy opted for a blockade as the initial course of action.

On October 22 (Monday), President Kennedy went on national television to announce the crisis and the blockade plan. The president addressed the nation:

Good evening, my fellow citizens. . . . Within the past week unmistakable evidence has established the fact that a series of offensive missile sites is now in preparation on that imprisoned island . . . But this secret, swift, and extraordinary build-up of Communist missiles . . . for the first time outside of Soviet soil . . . is a deliberately provocative and unjustified change in the status quo which cannot be accepted by this country if our courage and our commitments are ever to be trusted again by either friend or foe.

We will not prematurely or unnecessarily risk the costs of worldwide nuclear war in which even the fruits of victory would be ashes in our mouth—but neither will we shrink from that risk at any time it must be faced. (cited in Medland, 1988, p. 10)

On October 23 (Tuesday), members of the Organization of American States (OAS) unanimously supported the president's recommendation for a quarantine (a milder word for blockade) of Cuba. On the same day, the president composed a letter to Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev, asking him to comply and observe the legally established vote of the OAS for naval quarantine. On October 24 (Wednesday), the blockade went into effect while several Soviet ships kept moving closer to the area, and Soviet submarines were detected in nearby waters. On October 25 (Thursday), new information indicated that the Soviets were working to expedite the construction of their missile sites to operational status.

On October 26, (Friday), the *Marucla*, an international ship under Soviet charter, was stopped and searched by U.S. military personnel. No weapons

were found. Meanwhile, the president ordered the Department of State to proceed with invasion preparations. On the same day, Khrushchev's first official letter arrived in Washington. The letter acknowledged that nuclear missiles were installed in Cuba and that if the United States would not invade Cuba, the Soviets would withdraw or destroy the missiles. The translated letter to the president stated:

If assurances were given by the President . . . that the USA itself would not participate in an attack on Cuba . . . [and] if you would recall your fleet, [then] this would immediately change everything . . . Let us therefore show statesmanship wisdom. I propose: we, for our part, will declare that our ships, bound for Cuba, will not carry any kind of armaments. You would declare that the United States will not invade Cuba . . . Mr. President, we and you ought not to pull on the ends of the rope in which you have tied the knot of war, because the more the two of us pull, the tighter that knot will be tied. And a moment may come when that knot will be tied so tight that even he who tied it will not have the strength to untie it, and then it will be necessary to cut that knot. (cited in Medland, 1988, p. 23)

On the same evening, John Sali, an ABC news correspondent, was contacted by Aleksandr Fomin, a Soviet embassy counselor. A Soviet deal was offered: "The Soviets would remove the missiles from Cuba under U.N. inspection in exchange for a public U.S. commitment not to invade Cuba" (Garthoff, 1988, pp. 70-71). The message was quickly relayed to Dean Rusk and the president. The president responded positively.

On October 27 (Saturday), however, the hope for peace was shattered as Khrushchev's second official letter arrived. The letter "raised the stakes by also demanding the dismantling of the U.S. intermediate-range missiles in Turkey. Meanwhile, one of the Soviet ships, the tanker *Grozny*, resumed movement toward the blockade site. Almost immediately, more bad news followed: An American U-2 reconnaissance airplane had been shot down over Cuba" (Garthoff, 1988, p. 71). On the advice of Robert Kennedy, President Kennedy purposefully ignored Khrushchev's second letter and responded to his first letter. It was then suggested that the United States should respond to Khrushchev's offer of October 26, and to trade Cuban missiles for a guarantee that the United States would not invade Cuba. At 7:45 p.m. the same day, Robert Kennedy told Dobrynin that "the United States would pledge publicly not to invade Cuba if the Soviets would pledge publicly to begin withdrawing the missiles immediately. He also said privately that U.S. missiles were going to come out of Turkey, in any event" (Blight et al., 1987, p. 178). As Robert Kennedy wrote: "I was not giving them an ultimatum but a statement of fact" (Kennedy, 1969, p. 108). On October 28 (Sunday), the Soviets agreed to withdraw the missiles under

U.N. supervision if the United States would not invade Cuba. Khrushchev's letter to President Kennedy stated:

I regard with respect and trust the statement you made in your message of October 27, 1962, that there would be no attack, no invasion, of Cuba—not only on part of the United States, but also on the part of other nations of the Western Hemisphere as you said in your message. Then the motives which induced us to render assistance of such a kind to Cuba disappear. (cited in Medland, 1988, p. 28)

The nuclear crisis essentially came to a halt and temporary peace was restored. For an in-depth Soviet perspective on the Cuban missile crisis, see Gromyko (1973), Khrushchev (1970), and Medland (1988).

A Case-Study Analysis

Robert Kennedy, in his book *Thirteen Days: A Memoir of the Cuban Missile Crisis*, summarized as follows:

Neither side wanted war over Cuba, we agreed, but it was possible that either side could take a step that—for reasons of “security” or “pride” or “face” [italics added]—would require a response by the other side, which, in turn, for the same reasons of security, pride, or face, would bring about a counterresponse and eventually an escalation into armed conflict. (Kennedy, 1969, p. 62)

Khrushchev, the Soviet leader, in reminiscing about the Cuban missile crisis, reflected:

The fate of Cuba and the maintenance of Soviet *prestige* [italics added] in that part of the world preoccupied me even when I was busy conducting the affairs of state in Moscow and traveling to the other fraternal countries. While I was on an official visit to Bulgaria, for instance, the thought kept hammering away at my brain: what will happen if we lose Cuba? . . . It would gravely diminish our *stature* [italics added] throughout the world, but especially in Latin America. If Cuba fell, other Latin American countries would reject us, claiming that for all our might the Soviet Union hadn't been able to do anything for Cuba except to make empty protests to the United Nations. We had to think up some way of confronting America with more than words. (Khrushchev, 1970, p. 493)

While Robert Kennedy's summary clearly pointed out that the construct of *face-maintenance* played a critical role in the Cuban missile crisis, Khrushchev's memoir uncovers the motivational basis for why the Soviet

Union decided to install missiles in Cuba: that of maintaining national and international "face," "prestige," or "stature" in the Caribbean area. Hence, this intangible resource undergirds the tangible resource of "effective deterrent to American interference in the Caribbean" (Khrushchev, 1970, p. 493). By the same token, the Kennedy administration was acutely sensitive concerning its international reputation in the wake of "earlier East-West encounters involving Cuba [the Bay of Pigs fiasco], Berlin, and Laos. There was a strong feeling on the American side that the Soviets were seriously violating the basic 'rules of the game' in international politics with their buildup in Cuba, and that a failure to react decisively in this case might well undermine critical patterns of expectations underlying the East-West relationship" (Young, 1968, p. 212). Again, the importance of upholding one's national image and strength in the context of a face-threatening event sets the stage for the unfolding of the Cuban missile drama.

Of the three choices that ExComm recommended to President Kennedy, he finally opted for the naval blockade solution. Why? Three possible face-negotiation reasons may explain his decision. First, the OAS gave face to President Kennedy by endorsing the president's position for the quarantine solution. The vote of confidence legitimized the president's stance in the Cuban missile crisis and undermined Khrushchev's rhetoric stating that the United States was acting against international law and acted like a pirate. Secondly, if the president opted for a military attack on Cuba, the "surprise attack would erode, if not destroy, the *moral position* [italics added] of the United States throughout the world" (Kennedy, 1969, p. 49). Therefore, the national face of the United States would incur the evaluation costs of image loss. In addition, an invasion of Cuba would result in thousands of deaths of Cuban civilians, which would cause the United States to lose face in the eyes of salient referents and the third world countries. However, military inaction or the second option of the removal of missiles from Turkey and Italy would be unacceptable because this would result in status costs in the eyes of the opposing party, i.e., the Soviet Union. Hence, the third option, by process of elimination, the naval blockade solution, exemplified the best face-negotiation choice for both President Kennedy's face and the face of Khrushchev and, additionally, for preserving the face and dignity of both nations. The naval blockade solution reflects a face action, but without necessarily backing the opponent into a tight corner and, thus, without any recourse for face-restoration and face-saving strategies. As Robert Kennedy (1969) summarized: "During our crisis talks, he [JFK] kept stressing the fact that we would indeed have war if we placed the Soviet Union in a position she believed would adversely affect national security or such public humiliation that she lost the respect of her own people and countries around the globe" (p. 126). Khrushchev (1970) in his memoir, echoed a similar viewpoint: "We

could see that we had to reorient our position swiftly . . . we have to look for a *dignified way* [italics added] out of this conflict. At the same time, of course, we must make sure that we do not compromise Cuba" (p. 498). This point was summarized by Leng and Wheeler's (1979) research when they concluded:

The advantage that a reciprocating strategy provides in allowing an adversary to find a face-saving way out of an escalating dispute appears to be a salient component of at least four (Morocco, Bosnia, Trieste, Cuba) of the six [diplomatic] cases. This is consistent with the findings of social psychologists . . . of the importance of face-saving—a willingness to sacrifice tangible values to avoid looking foolish or weak in public—in interpersonal bargaining. (p. 679)

Hence, the need for face-saving, in the context of national image and pride, and the recognition that in order to save one's own face one has to start honoring the opponent's face, eventually paved the way toward active peace talks and a constructive solution in the Cuban missile crisis.

As Khrushchev, in his use of the knot metaphor in describing the Cuban missile situation, addressed President Kennedy in his first letter: "If there is no intention to tighten that knot and thereby to doom the world to the catastrophe of thermonuclear war, then let us not only relax the forces pulling on the ends of the rope, [but] let us [also] take measures to untie that knot. We are ready for this" (cited in Medland, 1988, p. 24). From a face-threatening process to a face-honoring process, the crisis talks moved through different spiraling phases of face-negotiation—face-restoration, face-saving, face-assertion, and, finally, face-giving concessions and counterconcessions.

Khrushchev's first letter to President Kennedy was viewed as an attempt at face-assertion behavior. His second letter, however, was perceived as a face-threatening letter by demanding that the United States on its part "will evacuate its analogous weapons from Turkey." The letter stated: "Do you believe that you have the right to demand security for your country and the removal of such weapons that you qualify as offensive, while not recognizing this right for us? You have stationed devastating rocket weapons, which you call offensive, in Turkey literally right next to us" (cited in Medland, 1988, p. 24).

The president, upon the advice of Robert Kennedy, purposefully ignored the second face-threatening letter while acknowledging and honoring the first proposal from Khrushchev via his cable response: "(a) to remove promptly the quarantine measures now in effect and (b) to give assurances against an invasion of Cuba." However, the president concluded his message with a face-threat warning: "The continuation of this threat, or a

prolonging of this discussion concerning Cuba by linking these problems to world security, would surely lead to an intensification of the Cuban crisis and a grave risk to the peace of the world" (cited in Medland, 1988, p. 27). Hence, a face-honoring message with a firm warning tone constituted President Kennedy's diplomatic response to Khrushchev.

In addition to the firm-but-conciliatory stance, unofficially Robert Kennedy told Dobrynin that the United States would remove the missiles from Turkey and Italy. However, this exchange was to be viewed as a parallel reciprocity exchange and *not* a symmetrical reciprocity exchange because the swap was not contingent on the ultimatum but as an aside or sweetener. Additional face-giving action then was exchanged through unofficial diplomatic channels.

According to Garthoff (1988), "while the Soviets understood that the sweetener—the unilateral American initiation to remove the missiles from Turkey and Italy—was parallel to and was to be regarded as separate from the public quid pro quo resolving the crisis, it was to them an integral part of the package" (p. 75). By this unofficial quid pro quo act, President Kennedy gave additional face to Khrushchev, so that he could settle his opposition in the Politburo and the military, and thus helped Khrushchev with his damage limitation (Blight et al., 1987, p. 179). Interestingly, Khrushchev (1970) in his analysis of the Cuban missile crisis came to a similar conclusion:

The episode ended in a triumph of common sense. I'll always remember the late President with deep respect because in the final analysis, he showed himself to be sober-minded and determined to avoid war. He didn't let himself become frightened, nor did he become reckless. He didn't overestimate America's might and he left himself a way out of the crisis. (p. 500)

In a private conversation between President Kennedy and Robert Kennedy, the president echoed the same words:

If anybody is around to write after this [Cuban missile crisis], they are going to understand that we made every effort to find peace and every effort to give our adversary room to move. I am not going to push the Russians an inch beyond what is necessary. (Kennedy, 1969, p. 127)

By understanding the face-honoring process intuitively, intellectually, and diplomatically, the two statesmen, in the final analysis, learned to honor and give face mutually in the eyes of their salient referents and in the arena of international diplomacy. As Medland (1988) concluded poetically: "As the radiance of the sun faded from the skies over the Potomac on that golden autumn afternoon, so did the crisis of the missiles of October" (p. 29). In the

context of intensive face-threatening and face-honoring negotiation processes, a world disaster was finally averted.

CONCLUSIONS

Scholars and policymakers, in studying the Cuban missile crisis, have examined closely the seven lessons that Robert Kennedy drew in his memoir of the crisis. These seven lessons are: "(1) Take time to plan; don't go with your first impulse; (2) the President should be exposed to a variety of opinions; (3) depend heavily on those with solid knowledge of the Soviet Union; (4) retain civilian control and beware of the limited outlook of the military; (5) pay close attention to world opinion; (6) don't humiliate your opponent; (7) beware of inadvertence" (Blight et al., 1987, p. 172). In particular, lesson six in terms of "don't humiliate your opponent" undergirds one of the central themes of the face-honoring process, that is, leave your opponent a honorable way out.

Other corollaries summarized by Blight et al. (1987) concerning crisis management include: (a) the importance of exploring alternative measures and channels of communication that help to avert crises and being skeptical of simple lessons in crisis management; (b) the dangers of "rigidly preconceived world views and the effect they can have on the processing of new information" among high-ranking decision makers and policy planners; (c) rational models of deterrence are not enough; (d) high-level officials need to prepare themselves ahead of time to deal with crises, "on-the-job learning during a crisis is unacceptably risky"; and (e) a little nuclear deterrence may go a long way (pp. 185-187).

The face-negotiation model presented in this chapter incorporates both the rational and the human relations elements. It is at once a rational and a relational model. The calculations and estimations of evaluation costs/rewards, status costs/rewards, and vulnerability costs/rewards are reflective of the rational (or irrational) continuum, while the actual doings (the underlying tone, the attitude, and the mutual-concern dimension) of face-giving and face-saving, face-honoring and face-restoring are reflective of the relational continuum of the model. The precise timing of face-giving and face-saving, and face-honoring and face-threatening stems as much from the head as it does from the heart.

In conclusion, the intent of this chapter is not to offer a full-blown theory to explain intergroup diplomatic conflict negotiation. Rather, the intent is to posit a possible theoretical direction for analyzing international conflict dispute cases. International diplomacy is far too complex and multifaceted to allow for a single grand theory analysis. At the same time, the face-nego-

tiation model, in conjunction with existing diplomacy and communication theories, may add to a deeper understanding and appreciation of the intricate fabric of diplomatic negotiation in the international arena.

Future researchers may wish to apply this face-negotiation model to analyzing past or ongoing international conflict cases and refining the model accordingly. Specific face typologies can be developed and the diplomatic negotiation processes and outcomes from each case can be retraced and recorded. Peace, on the brink of a global nuclear holocaust, is a precious commodity that should be treasured by all.

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Cultural Orientations of Argument in International Disputes *Negotiating the Law of the Sea*

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This chapter analyzes cultural orientations of argument in the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea negotiations. The commentary presents and applies a theoretical perspective of cross-cultural argument in international negotiation. The first-world, second-world, and third-world argument orientations reflect argument approaches of Western developed, Eastern Bloc, and nonaligned developing nations respectively. Examination of the Caracas, Venezuela, Law of the Sea Treaty negotiations minutes reveals cultural differences in argument that correspond to the three orientations of argument in international disputes.

In his opening remarks to the Seventeenth Law of the Sea Institute Conference, Willy Ostreng of Norway's Fridtjof Nansen Institute observed that the completion of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III) was "the culmination of the longest, largest, and most ambitious collective effort ever undertaken to promote peace and prevent conflict by agreeing on the precise distribution and effective limitation of power among all nations of the world" (Koers & Oxman, 1983, p. xv). British analyst R. P. Barston (1980) has called UNCLOS III "the most ambitious and complex of contemporary attempts at multilateral diplomacy" (p. 154). According to Cameroon's U.N. Ambassador Paul Bamela Engo (1985), the Conference was a "stimulating, ambitious exercise" that represented "the widening of the scope of dialogue on matters of global interest, providing opportunity for effective participation by all nations, large and small" (p. 21). International legal scholar Elisabeth Mann Borgese (1986) has commented that the emerging new international economic order will rely heavily on the new Law of the Sea and its foundation in the principles of nonownership, participation, equity, and peace (p. 131).

As it sought to peacefully resolve maritime problems, UNCLOS III embraced a decision-making process unique in international negotiations: decision by consensus. Adoption of treaty articles and provisions required general agreement without resorting to a vote. By a procedural gentleman's

agreement, voting only occurred as a final resort. The consensus process included the concept of the package deal. It dictated that the various parts of the Convention (treaty) be considered an entity, "as a single negotiated package, where the laws of give and take presumably had struck a reasonable balance between the participated states considered as a whole" (Evensen, 1985, pp. 27-28).

The Conference decision-making process emphasized the importance of communication in the negotiations. Legal scholar Milner Ball (1982) has called UNCLOS III "a productive laboratory, working experiments in the form of negotiation, multinational decisions, and transcultural discourse" (p. 463). The "transcultural discourse" featured persuasive argument. Proposed package deals "worked in practice because governments are made up of people" who required persuasion "to accept ideas and principles they had long resisted. That, as much as anything, was what this conference was about" (Sanger, 1987, p. 40). The UNCLOS III negotiation process included public and private debate (Ogley, 1984). As a process of consensus and conciliation, its success depended "upon the power of persuasion and the willingness to be persuaded" (Ball, 1982, p. 471).

UNCLOS III generated a comprehensive treaty in part through persuasive argumentation. As Ball has noted, "above all, [consensus] depended upon the tentative mutual trust among those who actually believed that arguments count" (Ball, 1985, p. 60). "The Conference has proven the possibility for accommodating mutual trust, good faith and proleptic belief in the efficacy of argument . . . [it] has been a means for impressive multicultural discourse" (Ball, 1982, p. 472).

Argumentation, then, played a critical role in UNCLOS III, an event that Henry Kissinger called one of the most important international negotiations to have ever taken place (Raiffa, 1982). The Conference demonstrated that multicultural argument can contribute to constructive diplomacy and negotiation. In negotiations for peace, argument is potentially "an affirmation of community" and "an exercise in the dignity of those one seeks to reach" (Ball, 1985, p. 45).

Despite the apparent importance of argumentation as cross-cultural discourse in the Law of the Sea negotiations, analysts have not examined this aspect of the Conference. To do so would acknowledge the two decades-old advice of negotiation scholars Sawyer and Guetzkow (1965). They featured "reciprocal argument and counterargument" as important factors in the international negotiation process (p. 479) and speculated about the influence of "cultural variation" on international negotiations. "The face-to-face conduct of negotiations," they wrote, "may be influenced by behavioral discrepancies when persons of different cultural backgrounds are brought together" (pp. 501-502).

Although argument appears throughout the negotiation process (Walker, 1985), international negotiation analysts have not followed Sawyer and Guetzkow's consult. While some scholars discuss cultural features of international negotiation (e.g., Druckman, 1977, 1983), argumentation and the argument-culture relationship seem overlooked or addressed simplistically. Steinberg (1985), for example, defines persuasive communication as "the exchange of proposals and responses, threats and promises, [and] concessions and offers," and adds that a negotiator's "rhetorical way of thinking diverts negotiation from the essence of bargaining" (p. 252). Former U.S. diplomat Winthrop Brown (1968) contends that concurrent interests provide "the basis for solid agreement, not argument [or] persuasion." He advises negotiators, when presenting a case, to "make the facts talk for you, and not rely on argument or emotion. The Foreign Minister across the table is likely to be persuaded by facts which appear to redound to his country's interest. But he won't be by oral argument" (p. 15).

This chapter addresses the paucity of discussion concerning cross-cultural argument in international negotiation. The commentary occurs in three parts. First, it examines the relationship between argument and culture. Second, it proposes a perspective for viewing cross-cultural argument in international negotiation. Third, it applies that perspective to selected UNCLOS III discourse. Two research aspirations frame the analysis: discerning the nature of cross-cultural argument in international negotiation, and illuminating argumentation as multicultural discourse in the Law of the Sea negotiations.

CULTURE AND ARGUMENT

Many international negotiations, particularly those concerned with political conflicts, occur in adversarial, distributive contexts (Lukov, 1985; Zartman, 1985). Consequently, negotiators often employ arguments to gain or maintain control. They use arguments to gain information, to establish procedures, to modify their adversary's perceptions and expectations, and to shape favorable outcomes (Walker, 1985). Whether or not negotiators achieve these ends depends, in part, on the degree to which their arguments account for cultural variations in reasoning, advocacy, and influence.

In formal settings such as negotiation, cross-cultural communication tends to be purposive in nature and reflects cultural predispositions concerning the generation of stereotypes, perceptions, attitudes, and images (Prosser, 1973). "Our perception is behavior that is learned and shared, and is mediated by symbols," Smith (1966) explains, and "culture is a code we learn and share, and learning and sharing require communication" (p. 7).

Argument embodies culturally bound values and manners of thinking. Oliver (1962) surmises that humankind is divided more by cultural differences than by language barriers. Not only do cultures speak differently, they think differently. "Every separate community has its own value system," he contends, and "every culture has its own modes of thought and its own selected interest areas which constitute the subject matter it chooses to think about" (p. xi).

Values

Values permeate every argument (Perelman, 1982) and mirror culture. Values represent "the most deep-seated aspects of culture" (Prosser, 1978, p. 158). Culture "includes systems of values; and values are among the building blocks of culture" (Hofstede, 1980, p. 25). Culture creates values that provide the foundation of social order and help construct a social reality. As such, values both guide and emerge from interaction and social influence, processes in which argument plays a significant role. Values "are the mediating factors through which social influence operates" (Zavalloni, 1980, pp. 113-114).

The values of a culture offer focal points of adherence. Argument becomes meaningful as social influence when it obliges the values of relevant cultures. Research concerning cultural differences suggests that Russians value security, patience, and collective freedom (Stein, 1982); Filipinos prize the family, community formality, and fate (Stewart, 1971); Arabs treasure honor, dignity, nationalism, and unity (Suleiman, 1967; Borthwick, 1967); Americans appreciate individual achievement and hard work; Indians stress discipline, tact, openness to experience, and courage; Greeks dignify patience and willpower; and Japanese respect achievement, concern with being right, serenity, and self-confidence (Triandis, Vassiliou, Vassiliou, Tanaka, & Shanmugam, 1972). English-speaking countries (e.g., Great Britain and the United States) embrace individualistic values such as independence, while many Asian and South American cultures promote collectivist values such as interdependence and sharing (Hofstede, 1980; Hui & Triandis, 1986; Leung, 1988).

Reasoning

Like language and meaning, reasoning appears to differ across cultures (Nadler, Nadler, & Broome, 1985). Almost four decades ago, Pribram (1949) posited four distinctive patterns of Western thought: universalistic reasoning, nominalistic or hypothetical reasoning, intuitional or organismic reasoning, and dialectical reasoning. Drawing upon this work, Glenn (1966) has studied

unique features of language and meaning in Russian, English, and French. He surmises that universalism, or trust in pure reason, characterizes Russian culture; case-particularism, or trust in experience and action accompanied by skepticism of pure reason, typifies American culture; and relationalism, or a reconciliation of reason and experience, epitomizes French culture. Universalism emphasizes deductive reasoning while case-particularism corresponds to inductive reasoning (Glenn, Johnson, Kimmel, & Wedge, 1970; Glenn, 1981). Reasoning in Chinese culture may not readily accommodate hypothetical cases and intent (Bloom, 1977). Contemplation and intuition appear important in Mexican reasoning (Fisher, 1980).

Cultural differences in reasoning, though, do not imply that members of a given culture can only reason in one particular fashion or that some reasoning patterns are better than others. Rather, cultures maintain preferred patterns of reasoning. Whether a culture features deductive or inductive reasoning may relate to values, traditions, and language. Hutchins's (1980, 1981) research with Trobriand Islanders, for example, reveals that people reason effectively when meanings relate to their cultural context. Hutchins (1980) concludes that "the clear difference between cultures with respect to reasoning is in the representation of the world [that] is thought about rather than in the [cognitive] processes employed in doing the thinking" (p. 128). Cultural differences in "representations" of the world should appear in arguments.

While commentaries concerning cultural distinctions in values and reasoning may seem speculative, they signify that culturally different arguments affect international negotiation. Fisher (1980) contends that "international negotiators frequently find that discussions are impeded because the two sides seem to be pursuing different paths of logic," reflected in diverse conceptions of issues, uses of evidence, and patterns of interaction. According to Fisher, this area represents "one of the most intriguing but least researched aspects of the cultural dimension in negotiation" (p. 49).

ARGUMENT ORIENTATIONS IN INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATION

Cultural variations in values and reasoning also suggest a tentative casting of three worlds of international argument. Argument in international negotiation corresponds to the following orientations: first-world argument, typically characteristic of Western developed national cultures; second-world argument, associated with Eastern Bloc national cultures; and third-world arguments, generally representative of developing and nonaligned national cultures. The orientations correspond with political and economic distinctions rather than cultural differences (e.g., high- and low-context culture).

This correspondence appears warranted for two reasons. First, in international negotiation differences and disputes between national cultures are often political, economic, and ideological. Second, cultural, political, and economic systems influence one another. Cushman and King (1985), in their study of Japan, the United States, and Yugoslavia, assert that "the national cultures of these countries are shaped . . . by their political and economic institutions" and the nations' political and economic structures reflect cultural values (p. 119).

While these orientations offer a useful means of comparatively analyzing cross-cultural argument in international negotiation, they require a number of qualifications. First, cultural variations in argumentation appear both within and between the first, second, and third worlds. Reasoning, values, and argument in the developed nations Japan and the United States, for example, appear more different than similar (Condon & Yousef, 1975). Japan endures as a high-context culture while the United States typifies low-context cultures (Hall, 1976, 1983; Ting-Toomey, 1985). Consequently, a first-world argument orientation may not pertain to Japanese negotiators, particularly when the negotiations take place in Japan (Thayer & Weiss, 1987; Graham & Sano, 1984). Ting-Toomey (1988) cites Japanese and U.S. cultures as the prime examples of high and low culture contexts respectively, suggesting that the former emphasizes arguments with "spiral logic" while the latter stresses arguments of "linear logic" (pp. 18-19). Second, representatives of a culture are not bound to argue according to that culture. A representative of a third-world nation, for example, might argue in a manner representative of a first-world argument orientation. Third, international negotiation has developed into a distinct culture. International forums may "become a world in themselves, separate realities with their own perceptions, which are often not coherent with perceptions in respective countries" (Allen, 1983, p. 195). For Glenn, Witmeyer, and Stevenson (1977), this represents the "common professional culture of diplomacy" (p. 59). Fourth, arguments of national cultures may embody historical, political, economic, and religious concerns. Nations pursue individual interests and seek self-reliance, advancing arguments based upon national and cultural strengths. The first world's strength is its economy; the second world's its ideology; and the third world's its history and morality. When third-world nations negotiate conflicts with first-world countries on economic terms rather than on historical or moral principle, they bargain at a disadvantage (May, 1983).

First-World Argument

In international negotiation, first-world arguers stress detailed, objective proof. Bargaining positions rely on statements of fact, careful study, statisti-

cal information, and the testimony of experts. First-world arguers reason inductively, preferring to negotiate specific, clearly defined issues before concurring on matters of principle. Their arguments are pragmatic and legalistic (Wedge & Muromcew, 1965), implying norms of equity and equality (Berman, Murphy-Berman, & Singh, 1985). In the North-South dialogue, Western cultures' arguments often emphasize economic values (Moore, 1983). In their examination of U. N. Security Council discussions, Glenn et al. (1977) cast this as the "factual-inductive" style of persuasion (p. 57). This orientation corresponds with Ting-Toomey's (1988) notion of low-context culture argument: "the arguments and the persuasions in a conflict situation would typically follow a linear logic pattern" (p. 19).

Second-World Argument

Second-world argument accentuates the abstract and the general, in contrast to the first-world argument emphasis on the concrete and specific. Basic values and general principles support second-world argument claims. Wedge and Muromcew (1965) assert that three principles guide Soviet negotiators' appeals: the sovereignty of states, the right to secrecy, and security from foreign penetration (pp. 20-28). Argument tactics include accusation and repetition; negotiators patiently repeat principles and positions in an effort to wear down their counterparts (Whelan, 1983). Arguments affirm right and wrong; compromise is rarely appropriate or necessary (Sloss & Davis, 1987). Reasoning is deductive and syllogistic, mirroring values and a universal or pure ideology, and inferring substantive or principled justice. Reference to the Soviet negotiators' penchant for principles, for example, appears in a number of commentaries (Garthoff, 1977; Smith, 1980; Marantz, 1982). Glenn et al. (1977) categorize this as "axiomatic-deductive" persuasion (p. 57).

Third-World Argument

While acknowledging the diversity of third-world cultures, generally third-world argument underscores moral appeal and compensatory justice; that is, the weak deserve the most (May, 1983; Berman et al., 1985). Unity offers a theme for third-world argument; a coalition argument of opposition and liberation (Rothstein, 1980). Accounting for history, this argument orientation often punctuates nationalism, anti-imperialism, and anticolonialism. Emotion, ambition, embellishment, and imagery appear in third-world argument (Walker, 1987). Suleiman (1967) asserts that hyperbole, assertiveness, and ambiguity characterize Arab discourse (p. 516). Exaggeration may appear as an extreme opening position, typical of Middle Eastern *suq* bargaining (Quandt, 1987). Glenn et al. (1977) claim that emotional rather than

vigorous criteria dominate Arab rhetoric, suggesting an "intuitive-affective" persuasive style (p. 59). Brazilians prefer conclusions based on common sense theory and emotional association to persuasion by facts (Wedge, 1968). Reasoning in Latin American cultures appears deductive (Fisher, 1980). Wedge (1966) describes Latin American thought patterns as universalistic and idealistic, dictating arguments of what ought to be done rather than what could be done (p. 277). Like second-world argument, third-world argument stresses universals over particulars, principles over details. High-context cultures seem likely to display a third-world argument orientation. Ting-Toomey (1988) notes that high-context culture system "values group value orientation, spiral logic, indirect verbal interaction, and contextual nonverbal style," and "the arguments and disagreements in a conflict situation would be ambiguously expressed" (pp. 18-19).

If three worlds of argument in international negotiation do exist, they should be discernible in actual disputes. A number of case studies, although not principally concerned with persuasive behaviors and interactions, suggest cultural differences in argument. Garthoff (1977) explains that the American approach to the SALT I negotiations "was to advance and tie together a fairly complete, complex, and detailed package" (p. 6). The Russians at SALT I favored a general formulation, but "it became U.S. policy to not react in principle until it knew the details (Jensen, 1984, p. 546). During U.N. disarmament committee negotiations, Noguee (1963) notes that the Russian representative Zorin used syllogistic reasoning to argue for adopting the USSR's disarmament proposal as the principal negotiation text. Glenn et al. (1977) use U.N. Security Council discussions to surmise about cultural variations in persuasion, and, as such, provide a study that examines communication explicitly. Glenn's work contributes much to this cross-cultural argument conception.

Although previous scholarship offers support, these orientations, if beneficial to understanding cross-cultural argument, should help interpret argument in actual international negotiations. The negotiations of UNCLOS III provide an excellent test for study. The Conference has produced, in addition to the Convention, volumes of documents, including the minutes of conference sessions.

THE THIRD UNITED NATIONS LAW OF THE SEA CONFERENCE (UNCLOS III)

As this chapter's opening remarks illustrate, the Third U.N. Law of the Sea Conference may endure as one of the most significant international diplomatic events in modern history. The seeds of UNCLOS III were

planted in 1967, when Dr. Arvid Pardo, Maltese representative to the United Nations, addressed the U. N. General Assembly about ocean policy. He proposed that the resources of the international seabed and ocean floor should be considered "the common heritage of mankind," in effect, calling for a new international order of the sea. Pardo contended further that a constitution or charter was required to guarantee that ocean space was treated as an ecological whole and used exclusively for peaceful purposes (Sebenius, 1984; Koh, 1986).

In response to Pardo's vision and concerns for a new economic order, the U.N. General Assembly called for a new oceans conference. With much media attention worldwide and high expectations, UNCLOS III convened in Caracas, Venezuela, in 1974. Almost nine years later, after additional conference sessions in Geneva and New York, 119 nations signed the resulting U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea in Montego Bay, Jamaica. Many additional nations, not including the United States, have since signed the treaty convention (Oxman, 1983).

UNCLOS III addressed a complex array of maritime problems. Via three principal committees, representatives of the world's nations considered more than 25 substantive agenda items. Major issues included the international regime for the nonnational seabed and ocean floor, the territorial sea, the contiguous zone, international navigation of straits, the continental shelf, the exclusive economic zone, coastal state preferential rights, land-locked nations' rights, preservation of the marine environment, scientific research, technology transfer, archipelagos, and dispute settlement (*United Nations Source Documents*, pp. 7-10).

Among the most volatile conference issues at Caracas were the related matters of the nature of the international authority for control of the deep seabed and how the resources of the deep seabed should be exploited. In fact, these international sea issues lay at the heart of why the United States has not signed the Law of the Sea treaty, causing some third-world leaders to charge that the United States bargained in bad faith (Pardo, 1983). Consequently, the minutes of the committee discussions pertaining to these matters provide the substance for analyzing cultural aspects of international argument. This analysis represents part of a more comprehensive and ongoing appraisal of all of the major UNCLOS III issues as negotiated in the Caracas, Geneva, and New York sessions.

ARGUING THE LAW OF THE SEA

Even though the UNCLOS III negotiations endured for almost a decade, agreements were reached on most items during the first years and on 90% of

the matters by 1978 (Sebenius, 1984). The administration of the deep seabed remained a contested issue. At Caracas, the Western industrialized nations advocated an international regime that would license private contractors to mine the deep seabed. The Eastern Bloc nations preferred that licenses be granted to state agencies rather than private companies. The developing nations, including the Group of 77, a coalition of third-world countries, argued that only the international authority itself should mine the sea (Caron, 1983). Arguments expressed by representatives of the various nations and factions during discussions of the First Committee, the group responsible for deep seabed issues, corresponded to the three-world argument orientations.

Third-World Arguments

The majority of the First Committee participants represented developing nations. These representatives frequently presented arguments that reflected third-world argument orientation characteristics. Consistent with the idea that third-world argument deductively emphasizes principles over details, most third-world negotiators began their statements with arguments of principle. Although the following statements only illustrate the substance of principled arguments, references to principles permeated the arguments of third-world delegates with great frequency. During the second First Committee meeting on July 11, 1974, Mr. Illanes of Chile noted initially that "the concept of a 'common heritage' [of mankind] would serve as the cornerstone of the international regime and machinery." He explained that the Convention [agreement] concerning the nature of the international regime "must be universal; it must be based on the Declaration of Principles [developed by the U.N. Seabed Committee and adopted by the U.N. General Assembly in Resolution 2749], and must reflect the concept whereby the area and its resources were part of the common heritage of mankind" (Platzoder, 1985c, p. 405). Similarly, Nigerian delegate Adeniji, speaking four days later, initially referred to principles. As Platzoder reports, he

stressed, the historical nature of the Declaration of Principles, according to which what belonged to all could not be seized by the few, but must be divided equitably among everyone. The concept of the common heritage was the cornerstone on which the edifice under construction rested, but it implied common responsibilities as well as common benefits. Nigeria would not be content with a few crumbs; it intended to take full part in administering the exploitation of the common heritage and the benefits derived therefrom. (1985c, p. 411)

Echoing these sentiments generally at the Committee's sixth meeting, Mr. U Myo Htun Lynn of Burma first addressed matters of principle, stating that "his delegation associated itself with developing and other countries in firmly supporting the principle that the seabed and ocean floor and the subsoil thereof beyond the limits of national jurisdiction, as well as the resources therein, should be the common heritage of mankind." He proposed that "in order to ensure that the common heritage of mankind did not become the common heritage of multinational corporations, all exploration and exploitation in the international seabed area should be properly controlled, if not carried out, by an international organization" (Platzoder, 1985c, p. 422).

Third-world representatives periodically tied principles to arguments concerning compensatory justice. The norm of compensatory justice dictates that outcomes should be distributed according to need; that those who need the most (the weakest) deserve the most (Zartman & Berman, 1982). Regarding the design of the international administration, Mr. Thomas of Trinidad and Tobago voiced concern about the implied veto, weighted voting, and geographic and population criteria—proposals emanating from first-world delegations. "Such maneuvers," he observed, "were essentially political and should find no place in the genuine pursuit of the economic development of developing countries; they might conceivably even do violence to the implementation of the common heritage." Thomas continued, "To entrust the management of the common heritage to developed countries, however benevolent, was illogical and unjust and was merely a perpetuation of the United Nations system with all its inherent defects, a return, indeed, to the status quo" (Platzoder, 1985c, p. 408).

The third-world argument orientation suggests that emotion, exaggeration, imagery, ambiguity, and a strong case of history pervade the cultural arguments of developing nations. Although some ambiguity often accompanied the third-world delegates' promotion of principles, emotion and embellishment did not occur with any frequency. Still, some emotional appeals and strong language did appear in arguments. During the fourth First Committee session, Mr. D'Stefano Pissani of Cuba alleged that the developing nations would not benefit if "the multinational companies [that] were already pillaging the wealth and exploiting the labor of so many peoples were given access to those resources" of the deep seabed. "It should not be forgotten that the champions of imperialism were barely concealing their support for a so-called 'new structure of international law,' " he concluded, "which was actually new in the sense that they wished to consecrate, in a legal and ideological instrument, the acts of plunder in which imperialism was engaged and would continue to be engaged if allowed." Claiming to echo the sentiments of the Argentine delegation,

D'Stefano Pissani urged the Committee to resist the "ideology of plunder" (Platzoder, 1985c, pp. 410-411).

The Albanian delegate, Mr. Angoni, also tied emotional arguments to principle. "The international sea had become the scene of rivalry and collaboration between the two superpowers in their efforts to establish world hegemony," he exclaimed; "The Conference must therefore establish a legal regime for that area which would put a stop to the pillage of the resources of the sea and the seabed by the imperialist powers and would administer the international area of the sea in accordance with the Declaration of Principles set out in General Assembly Resolution 2749" (Platzoder, 1985c, p. 433).

Mr. Allouane of Algeria expressed similar sentiments, and, like most of the third-world delegates, opposed licensing private contractors to mine the deep seabeds. "There should be absolutely no question of ceding exploitation of the international area to multinational companies," he declared, "who would betray the concept of the common heritage of mankind and, on the pretext that the international machinery lacked the technical means, would hand over exploitation to private enterprises whose colonial activities the third-world countries knew only too well" (Platzoder, 1985c, p. 437).

While emotionally vivid arguments were not common, third-world representatives did frequently use history to support their positions. Mr. Warioba of Tanzania did so when arguing in opposition to licensing. "History had fully demonstrated that in order to guarantee that wealth produced from resources went back to its lawful owner, that owner must himself have full control of the means of production," Warioba proclaimed, and "companies had always been the weapons of colonialism, imperialism, neo-colonialism, and exploitation" (Platzoder, 1985c, p. 429). Venezuelan delegate Mr. Figueredo drew extensively upon his nation's history to speak against licenses, stating:

Venezuela had had ample experience with the licensing system since the start of its petroleum industry in the 1920s. In the course of time, with growing awareness of sovereign rights, efforts had been made to improve the system, by export and other taxes, by control of activities, by conservation measures, and so forth. However, it was clear that the licensing system, despite all those improvements, did not provide absolute sovereignty over resources that were essential to the economy. Venezuela had therefore decided to end all licenses . . . it would be pointless to try to revive in the case of the sea a system that had become obsolete in the case of land-based resources. (Platzoder, 1985c, p. 453)

Third-world argument may feature unity. Throughout the First Committee sessions, representatives of the developing nations often referred to the

Group of 77, a coalition of third-world countries. At the eleventh meeting, Mr. Fonseca Truque of Columbia, as its chair, presented the Group of 77's plan for administering the international sea. The first paragraph stipulated that "all activities of exploration of the sea and of the exploitation of its resources, and all other related activities, including those of scientific research, shall be conducted by the [international] Authority" (Platzoder, 1985c, pp. 449-450; Platzoder, 1985b, p. 437). Following the Colombian delegate's remarks, the representatives of Venezuela, Jamaica, Zaire, Madagascar, Yugoslavia, Peru, and Chile each voiced support for the proposal (Platzoder, 1985c, pp. 453-455).

First-World Arguments

In contrast, the representatives of Western developed nations rarely based their arguments on principle or offered emotional appeals. They often stressed procedure and structure, reflective of the first-world argument construct. At the First Committee's sixth session, U.S. delegate Ratiner spoke only of procedure, reminding "members that the mandate of the First Committee did not include the elaboration of treaty articles for the control of activities in the waters superjacent to the international seabed area by the regime and Authority. That matter fell more properly within the mandate of the Second Committee" (Platzoder, 1985c, p. 420). Mr. Ratiner addressed procedural concerns again and conveyed a procedural warning at the seventh meeting. Following a lengthy statement by Mr. Sepulveda of Mexico, Ratiner

pointed out that he had refrained from raising a point of order when the representative of Mexico had touched on issues that had nothing to do with the items on the agenda of the First Committee. He thought it important, however, to draw attention to the fact that the First Committee must deal essentially with the international regime to apply to the seabed and ocean floor beyond the limits of national jurisdiction. If members of the First Committee continued to raise questions that were not relevant, either during the work of the Committee or in the unofficial meetings, his delegation would be obliged to raise points of order. (Platzoder, 1985c, p. 427)

Implying a different argument orientation, one that favored generality over specificity and flexibility over fixed rules, Sepulveda replied that Ratiner's remarks were out of place. "The questions concerning the exploration of the [international] area and the exploitation of its resources were related to nearly all the other activities of the conference," Sepulveda argued, "and any attempt to fix any rigid frame was inadmissible." He

concluded: "It must be borne in mind that the Conference was a meeting of plenipotentiaries aimed at finding solutions in the interest of all, and consequently it was inappropriate to compartmentalize the various issues" (Platzoder, 1985c, p. 432).

Delegates from Western developed nations emphasized the need for detail, whereas delegates from third-world countries voiced opposite sentiments. Adjacent remarks concerning the seabed administrative mechanism illustrate this contrast. During the fourth First Committee session, Mr. Gonzalez LaPeyre of Uruguay asserted "it would be preferable not to enter into the rules and regulations in too much detail so that the machinery could subsequently adapt itself to evolution on technical, juridical, and economic levels." A rejoinder came forth. "Even if it were possible to achieve a draft of articles covering the international regime and Authority," Mr. Chamberlain of the United Kingdom argued in reply, "that would provide only a skeleton which it would be necessary to complete with detailed rules which, in the view of his delegation, should be drawn up at the same time as the substantive articles" (Platzoder, 1985c, p. 412).

Western representatives also advocated study as positional support or as a prerequisite to decision making. Chamberlain of the United Kingdom claimed that study justified licensing private contractors to develop the sea: "After giving careful consideration to the alternative possibilities, [his delegation] had concluded that a licensing system still remained the best way of achieving the objectives he had outlined" (Platzoder, 1985c, p. 412). U.S. delegates frequently referred to the importance of study in their statements. To illustrate, in response to the presentation of three U.N. Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) mineral production econometric studies, Mr. Ratiner contended the research was

important because many of the proposals before the Committee were motivated by a concern for the possible economic implications of seabed production. He urged a full discussion of that issue during the Conference and hoped that the UNCTAD representative's statement could be reproduced in extenso in the records, so that representatives could study and comment on it. His delegation had difficulty with many of the assumptions in the reports. . . . His delegation planned to study the UNCTAD reports with care in order to be responsive on that topic at a later time. (Platzoder, 1985c, p. 424)

Second-World Arguments

During discussions of the international sea, third-world representatives frequently argued from principle and first-world delegates advocated the precedence of procedure. Committee members from Eastern Bloc nations —

the second world—periodically turned to both principle and procedure as grounds for their claims. The second-world argument orientation emphasizes principles prior to particulars, and Eastern Bloc delegates utilized principles regularly in their arguments. As the opening speaker at the First Committee's second session, Mr. Wuensche of the German Democratic Republic (East Germany) stated "that the exploration and exploitation of the seabed and its subsoil should be carried out in accordance with the basic principles of international law in the interests of all peoples and exclusively for peaceful purposes." Furthermore, "the concept of the common heritage of mankind could be defined only in relation to the basic principles of international law and the other principles laid down in General Assembly resolution 2749" (Platzoder, 1985c, p. 402). During the fifth session, both the Romanian and Polish delegates addressed first matters of principle, with Mr. Goralczyk of Poland proposing "that the regime of the international arena should be based as far as possible as the Declaration of Principles. . . . The task of the Committee was to translate the basic concept of the Declaration, that of the common heritage of mankind, into the language of legal rules" (Platzoder, 1985c, p. 414).

At the eighth session, Mr. Romanov of the Soviet Union initially referred to the Declaration of Principles, but used ideological argument to oppose licensing private companies (the USSR supported licensing state agencies). "It would be unrealistic to suppose that capitalistic monopolies would work for an international organization for purely altruistic motives, forgetting their own interests and the need for a substantial return on their invested capital," Romanov surmised, for "experience showed only too well that capitalist monopolies did not act in that way" (Platzoder, 1985c, p. 434).

Eastern Bloc representatives, like Western delegates, voiced procedural arguments. Illustrations appear in the Second Committee negotiations over the territorial sea. At the initial meeting of the Second Committee, Mr. Yankov of Bulgaria, speaking for the group of Eastern European states, suggested that "substantive meetings should begin at the end of the general debate in the plenary meetings." He urged: "Both official and unofficial meetings should be held; working groups might be set up later. . . . Once the general feeling of the Committee on a particular item had been established, it should be 'put on ice' for future consideration" (Platzoder, 1985a, p. 231).

Similarly, at the fourth Second Committee session, Mr. Movchan of the Soviet Union, consistent with the second-world argument value of control, promoted procedure and a specific agenda. Referring to the Guyanan and Spanish proposals for the territorial sea, Movchan commented that "before those questions were discussed other questions should be considered, mainly those relating to the economic zone, just as the question of archipelagos must

be discussed before that of archipelagic waters." Valuing control and procedure over patience, he expounded that "only 30 working days remained for consideration of the issues referred to the Committee and that it should try to speed up its work." Movchan then called on the Committee to consider critical matters such as innocent passage and the rights of coastal states, "for there was enough documentation available to deal with those questions" (Platzoder, 1985a, p. 241).

Eastern Bloc representatives also periodically incorporated concerns for security, a fundamental value, in their arguments. Soviet delegate Kolosovsky, speaking on the issue of straits used for international navigation, noted that

the [Soviet Union] recognized the need to protect the security of coastal States bordering on straits used for international navigation between one part of the high sea and another, but it also believed that the security and other interests of countries that used those straits, which comprised the majority, should also be taken into account. The security of the [Soviet Union] depended upon communications by sea and through straits. Consequently, his delegation could not agree that matters relating to navigation through straits used for international navigation admitted unilateral solutions. Attempts to modify the traditional regime or to limit transit through those straits were against the interests of the international community. (Platzoder, 1985a, p. 263)

Even though many statements of the delegates from developing, Western, and Eastern Bloc nations corresponded respectively to the third-world, first-world, and second-world argument perspectives, some remarks did not reflect one particular or the predicted cultural orientation. At the fourth meeting of the First Committee, for example, Mr. Sugihara of Japan interpreted the principle of common heritage in a manner opposite to the third-world representatives—to support licensing. "It followed from the notion of the common heritage [of mankind] that the resources of the seabed should be exploited in the most efficient and profitable manner possible," Sugihara contended; "for that reason, the international organization [that] would be created grant licenses to States which . . . would . . . make full use of the efficiency which characterizes private entities" (Platzoder, 1985c, p. 409). Similarly, the Austrian delegate argued initially from principle in his presentation concerning the international sea Authority (Platzoder, 1985c, p. 413). Although the delegates' statements generally corresponded to the appropriate argument orientation (first, second, or third world), no persuasive appeal or argument type was the domain of a particular culture or group of nations.

CONCLUSION

Cross-cultural argument permeated much of the Law of the Sea Conference proceedings, just as it does many international negotiations. As part of the decision-making process in international negotiation, argumentation, as cross-cultural communication, "communicates for peace." Argumentation "affirms community" and promotes dignity as it fosters constructive, negotiated decisions (Ball, 1985). Despite its apparent importance, little scholarship scrutinizes cross-cultural argument, perhaps because persuasive argument seems a microscopic part of international negotiations, or perhaps because analysts have not generated a theoretical lens for examining cross-cultural argument in international negotiations. This inquiry presents a perspective appropriate for this endeavor and employs it to offer preliminary observations about argument in the Law of the Sea Treaty negotiations.

This introductory examination of the UNCLOS III Caracas sessions, particularly the committee meetings regarding the issues of seabed administration and development, the territorial sea, and exclusive economic zones, illustrates the cross-cultural nature of argument in international negotiation. While it provides rich examples of cultural variations in argumentation, the analysis only begins to explore the nature and role of persuasive argument as multicultural discourse during UNCLOS III. Simply describing and reproducing a few arguments does not sufficiently illuminate the similarities and differences in argument across cultures, issues, and forums. Analysis of argumentation in the UNCLOS III negotiations could include examination of the plenary meetings, the major issues over the life of the conference, and the informal negotiation sessions. Argument forms and functions in negotiation sessions and formal documents, such as position papers, could be compared. The Law of the Sea documents offer a provocative test for intercultural communication—and argument—research. Studying UNCLOS III can contribute significantly to understanding how national cultures can communicate effectively and collaborate to reach agreement.

In addition to speculating about cross-cultural argument in the Law of the Sea negotiations, this initial inquiry has explored the utility of a "three worlds" perspective of cross-cultural argument. The three orientations, while tentative, appear helpful in discerning cultural variations in argument. The argument orientations are not intended to promote stereotypes or compartmentalization. Rather, they are presented as a means of better appreciating cultural differences in communication. Just as scholars have found individualism/collectivism and low-context culture/high-context culture useful theoretical concepts for analyzing intercultural communication variables such as fairness (Berman et al., 1985), distributive justice (Leung &

Iwawaki, 1988), conflict style (Chua & Gudykunst, 1987), and face-negotiation (Ting-Toomey, 1988), the three-world argument orientations illuminate cultural differences and similarities in international argument. The argument orientations may promote comparisons of between-culture and within-culture argument and influence strategies. Further research could combine the three argument orientations with the high- and low-context culture constructs to determine more explicitly how cultures argue and reason. In international negotiation, representatives of national cultures do argue differently. The three argument orientations offer a viable perspective for assessing arguments in intercultural and international settings, including the Law of the Sea Treaty negotiations.

Critics might contend that the first-, second-, and third-world argument orientations are simply stylistic distinctions. The relevant literature refutes that claim, building a strong case for substantive cultural differences in argument. Skeptics could assert that a particular delegate's remarks do not represent a culture or cultural group. Yet an examination of the UNCLOS III negotiation minutes, the scope of which extends beyond what this commentary reports, reveals cultural consistencies. For example, Mr. Ratiner was not the only first-world negotiator to refer repeatedly to the importance of study. U.S. delegate Stevenson and representatives Dudgeon of the United Kingdom, Rosenne of Israel, and Maas Geesteranus of The Netherlands, all of the Second Committee, spoke to the value of detailed study (Platzoder, 1985a and 1985c).

Critics might question the utility of the cultural argument orientations for studying social influence. Kay (1985) asserts that conceptions similar to the "three worlds" of argument are merely descriptive, and, consequently, of limited value. He argues that such an approach "operates at a level too microscopic to permit understanding of the rhetorical impact of argument between nations" and does not locate stasis in the arguments (1985, pp. 4-5). Both Kay and Renz (1987), after analyzing select U.N. Security Council discussions, conclude that nations, particularly the United States and the Soviet Union, do not argue differently.

The negotiation sessions of UNCLOS III provide ample evidence to deny Kay's and Renz's conclusion. A close reading of the negotiations reveals both similarities and differences in the manner in which representatives of nations and cultures communicate and argue. The three worlds of argument are descriptive, yet description is one step toward understanding cultural features of persuasive discourse. As the argument orientations become refined, perhaps combined with high- and low-context culture distinctions, they could clarify the rhetorical implications of argument and influence and highlight points of stasis. Until then, the three worlds of argument as

revealed in the Law of the Sea Conference may foster a better understanding of cultures and cultural dimensions of communication in international negotiations.

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Taoism and the Metaphoric Analysis of International Dispute Mediation

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The efficacy of metaphoric images as a means of analyzing the mediation of international disputes is demonstrated through the case study of a successful mediation effort by the Organization of American States. Seven metaphoric principles, derived from the description of the ideal leader found in the Tao Te Ching of Lao-Tzu, are applied to the analysis of this incident. Implications and limitations of the technique of metaphoric analysis are discussed.

THE MEDIATOR'S DILEMMA

In recent years, mediation has become a popular alternative in the resolution of many kinds of conflict. One feature of mediation that supposedly distinguishes it from other forms of dispute resolution is that the best mediators are often conceived of as objective facilitators of communication who take little or no active role in the mediation sessions.

However, in the mediation of international disputes, this ideally disinterested stance is very difficult for the mediator to attain, for at least three reasons. First, in any given international dispute, the mediator may be accepted by contesting parties, not because of its neutrality (for the mediator is nearly always a country or group of countries, not an individual), but because of the power it has to enforce an attractive outcome (Zartman & Touval, 1985). Second, a great deal of international mediation is accomplished by organizations (such as the Organization of American States) that are mandated by their charters to intervene for security reasons, thus considerably constraining the degree of freedom the mediator can utilize in fashioning an agreement (Carnevale, 1985). Finally, the mediating body must have mastered an impressive repertoire of strategies to leverage the disputants toward a resolution (Fisher, 1978), thus abandoning disinterest in favor of strategic influence.

Given these confounding factors, mediators face a difficult problem: They must help settle the case while at the same time remaining uninvolved with the disputing parties. As Silbey and Merry (1986) put it,

[The mediator] has no socially legitimate authority to render a decision. Yet, the mandate for all mediators is to settle cases. The mediator thus faces a dilemma: to settle a case without imposing a decision. (p. 7)

This "mediator's dilemma" arises because of the tendency in Western cultures to insist on conceptualizing the resolution of disputes as a *linear process*, which reduces the complex interaction to a series of stages, and specifies that the mediator should guide participants through these stages to a resolution of their dispute. This linear model of dispute resolution stipulates specific kinds of involvement at specific stages and in specific ways; however, the mediator's dilemma places the mediator in a position that demands involvement without involvement.

Given that all mediators face the mediator's dilemma, and that the Western approach to dispute resolution forces an unquestioning acceptance of a linear model of communication process, mediation seems to present an insoluble problem, which can be restated in the following terms: *Successful mediation demands that one be able to act (control the mediation process) without acting (without interfering in the process)*. In fact, the problem's seeming insolubility is only an artifact of the Western perspective. The mediator's dilemma has already been solved—elegantly and persuasively—more than 2000 years ago by the Chinese philosopher Lao-Tzu in his famous work, the *Tao Te Ching* (*The Way of Lao-Tzu*).

This chapter shows how Lao-Tzu, in Chapter 15 of the *Tao Te Ching*, provides an explanation of the ideal behavior of a leader. Central to his explanation is the notion of *wu wei*, or "actionless activity." Lao-Tzu's method is highly unorthodox: He provides a list of seven attributes, expressed metaphorically through seven naturalistic images (example: "[The ruler] must be supple and pliant, like ice about to melt"), and challenges the reader to use these images as *generative metaphors*; that is, cognitive juxtapositions that enable innovative concepts to be formulated through novel comparisons of the new with the old (Schon, 1979).

Later in the chapter the seven metaphors are applied to instances of negotiation of international disputes, after they have been reformulated in terms of mediator behavior (as in "The mediator must be supple and pliant, like ice about to melt"). The authors were surprised at the number, novelty, and depth of the insights that could be obtained concerning the behavior of disputants and mediators, and particularly at how Lao-Tzu's idea of *wu wei* provides a unique and practical solution to the mediator's dilemma. These

findings will be advanced in the following steps: (1) a brief picture of the ideal mediator from the Taoist perspective, (2) an overview of the use of generative metaphors in the resolution of disputes, (3) a metaphoric analysis of an example case of international mediation, and (4) a discussion of the study's limitations.

THE TAOIST MEDIATOR

Philosophical Taoism, along with Confucianism and Buddhism, is one of the chief systems of thought responsible for shaping Chinese culture. The main source of Taoism is a single book, the *Tao Te Ching*—literally, *The Way of Lao-Tzu*—reputed by legend to have been written by an historian named Lao-Tzu in about the third century B.C.

Taoism's central tenet, though complex in application, is simple to state: Governing the universe is an unnameable, undefinable principle known as *Tao*, which may be translated simply (though inadequately) as "the Way." This principle, which directs and guides rather than simply serving as a path to be followed, brings increase and decrease in human affairs, each following the other. *Tao* is observable through, and expressed as, naturalistic images: flowing water, the willow tree, the ceaseless wind, and so on.

In Chapter 15 of the *Tao Te Ching*, Lao-Tzu describes his ideal leader in terms of seven naturalistic metaphors. Because these seven characteristics also may be applied to the ideal mediator (who must, like the Taoist sage, lead without leading), Lao-Tzu's descriptions may be reformulated as a Mediator's Creed:

[The best mediators are . . .]

Cautious, like crossing a frozen stream in the winter.

Being at a loss, like one fearing danger on all sides.

Reserved, like one visiting.

Supple and pliant, like ice about to melt.

Genuine, like a piece of uncarved wood.

Open and broad, like a valley.

Merged and undifferentiated, like muddy water.

The enlightened leader (or mediator) is one who recognizes the existence of *Tao* and does not challenge it by acting, even when the environment may appear to demand action. The aim of the Taoist mediator is to execute his or her duties so flawlessly and unobtrusively that people think they have accomplished agreement by themselves, taking no notice of the mediator.

Accomplishing this difficult task demands that the mediator practice *wu wei*, or actionless activity. This means that no unnecessary action contrary to

the natural state of the mediation session can be undertaken: no unnecessary interference, no unnecessary advancement through artificial stages, no unnecessary attempts to shape the opinions of the participants. Heider (1986) defines *Tao* as "what happens"; the Taoist mediator is cautioned to pay attention only to what happens in the session.

Admittedly, such paradoxical notions are initially difficult to grasp, particularly if one views mediation as conforming to the linear model. It must be kept in mind that Lao-Tzu is positioned against the analytic tradition of the West. He is saying, in effect, that analysis of what is natural is impossible (or, as he puts it, "the *Tao* is ineffable") and that the reason so many leaders (and mediators) fail is simply that they try to do too much. As this essay reveals, the paradoxical nature of these ideas yields particularly fascinating results when applied to international conflict.

The foregoing descriptive treatment of Taoism is of necessity brief. Later in the chapter, however, this deficiency is rectified somewhat when *wu wei* is explicated further through metaphorical analysis of an example case of international mediation.

GENERATIVE METAPHORS IN THE STUDY OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION

Donald Schon (1967, 1979) was the first to propose the term *generative metaphor* to describe an alternative linguistic formulation in which one juxtaposes a metaphor on a set of data in order to generate new insight. Schon rests his argument on the provocative observation that "problems are not given [but] are constructed by human beings in their attempts to make sense of complex and troubling situations" (1979, p. 261). Thus, because the solution is delimited by how one conceives of the problem, the difficulty with most analyses of social phenomena lies "in problem setting rather than problem solving" (Sternberg, Tourangeau, & Nigro, 1979, p. 344).

This observation has direct consequences for the study of international mediation, one of the most complex social phenomena imaginable. The key to creative problem-solving, as Schon sees it, is in the conscious use of metaphor. In other words, if one wants to see new aspects of a problem, one must stop conceptualizing it as just one thing and deliberately conceive of the problem as if it were something else. This deliberate shift in perspective (which, Brown [1976] argues, is the basis of all scientific enterprise) is accomplished through application of the generative metaphor to the problem in question.

Schon (1979) provides an illustration of a generative metaphor by recounting an incident in which engineers were trying to devise an improved

paintbrush. So long as they continued to see the paintbrush simply as a brush (i.e., some bristles that smeared paint over a surface) they were not able to achieve anything. Then one engineer said, "You know, a paintbrush is a kind of pump." The engineers found that conceptualizing a paintbrush as a pump that transfers liquid paint from one place to another led to a greatly improved design, causing them to "pay attention to the different bending angles of the natural and synthetic brushes, noting how these different angles make for different ways of compressing channels and thereby affecting the pumping of liquid" (p. 258).

Generative metaphor has also been used to study conflict. For example, the reframing of conflict in terms of metaphors and analogies is the hallmark of *brief strategic therapy*, which aims thereby to "prevent the repetition of sequences and to introduce more complexity and alternatives" (Madanes, 1981, p. 21).

The chief metaphor used by brief strategic therapists likens dispute resolution to a judo match (Watzlawick, Beavin, & Jackson, 1967; Watzlawick, Weakland, & Fisch, 1974). In judo, the opponent's strength can be used against him or her, much in the same way that brief strategic therapy allows the therapists to use conflict as a means to gain the upper hand over patients. Saposnek (1980, 1987), while acknowledging the usefulness of the judo metaphor, still viewed it as too confrontative and proposed another, based upon the Japanese martial art *aikido*:

The Aikidoist always views challenges from a systems perspective within a multilevel interactional context. The challenger is perceived in direct relation to the Aikidoist, in relation to his immediate surroundings (especially to other challengers), in relation to spatial and temporal factors (timing), and, on the most abstract level, in relation to all natural hierarchical levels. (Saposnek, 1980, p. 228).

Through applying the generative metaphors "dispute as judo contest" and "dispute as aikido," one reconceptualizes the phenomenon of resistance. Originally viewed as something to be confronted, resistance is reconceptualized as a tool to be utilized in resolving the conflict (Haley, 1976; Watzlawick, 1978). The same basic approach has been applied to international mediation (Fisher, 1978).

Thus, metaphoric analyses permit the researcher to penetrate below surface interactions of disputes and to generate new insights to aid in their solution. In a similar manner, the seven descriptions expressed in Chapter 15 of the *Tao Te Ching* will be used as generative metaphors in the following discussion to analyze an example case: the Organization of American States (OAS) as mediator of a 1969 border war between Honduras and El Salvador.

METAPHORIC ANALYSIS OF AN EXAMPLE CASE

In analyzing the Honduras-El Salvador mediation effort by means of Lao-Tzu's metaphors, a three-step process will be followed for each of these seven metaphors. The first step is to describe the background, that is, that aspect of the dispute's context which most clearly illustrates the metaphor. Second, the metaphor will be analyzed by playing out its implications in terms of the chosen aspect. And third, the metaphor will be applied to the case, showing how it generates new observations and insights. Before the presentation of the analysis, however, the context surrounding this dispute will be briefly summarized.

The OAS is a body composed of most of the countries of the Western hemisphere. According to its 1948 charter, the OAS was charged with the responsibility for keeping peace among its member nations. One successful OAS mediation effort was the cease-fire agreement between Honduras and El Salvador. Scheman and Ford (1985) explain the reasons for the dispute between these two countries:

The conflict was rooted in the economic and social problems afflicting both countries. Rural poverty, maldistribution of land, and growing population prompted a flow of Salvadorans into less-populated Honduras, which responded with legislation to stem the flow of refugees and establish a deportation program. A violent incident involving fans at the Soccer World Cup elimination in El Salvador caused diplomatic relations to be sundered on June 27, 1969.

Open warfare between the two countries broke out on July 14, 1969. Through a complex weaving of shuttle diplomacy, private talks, economic pressure, and round-the-clock negotiations, the OAS was able to achieve the cease-fire only 12 days following the outbreak of hostilities. More details of the example case will be provided as the context in which each of the seven metaphors can be applied is discussed.

Metaphor One: Cautious, Like Crossing a Frozen Stream in Winter

Background. In the conflict, it was clear that the OAS member nations (if not the body itself) regarded El Salvador as the aggressor. Before the first troop withdrawals on August 3, two resolutions had been offered. The first resolution, calling for strict economic sanctions against El Salvador, was sponsored by 12 OAS countries. The second resolution, sponsored only by El Salvador and calling for Honduras to be declared the aggressor, found no

support among the other nations. Thus, there was evidence of a potentially explosive division of opinion between most of the nations and El Salvador.

Playing Out the Metaphor. One of the favored metaphors of Chinese literature is that of the fox crossing a frozen stream. The fox is renowned for its ability to carefully test each step on the ice before advancing further. Ice that might at first seem solid enough to walk on may in fact break under the fox's weight. The lesson the Chinese draw from this image is that what seems reliable at the outset may prove dangerous later on. Therefore, one should be certain and be cautious, otherwise one's precipitous behavior may end in disaster. Then, too, the farther the fox advances onto the ice, the more precarious is its position: The ice is more fragile and the water is deeper. Thus, the fox negotiates the ice both by being certain of where it steps, and by not going out too far.

A possible reading of Lao-Tzu's metaphor in terms of mediation might be as follows: The mediator should not wantonly trample across the "frozen stream" of the disputants' past, rigidified patterns of behavior with each other. To avoid worsening the situation, the mediator ought to remain cautious, resisting the temptation to argue for his or her own viewpoint. Like the fox making its tentative way across the ice, when confronted with a potentially disruptive controversy the mediator should remain noncommittal.

Application of the Metaphor. Given their past history of conflict, both Honduras and El Salvador had come to regard each other as enemies; in other words, their interaction had become rigidified and hardened, much like the ice in Lao-Tzu's metaphor. It was upon this "ice" that the OAS had to step, delicately and tentatively.

When Lao-Tzu's metaphor is applied, one can see how damaging a headlong rush out over the ice would have been. The danger of breaking the ice, shattering the delicate relationship between the two countries, would thus have been intensified. Therefore, the best course would be to advance slowly and cautiously, in order to avoid having the ice collapse under the weight of official OAS action.

In fact, the OAS did choose the incremental approach over a headlong rush onto the ice. As Scheman and Ford (1985) note, "The goals of the OAS mediators were clear and limited: to establish a cease-fire and to obtain the withdrawal of troops from occupied territories" (p. 216). In other words, they made sure the ice could be walked upon before they advanced any further. No ice was broken — that is, the fragile relationship between Honduras and El Salvador was maintained. Thus, the initial danger of not knowing whether the ice would support them was circumvented through caution and reservation.

Had the OAS not proceeded in this way, they might have shattered the precarious path across the stream (by trying to do too much too soon) and

left themselves stranded on one side (unable to proceed) or floundering in the water (in over their heads). At each stage, beginning at the very outset, the OAS made sure of its ground in the preceding stages before advancing further.

Metaphor Two: Being at a Loss, Like One Fearing Danger on All Sides

Background. As a result of the long and troubled history between El Salvador and Honduras, the OAS faced a host of complicated and interrelated issues, particularly with each side blaming the other for the outbreak of hostilities. Typically in international disputes, as each party tries to blame the other, there is an escalation of charges and countercharges, which tends to bring into the dispute tangential and even irrelevant issues. Thus, mediation can break down in its early stages because the process of addressing substantive claims, which might seem simple at the outset, quickly becomes too complex. In the example case, the OAS faced the danger of prematurely bringing up sensitive issues before the practical business of engineering a truce could be achieved.

Playing Out the Metaphor. Mediators should be like silent hunters who enter the forest afraid of alerting dangerous beasts to their presence. They should not stride boldly forward into the dark glades of the disputants' deep and hidden feelings toward each other, snapping twigs and noisily brushing aside branches. Mediators must avoid calling forth the beasts of the disputants' forest, heedless of the damage they can cause. Reckless explorers, fearing no danger on any side, empower forces that can overwhelm them.

Application of the Metaphor. Like the hunter in the forest who must avoid summoning dangerous beasts, the OAS faced the danger of bringing up issues that were too dangerous to be dealt with at the outset of mediation. Rather than discussing these sensitive issues, the OAS instead "aimed at stopping hostilities and assuring human rights protection, meticulously avoiding the substance of the claims" (Scheman & Ford, p. 215). Early on, the OAS refused even to focus on the substantive issues involved in the conflict, choosing instead simply to stop the fighting, and to reserve the more complex task of dealing with the history of the conflict until later in the process. In this way, they forestalled the possibility of deepening the rift between the two countries, just as the hunter in the forest survives by not awakening the beasts who have dwelt in the forest for years. Just as the hunter must wait until he or she is properly armed before confronting a dangerous animal, so mediators should wait until they possess the resources to deal with dangerous issues.

Suppose the OAS had chosen the alternative of dealing with issues underlying the conflict, such as refugee incursion into Honduras, at the

outset. Immediately, they would also have had to deal with the reasons for the incursion, such as poverty in El Salvador. As each issue relating to the conflict was addressed, other relevant issues would have been revealed, and these in turn would have required immediate attention. Very quickly, the OAS would have found itself mired down in a complex of interrelated factors. Like the hunter who finds himself surrounded by dangerous beasts he has summoned, the OAS would have rendered itself powerless almost from the outset of mediation. The underlying issues should be addressed only when the mediator is capable of handling the situation. Any premature attempt to engage these issues will result in failure, damaging not only the present situation, but also worsening the relations between the disputants in the future.

Metaphor Three: Reserved, Like One Visiting

Background. Given the fact that no nation supported El Salvador, OAS mediators faced a situation in which it would have been difficult not to commit to the majority opinion: With its member nations standing 12 to 1 against El Salvador, the OAS must have been strongly tempted simply to side with the majority and declare Honduras the aggrieved party.

However, as is so often the case in international law, clear legal assignment of blame is extremely difficult. Frequently, there is no legal standard, recognized by all the conflicting parties, that can be appealed to for adjudication; therefore, blameworthiness becomes a particularly sensitive issue. The laying of blame, which is common in many international disputes, often results in the blamed party assuming a defensive posture, thereby making a mediated solution even more difficult.

Playing Out the Metaphor. If the mediator is to be "like one visiting," then certain behavior inappropriate to the courteous guest must be avoided. For example, no polite guest would take sides with one family member against another, or interfere in family interaction, or aggressively take charge of household affairs. Instead, the polite guest would behave with restraint: If a quarrel should break out at the dinner table, for example, the guest would not participate. Though one might have definite opinions on what is being discussed, reservation demands that they be kept to oneself.

Application of the Metaphor. The mediator can be seen as a guest in a dispute. Either through specific invitation, or by standing agreement (as in the example case), the mediator is seen as a neutral party whose purpose is frequently (though not always) to prevent open conflict by serving as a channel of communication. The two warring countries, then, can be seen as part of the same "family," with the OAS as an invited guest. Like a guest, the proper procedure for the OAS is to avoid offering its opinion too early and to wait until the proper time to tell what it thinks.

In this case, the OAS did not assign blame prematurely. Indeed, "it was clear that the mediating committee [formed by a smaller group of OAS member countries, ODECA] viewed El Salvador as the aggressor and might have passed a resolution to that effect. It eventually abandoned that idea so as to maintain a policy of neutrality. As a mediating agency, the [OAS] committee sought only to get the nations to agree to cease-fire and troop withdrawal" (Scheman & Ford, p. 217). The OAS behaved with the reservation of the ideal guest, refusing the attractive option of siding with the majority against the obvious aggressor. This high-minded approach doubtless defused an otherwise potentially defensive action on the part of El Salvador.

If instead the OAS had chosen to take sides, its influence with El Salvador would have been significantly curtailed. Had El Salvador been faced with the combined enmity of its neighbors and the mediating committee, it might have seen itself as having no choice but to escalate the war, and the OAS (deprived of influence because of its partiality) would have had no choice but to respond with force, to which the Salvadorans would have likely responded with more force, and so on. When a guest gets caught in the embarrassing position of being expected to side with one family member against another, the result is that hostilities increase, for the guest is now seen by at least some family members as one of the combatants. By not taking sides, the OAS successfully engineered a ceasefire in only two weeks.

Metaphor Four: Supple and Pliant, Like Ice About to Melt

Background. As Scheman and Ford (1985) point out, the heart of OAS mediation procedures rests "in articles 23 through 28 of the OAS Charter, the Pact of Bogota, and Article 7 of the Rio Treaty" (p. 205). In particular, the Pact of Bogota serves as "the principal instrument for peaceful resolution of disputes" (p. 205), providing an exhaustive set of procedures which spells out in complex detail what actions are to be taken in the event of a dispute. However, the amount of detail in the Pact has proved a deterrent to its use: While "the document is as comprehensive as human ingenuity can devise" (p. 205), countries have avoided ratifying it or using it in actual conflicts. Instead, the OAS has achieved its best results through informal, noncompulsory means.

Playing Out the Metaphor. When Lao-Tzu uses the image of "ice about to melt," he is beginning a Taoist tradition in which images of presumably powerless things are used to illustrate the power of noninterference and noncontention. Commonly used images are: the willow which bends, but does not break; the infant whose sinews are weak, but whose grip is strong; the steadily flowing water which eventually wears down even stone; and so

on. Suppleness and pliance on the part of the mediator are seeming weaknesses which easily overcomes the seemingly strong. (Lao-Tzu's thought here is very similar to the earlier metaphors of "mediation as judo" and "mediation as aikido," in that both these martial arts emphasize the enormous strategic advantage of yielding and letting the opponent's own strength defeat him or her.) Ice about to melt is very different from ice still solidly frozen. Melting ice seems powerless and weak, because it is losing its sharp edges, is going to a fluid state, and thus merges more easily with its environment. Frozen ice, which seems strong and solid, is nevertheless sharp, resistant to movement, and cracks when pressure is applied to it. Thus, the seemingly weak is in fact strong, while the seemingly strong is in fact weak.

Application of the Metaphor. The great amount of detail concerning mediation procedures in the Pact of Bogota have led to its being ignored as a means of resolving many important disputes. Like frozen ice, the extremely detailed laying out of complicated rules and procedures in the Pact has proven too rigid for use in practical mediation. "If one lesson is to be learned from the [OAS] efforts to mediate disputes among its member states, it is that when procedures are informal, they work. The moment the framework becomes too rigid or formal, mediation falters" (Scheman & Ford, p. 197).

In the case in question, the OAS chose a path of seeming weakness, a more yielding and fluid form of intervention, like ice about to melt. The social context of most mediated disputes is usually so complex that an unyielding, rule-governed process cannot be successfully applied. Because conflicting interests between countries are involved (including many factors related to culture and history), international disputes are particularly complex; therefore, the Taoist approach is especially useful in the mediation of international conflicts.

The Taoist mediator, by cultivating spontaneity, remains open to "what happens" (Heider, 1986) and thereby avoids the danger of approaching the conflict with preset ideas. Remaining spontaneous (seemingly weak), the Taoist mediator expands the range of his or her options (and is thus strong). Sacrificing spontaneity and being governed by rules (seeming strength), a mediator closes off options (and is thus rendered weaker).

Metaphor Five: Genuine, Like a Piece of Uncarved Wood

Background. In the conduct of international diplomacy, details of how to address the other parties (terms of reference) are often highly important. One country may have severed (or, indeed, may never have formed) diplomatic

ties with another country. Thus, how to refer to, or communicate with, another state may be unclear.

In the example case, the OAS, by opting for a more informal approach to mediation, avoided the complex problem of having to assign terms of reference. "This, of course, turned out to be an advantage. The basic treaties give [the OAS], in effect, the *a priori* consent of the parties to assume jurisdiction. . . . Beyond that, no specific terms of reference, strategy, functions, or procedures were necessary" (Scheman & Ford, p. 217). Thus, the OAS was able to view the mediation process as a whole, without having to parcel it out according to some plan based upon arbitrary divisions such as terms of reference.

Playing Out the Metaphor. The image of "uncarved wood" can be contrasted with a finely wrought, intricate carving. Before it is carved, the block of wood might be conceptualized as containing many potential carvings. In the same way, thinking of the mediator as the uncarved block allows us the liberty of assuming that many different solutions to a conflict are possible. The final solution, the final carving, if you will, does not emerge until the session is completed, and any attempt to force a solution, no matter how attractive it may seem, leads to a distorted, misguided preconception of what will actually transpire. One who would prematurely take a chisel to the uncarved block must necessarily do violence to its wholeness. Moreover, one must take extreme care in the carving: Once the wrong stroke is made, restoration of the wood is impossible.

Application of the Metaphor. The Taoist mediator, resembling an uncarved block, possesses the original integrity of his or her own nature. Such a mediator is genuine, that is, not artificially limited in terms of the variety of approaches he or she may take. The carved block, on the other hand, is suited only to a limited number of functions; likewise, if mediators are like carved blocks, then they can function only in certain contexts and the solution such mediators engineer fits only a limited number of circumstances.

At the outset of the mediation, the OAS was free to choose from a number of different options. Thus, it could see itself, not as something carved from its original form, but as a body that possessed *a priori* authority to conduct the mediation as it saw fit. In this sense, the OAS could approach the mediation in its entirety (like an uncarved block), remaining open to the best solution without having to decide what might be best for the mediation process in advance.

Had the OAS not approached its mediation duties as an uncarved block, it might have found itself entangled in the intricacies of its carving, the complex strategies that result in a preplanned outcome at the expense of the original goal. By fixing such factors as terms of reference, one also fixes the relationships between the mediator and the disputing parties. Like a carved

block, then, flexibility is no longer possible, because the mediator is controlled by the specification of the relationship.

Metaphor Six: Open and Broad, Like a Valley

Background. Before the OAS agreed to step in as mediator of the Honduras-El Salvador conflict, an earlier effort at mediation was attempted by a body composed of several of its member states (Organization of Central American States, or ODECA). Honduras, however, refused to recognize ODECA and appealed to the OAS. The OAS's first action was to pass a resolution expressing confidence in the ODECA attempt, and, at the outbreak of hostilities, OAS "dispatched a seven-member committee to the area with a broad frame of reference to help the parties reach a cease-fire" (Scheman & Ford, p. 215). By appealing to previously ratified treaties, the OAS achieved a cease-fire between the two countries in only 14 days.

Playing Out the Metaphor. Lao-Tzu uses the image of a valley to suggest that the wise person is one who does not exclude other people. Indeed, Taoists are known for their exaltation of those whom society might regard as outcasts: A poor person, for example, in fact is exalted in Taoism because such a person is free from the bonds of material possessions. Thus, the Taoist does not differentiate such people, but remains "open and broad" toward them. The sage "has no fixed personal ideas [but] regards the people's ideas as his own" (Chan, 1963, p. 186). As one Chinese proverb has it, "the empty mind is like a valley." To be open to the opinions of others, one must be ready to accept another's opinion as one's own.

The valley is a particularly appropriate image to suggest this tendency to include and accommodate. It is an open area among the mountains, a reservoir into which water flows naturally. Moreover, the valley does not try to keep out the water; instead, since it is always geographically lower than the mountains, the water flows into it without restriction, and the valley accepts the water, no matter its origin: gentle rain, violent thunderstorm, melting snow, or whatever other form it chooses to take.

Application of the Metaphor. The key to the OAS's success in getting the parties to agree to a cease-fire lay in the fact that no one was deliberately excluded from the process. Even though, as was shown earlier, El Salvador was widely regarded as the aggressor, no attempt was made to officially sanction this designation. Thus, toward El Salvador, the OAS remained open and broad, like a valley.

Moreover, the OAS did not declare itself as a new mediating body, but instead sanctioned the efforts of the ODECA states by expressing confidence in their mediation efforts to that point. Again, the OAS aimed at inclusion, rather than exclusion, just as the valley is free to accept water, regardless of

its point of origin or original state. Had the OAS not demonstrated continuity with the findings of ODECA, it might have been interpreted as a signal that the member nations of ODECA and OAS disagreed among themselves, and thus the task of achieving agreement would have been that much more difficult.

Metaphor Seven: Merged and Undifferentiated, Like Muddy Water

Background. In mediating the Honduras-El Salvador conflict, the OAS served as a channel of communication between the two countries. "Although the parties were formally kept apart, with the committee serving as the principal communicating agent, the foreign affairs ministers of both countries and their ambassadors met regularly in OAS meetings" (Scheman & Ford, p. 217).

The OAS could act as a forum before which the conflicting parties could talk, while at the same time it would be listened to by everyone, because it had placed no artificial barriers between itself and the other nations. Because the OAS had not differentiated among the other nations on the basis of their relative status, blameworthiness, or any other factor, it came to be trusted as a reliable and impartial agency in mediating the dispute.

Playing Out the Metaphor. The Taoist aim is to become at one with the environment, so much so that events transpire without interference. The metaphor of muddy water expresses this concept perfectly. In approaching the total mediation environment, resembling muddy water is to be preferred, because one then encompasses the dynamic interplay of the so-called impurities (i.e., soil) with the water.

To contrast this with another image, consider what would happen if one were to be able to separate out the soil from the water. One would then have two static substances: still water and silt. Metaphorically, however, the muddy water of mediation flows dynamically, and the separating out of silt is achieved only when the river is moving very slowly or not at all. When the river is in motion—that is, when the participants are interacting in a dynamic, spontaneous, flexible manner—only then will all the facets of the session be encompassed by the mediator. When the river is stagnant—that is, when the process is frozen by excessive and artificial mediator intervention—only then will the water be cleared, though at this point, the silt will have sunk to the bottom. Unfortunately, when one sees clear water and silt, separated, one is not really looking at river water, but only at its constituent parts.

Application of the Metaphor. In performing its mediation duties, the OAS had to assume a large number of roles in many different aspects of the situation. It had to plan, to serve as communication conduit, to forecast possible reactions, to be sensitive to the historical factors that had led to the

conflict, and so on. To perform these roles, the OAS, paradoxically, sought not to define itself as any particular role, but literally to be "all things to all people." Thus, like the muddy water of the metaphor, the OAS made certain that it was not differentiated from the other parties involved in the conflict.

Likewise, since each of the roles depended on the successful playing of the other roles, the OAS's performances of its specific duties were interdependent upon each other (that is, "merged"). The OAS might have found it difficult to be yielding at one point (such as being flexible about terms of reference), yet take a "hard" line about another point (such as laying blame on El Salvador). The key to the OAS's success was consistency; just as when one takes a sample from any point in the river, one gets water and dirt mixed thoroughly together, so any observer watching the OAS's performance throughout the mediation of the dispute could only conclude that their actions were consistently governed by the same basic set of principles.

LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY

Despite the usefulness of Taoist metaphors in analyzing the example case, there are two possible limitations to the method, which should be kept in mind. First, "the metaphor giveth and the metaphor taketh away." On the one hand, metaphor provokes insight as one views something as something else; on the other hand, one can be limited by viewing one thing as another. Thus, the conscious use of metaphor provides a new conception, but it is still only a conception.

This limitation of reality can have very real political consequences. As Landau (1972) points out, metaphors, when taken as the thing they describe, become myths.

Difficulty arises . . . when we allow a metaphor to congeal, to harden into a rigid set—when we take it literally. What we then do is to allow a presumed analogy to become an identity, an assertion of fact that may be, and usually is, entirely erroneous. (p. 83)

Thus, if one comes to view mediation only according to the seven Taoist metaphors, he or she will have made a grave mistake: Taoism, though a useful way of looking at mediation, is still only one of many ways.

A second limitation lies in the arbitrary assignment of certain aspects of the Honduras-El Salvador conflict to one (and only one) of the seven metaphors. As befits a truly holistic perspective, any one of the seven metaphors can be taken as reflective of the whole of Taoist philosophy. Thus, to parcel out aspects of the whole context is to violate one of the basic principles of Taoism. To take just one example, consider metaphors four

("supple and pliant, like ice about to melt") and five ("genuine, like a piece of uncarved wood"). Under metaphor four, the value of informality as "supple and pliant ice" was discussed; however, this advantage could be equally well discussed as "a piece of uncarved wood" (simple, rather than complex). With a little ingenuity, each aspect of the context could equally well be explained in terms of all seven metaphors.

However, it is the interlocking character of the seven Taoist metaphors that in fact illustrates one of the basic lessons that can be learned from generative metaphors. New insight is generated through the cognitive effort involved in the process of making the connection between the metaphor and the thing it describes. In most instances, such effort results in an expansion of the "problem space," and a resultant improvement in the quality of the solution (Sternberg et al., 1979).

CONCLUSION

This paper has tried to draw the readers' attention to what the authors consider to be a useful way of viewing mediation: the way of philosophical Taoism. Given the limitations discussed above, this perspective nonetheless provides a more holistic, comprehensive, and realistic view of the mediation process, offering at least four advantages to traditional conceptualizations of mediation. First, Taoism is one of the few systems of thought that permit the mediator to remain indifferent and nondirective, while at the same time gently moving the disputants toward agreement. Second, training in Taoism's quietistic philosophy enhances a mediator's ability to alleviate and calm disputant fears. Third, since the Taoist mediator acts without action, the disputants must frequently look to themselves for the resources to solve their conflict. Fourth, because of its frequent use of paradox and metaphor, Taoism offers an effective way for analysts of the mediation process to recast recurrent problems in a different light, and thereby to discover creative and innovative solutions.

Throughout, this may have seemed to be enthusiastically endorsing the prospects for the use of philosophical Taoism by practicing mediators; however, it is not proposing the Taoist approach as the definitive model for mediation. Rather, because of Taoism's ability to enlighten through the provocation of insight, it can be useful in broadening current conceptions of what mediation entails. When boundaries are thus enlarged, mankind is strengthened in its search for answers to the persistent questions about the puzzle of human communication.

In the final analysis, Taoism's recommendations about human behavior are quite simple, in the way that all great truths are simple. They are summed

up in Chapter 49 of the *Tao Te Ching* and they provide a fitting conclusion to this discussion:

The sage has no fixed (personal) ideas.
 He regards the people's ideas as his own.
 I treat those who are good with goodness,
 And I also treat those who are not good with goodness.
 Thus goodness is attained.
 I am honest to those who are honest.
 And I am also honest to those who are not honest.
 Thus honesty is attained.

If the mediator would only attend to this simple prescription, the quality of mediation would be vastly improved.

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Deadlock

Israel and Egypt Negotiate

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Israel and Egypt have engaged in a series of major and minor negotiations since 1948. A number of cross-cultural antinomies have invariably hindered talks. First, the two sides have differed in the very role that they assign to bargaining: Israelis, as a reaction to the diaspora experience, consider haggling to be undignified, though this activity is prevalent throughout the Middle East in general and Egypt in particular. Second, a Jewish sense of vulnerability rooted in centuries of persecution has tended to burden Israeli diplomats with a grave weight of responsibility discouraging flexibility. Egyptian diplomats, representing the ageless civilization of the Nile delta, have displayed much greater confidence. Contrasting legal traditions and an Israeli preference for specificity and explicitness in contrast to a greater Egyptian tolerance for ambiguity have also been salient. In the face of these dissonances the only escape from deadlock and failure has been resort to the good offices of a mediator or cultural interpreter, a role that fortunately possesses favorable connotations in both cultures.

INTRODUCTION

International negotiation can be defined as a structured dialogue of claim and counter-claim in which an attempt is made by the accredited representatives of states to reconcile opposing views and reach agreement on subjects of mutual concern. In an anarchic world without any accepted overarching authority able to resolve disputes and allocate resources between contending powers, negotiation remains the principle mechanism for the peaceful accommodation of contending interests.

Yet its benefits are rivalled only by its inherent difficulties. Diplomatic negotiation is a deeply serious business, and may engage core values and vital interests. Issues at stake are contentious by definition and are also often unclear, intricate, and emotive. At the best of times the process taxes human ingenuity to the utmost. Even the possession by the parties concerned of shared assumptions about the forms and procedures—implicit and explicit—of negotiation is self-evidently no guarantee of success. What,

though, are the consequences when negotiators are not only the representatives of separate nations, but are also the products of different cultures and negotiating traditions? To what extent are the conduct and outcome of a negotiation affected by the confrontation of contrasting and possibly dissonant cultural expectations and approaches? Indeed, may intercultural incompatibility actually hinder negotiations that might otherwise have borne fruit?

The following chapter seeks to examine, as a kind of pilot project, the effect of intercultural dissonance and consonance on diplomatic negotiations between Egypt and Israel. Like all historical-diplomatic studies of this kind, its aim is largely to suggest relevant questions and possible directions of inquiry rather than supply conclusive answers. It also has the goal of building a bridge between international relations and intercultural communication. Regrettably, neither discipline seems to have much knowledge of the other's work, constraints, or concerns.

Most textbooks in the international relations field pass over the intercultural dimension in silence. For a survey of the specialist literature see Cohen (1987). The intercultural communications literature does little more than draw on diplomatic anecdotes. In recent years there has been growing interest in national negotiating styles with some attention paid to the problems facing the cross-cultural negotiator (e.g., Binnendijk, 1987). So far, though, the effect of intercultural factors on diplomatic relationships has only occasionally been addressed in a systematic way. In a seminal study, Strazar (1981) examines the effect of intercultural complementarity on negotiation of the 1951 San Francisco peace treaty between the United States and Japan. In contrast, Kimura (1980) analyzes the incompatibility of Soviet and Japanese negotiating traits as exemplified in the 1977 fisheries talks.

A few words of caution are in order. A study like this one should be wary of the reductionist heresy: the tendency to explain negotiating difficulties solely in terms of intercultural dissonance when incompatible interests, circumstances, or personality factors were really at fault. To avoid this tendency requires first and foremost detailed knowledge and sound judgment of what factors were or were not relevant in specific historical cases. Aggregation, the blurring over of the particular features of individual instances, is to be shunned. If in doubt, one must assume that objective interests and not subjective cognitive factors hindered progress. Atypical occurrences are to be discarded and only those tendencies noted that repeat themselves over time in varying situations involving a changing cast of actors and a repertoire of different issues.

At best, one's conclusions are bound to be tentative. Since the events under investigation were unique historical occurrences, they can never be

replicated in the laboratory, nor can one variable be manipulated as others are held constant. However, the comparative analysis of case studies can provide the kind of historical variation that the laboratory scientist tries to create artificially. It is clear, therefore, that this kind of exercise cannot achieve the degree of scientific precision available to the researcher of human behavior under controlled conditions. All it can do is to propose more or less suggestive explanations of otherwise puzzling phenomena. But it cannot, with any degree of certainty, prove that one factor rather than another was crucial in hindering or actually aborting a given negotiation. Results, in short, can be probabilistic but far from certain.

In the final analysis, then, there can be no substitute for the skill and discrimination of the researcher. He or she must piece together a conventional narrative of what actually occurred and also attempt to provide a psychological reconstruction of what lay behind the outward train of events. In other words, he or she must open up the black box and peer into the inner world of the negotiators' perceptions, assessments, and anticipations. To do this, one can only rely on the personal testimony of participants, whether in the form of contemporary records (memoranda or protocols of the negotiation), written autobiographical accounts, or solicited interview material. On occasion, existing secondary sources can supplement the picture.

CONTRASTING ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT NEGOTIATION

There was unquestionably a profound conflict of objective interests underpinning the Egyptian-Israeli dispute. Nevertheless, even before the talks leading to the historic 1979 peace treaty, the two sides had engaged in a series of negotiations, formal and informal, going back many years. Some succeeded; others did not.

A fundamental obstacle to untroubled negotiation was the parties' different assumptions about the scope and role of negotiation itself. Throughout the Middle East, bargaining is more than just a cold mechanism of the market. It is a pastime enjoyed and valued in its own right, a forum for human relationships, a mechanism of social integration. There is nothing offensive about haggling, as many Western visitors to the Middle East seem to think. On the contrary, it is expected, and its absence causes disappointment. It may actually be seen as a sign of good faith. It is certainly an opportunity for pleasurable conversation and hospitality. Only notables do not bargain, as a sign of their superior status (Khuri, 1968; Hall, 1973, pp. 106-107).

According to William Quandt (1987, pp. 118-120), Egypt's negotiating style exemplifies two Middle East traditions. One is indeed that of the bazaar or *suk*. But there is another parallel model that is very different, the tribal or

bedouin approach. Egyptians, as members of an essentially collectivistic culture, are acutely sensitive to matters of honor or face – the reputation of the individual in the eyes of his or her group. Imputations to one's honor are intolerable, face-saving is all-important. And where one's standing and self-respect are at stake, according to Quandt, the *suk* model of bargaining is quite inappropriate. Rigid insistence on principle replaces haggling; instead of face-to-face negotiation involving the risk of loss of face, mediation through the good offices of a prestigious and trusted intermediary is the accepted mode of conflict resolution.

Both approaches have been equally confusing for Israelis. When the Jews arrived in Palestine they were certainly no strangers to commerce. For generations trading had been one of the few occupations open to them. It was precisely against this aspect of diaspora life that the Zionist movement set its face. The mercantile talents of the Jew were far from a source of pride. On the contrary, they were viewed as an aberration, the result of professional discrimination. In their own land, it was argued, the Jews, freed at last, would turn their back on the marketplace. In the economy of a Jewish state every man could do that for which he was best fitted.

It is against this background that international negotiation acquires meaning for Israel's political elite. Bargaining is strongly associated with the marketplace of the *shtetl*, the East European township. Here the Jews found the source of their livelihood at the expense of their wider integration in society. Trading was not a pleasurable pastime, but part of a struggle for survival in a hostile environment. Thus, where bargaining has positive connotations for the Arab, for the Israeli it is reminiscent of a rejected and despised way of life.

Distaste for the *suk* model of negotiation is compounded by incomprehension of the bedouin approach. As a political culture, Israel is strongly attached to the virtues of compromise. The discovery that some issues are nonnegotiable comes as an unpleasant surprise.

OPENING MOVES

The contrasting Israeli and Egyptian approaches to the inaugural phase of a negotiation have provided an initial source of confusion. A classic dilemma is involved: the connection between one's opponents' opening bid and the minimal outcome they would settle for. Put another way, what element of the offer was truly negotiable?

When Egyptian negotiators conform to the *suk* model, it is natural for them "to start with opening positions that are quite far from the positions that they expect to accept when the negotiations have reached an end" (Quandt, 1987, p. 119). Israeli practice, relative to that of Egypt, is invariably to avoid

making a grossly inflated opening offer. A posture is preferred that, while leaving some limited room for maneuver, is not all that far from the final, fallback position—the minimal acceptable line of retreat. Should circumstances permit, Israel's inclination is to eschew the philosophy of the petty dealer—asking a high price to give the customer a fictitious discount. If this optimal strategy is ruled out, Israel is usually prepared to allow itself some scope for concession, but it does this to a limited extent only and with a great show of reluctance.

The reasons that Israel eschews the strategy of the inflated opening bid are not only cultural, though. Because of leaks in the press, Israeli negotiators find it difficult to engage in tactical bidding—putting forward demands that they intend to give up later. Israeli public opinion is quick to equate any such concession with selling out the national interest. Particularly on security matters, Israelis are highly conscious of their limited margin of safety. Better, they feel, to start out fairly close to the limit of the acceptable and then fight a tenacious rearguard action, eking out any concessions in very small amounts.

Israel's first acquaintance with Egyptian practice was made at Rhodes in 1949 during the armistice negotiations. In this particular case cross-cultural incompatibility made little difference to the final outcome of negotiations because the dimensions of the Egyptian defeat, and especially the overwhelming need to extract the beleaguered Faluja garrison, left Egypt with little real room for maneuver. Egypt's opening gambit still came as something of a shock to the Israeli negotiators: It was to demand Israeli agreement to the appointment of an Egyptian military governor at Beersheba, which was fairly and squarely within Israeli territory. When this proposal was laughed out of court, the Egyptians put in the claim for a governor at Bir Asluj, a collection of mud huts to the south of the town. In the end U.N. mediator Ralph Bunche prevailed upon Israel to agree to a demilitarized zone at the site, as a face-saving concession to Egypt. Walter Eytan, leader of the Israeli delegation, drew the rueful lesson from the episode that in the future Israel would also have to start out with "far-reaching and even fanciful demands," otherwise it would "not get very much in the end." "This whole business," he added, "consists of oriental bargaining. When the Egyptians finally agreed to drop their demand for a Civil Administrator in Bir Asluj, Bunche at once chalked it up as a concession to their credit and demanded an equivalent concession from us" (Rosenthal, 1983, p. 254).

Despite the lesson of Rhodes, cultural imperatives invariably proved more compelling. Of course, Israelis were theoretically aware of the virtues of tactical bidding, but found it difficult to transcend fundamental assumptions. At the Camp David talks of September 1978, which everybody knew were a make-or-break opportunity for the success of the peace process, and which

were the culmination of all Israel's experience of negotiating with Egypt, President Sadat's stiff opening price — which included a demand for reparations — still caught Israeli negotiators unawares. Dr. Moshe Sharon, a government adviser on Arab affairs, recalls that on the eve of the conference "[Prime Minister] Begin told his associates that Sadat was a modern man, and that one should not bargain with him as though one were in a market. Right at the beginning of the talks one should make clear the maximum extent of one's concessions" (Sharon, 1985). Begin was to be sorely disappointed. At the opening session Sadat presented the detailed draft of an overall agreement that went back on all the concessions made or hinted at in prior contacts and reiterated the most inflexible of Arab positions. Even so, Egyptian Foreign Minister Kamel considered his president's strategy to be excessively moderate. He advised him to adopt an even "tougher" opening stand than envisaged in order to obtain greater "elbow-room" in the face of "pressure designed to secure concessions from the outset." Sadat disagreed, clearly more aware than Kamel of what the market would bear (Kamel, 1986, p. 286).

Still, the Israeli team was left at an utter loss as to Sadat's intentions. Begin saw the Egyptian draft as a ploy "to force Israel to break up the conference and incur international condemnation." Ezer Weizman and the others were equally shocked. Moshe Dayan, who had been dealing with Arabs at both the private and official levels for most of his life, wondered whether the move was meant as an opening gambit or was intended for public consumption as a demonstration of Egypt's unflinching defense of the Arab cause (Weizman, 1981, p. 353; Dayan, 1981, p. 162).

The Israeli approach was no less deceptive for Egypt. Saadia Touval (1982) observes that Egypt was seriously misled about the limits of Israeli concessions in U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger's ill-fated attempt to achieve a second disengagement agreement in March 1975 (p. 269). It is learned from the memoirs of Israel's then prime minister, Yitzhak Rabin, that in return for a peace treaty he was prepared to withdraw from most of the Sinai. His second preference was for a solemn Egyptian declaration of nonbelligerency, for which Israel would withdraw to a line bisecting the desert. Failing either of those two alternatives, of which he doubted the feasibility, he was prepared to settle for a "mini accord" — a limited withdrawal in return for a consolidation of the cease-fire. Either way, it was clear that Egypt would not settle for much less than the Abu Rodeis oil fields on the Gulf of Suez and the strategic Mitla and Giddi passes, which control the approaches to the Suez Canal.

In two ill-advised interviews in the run-up to the shuttle-style, Rabin candidly sketched out a position that actually reflected his true views but would inevitably be perceived by Egypt as an opening offer to be whittled

down. To *Ha'aretz* on December 3, 1974, Rabin admitted that the demand for a nonbelligerency agreement was unrealistic. In a second interview with ABC television in February, 1975, Rabin gave notice that "in exchange for an Egyptian commitment not to go to war . . . the Egyptians could get even the passes and the oil fields." If this was Rabin's opening position it could only mean in Egyptian eyes that (a) he would settle for less than a declaration of nonbelligerency, and (b) Egypt could expect to receive at least the passes and the oil fields. Rabin had stripped himself naked even before negotiations had got under way. Because this was actually his fallback position, he had left himself with no cards to bargain with.

As Touval (1982) correctly argues, the rules of the game required that both sides make concessions during the course of the shuttle, above and beyond anything given away beforehand. Adopting precisely these tactics, Egypt opened the bidding with an extravagant opening proposal. Israel would withdraw hundreds of kilometers to within 20 kilometers of the international boundary; Egypt would advance to a line east of the strategic passes; while a demilitarized zone would separate the two sides. Having left himself the whole of the Sinai Peninsula to maneuver in, Sadat, from then on, could afford to be generous. Rabin, in contrast, had provided himself with little to give away apart from a handful of transparently artificial demands for a cessation of the propaganda war and the passage of Israeli cargoes through the Suez Canal. Worst of all, and to the utter confusion of the Egyptians, Israel—in the absence of a full-blown nonbelligerency agreement—refused point-blank to concede the Mitla and the Giddi passes to Egypt. With the world accusing Israel of intransigence, the shuttle ended in abject failure (Rabin, 1979a). That the breakdown was a result of miscalculation and not the clash of irreconcilable interests is demonstrated by the fact that Kissinger returned to the Middle East six months later, in August 1975, and this time succeeded in mediating an accord satisfactory to both sides, including an Israeli descent from the passes.

MIDDLE GAME

The intermediate stages of an Egyptian-Israeli negotiation have been marked by dogged and drawn-out rearguard actions on the part of Israel. Compared with their Egyptian counterparts, Israeli negotiators tend to a slow rate of progress, acute sensitivity to the security implications of any moves, hesitant and piecemeal concessions resisted until the last possible moment, and a propensity to excessive legalism. The Egyptian style is uncompromising on issues of high principle—the land and sovereignty—and, while tactically tenacious, ready for the unexpected and advantageous concession.

Some of the differences between the two sides can be immediately accounted for in terms of their respective political cultures, especially as reflected in the structure and practice of government. For their part, Israeli cabinets rest on finely balanced coalitions in which the prime minister is no more than a first among equals. Cabinet ministers can rarely be dismissed because they owe their position, not to prime ministerial preference, which can be subsequently withdrawn, but to the autonomous support of their own parties or party factions, which cannot — without a government crisis. Political necessities apart, democratic habits of consultation run deep, and leaders are highly accessible to subordinates and sensitive to public opinion.

In contrast, the Egyptian president stands at the head of a relatively compliant and authoritarian regime. With due regard to the formidable practical constraints to which he is subject, the *Rais* enjoys, within the system, undoubtedly wide prerogatives. He can appoint or dismiss ministers at will, is not vulnerable to a vote of no confidence in parliament and has a formidable security and propaganda apparatus at his disposal. Public opinion has shown itself pliable to government directives on matters of foreign policy. Consent, rather than consensus, is the pattern. All this implies that the Egyptian president has greater freedom to make timely and crucial negotiating decisions than his Israeli counterparts. Thus he is in a far better position to bargain tactically and to regulate the pace of negotiations without reference to domestic political imperatives.

American and Egyptian impatience with Israel's convoluted and contentious method of decision making, though understandable, was misguided and unhelpful. Sadat's assessment during the long gap in substantive negotiations that lasted through the spring and summer of 1978 — that he could somehow undermine Begin's leadership by cultivating leader of the opposition Shimon Peres, by attacking the Israeli prime minister in the media, and by parading his friendship with Ezer Weizman — was equally mistaken. Former Foreign Minister Kamel's report that Sadat actually approached the Americans with the idea of toppling Begin, suggests a complete misreading by Sadat of the Israeli political map. To the extent that Sadat's faulty grasp of Israeli domestic debate misled him into believing that he could somehow reach agreement with Israel while bypassing the Begin government, it clearly contributed to the delay in the peace process. For all Israel's own misjudgments of Egyptian necessities, a settlement was only going to be achieved by the resumption of dialogue and not by one side's imposition of its views on the other.

In addition to a political system that leaves the leadership limited powers of discretion, Israel brings to negotiations an obsession with security that only makes sense in the light of the Jewish history of persecution that culminated in the Nazi mass extermination of the Jews. This emerges in the

form of very deep suspicion of the opponent (and even the mediator), reluctance to move too fast before every possible implication has been weighed, and a degree of emotional involvement that is not always well concealed. Thus while Israel might be objectively stronger, militarily, than Egypt, subjectively, it felt itself weaker. Egypt, the product of 7000 years of uninterrupted settlement, has seen countless conquerors come and go, and has outlasted all of them. Thus it is not surprising that Israel's security concerns should be viewed by Egyptian leaders as a mere pretext for expansionism.

Hence the paradox of the post-1973 series of negotiations: Although convinced that it had defeated Egypt on the battlefield, Israel conducted itself at the negotiating table with a shrill defensive-mindedness verging on the paranoid, while Egypt could adopt a move philosophical posture. The pattern was established as early as the cease-fire negotiations of October 1973, which terminated hostilities in the Yom Kippur War. It entailed Israeli haggling over the slightest concession, avoiding any compromise that was not absolutely essential, and settling only when other parties had reached the very limits of exhaustion. In contrast, Sadat displayed a serene and flexible willingness to make needed concessions on the road to an ultimate settlement.

Over the crucial issue of the encircled Egyptian Third Army, effectively trapped on the east bank of the Suez Canal by Israel's invasion of the West Bank, Israel only consented to allow essential supplies through in the face of an American ultimatum. It was easier for Israel to be coerced into agreement, to be able to claim before parliament and public opinion that there was no other alternative, than to concede of its own free will (Kissinger, 1982, pp. 538-539, 624).

In the 1975 negotiations for a second disengagement agreement, Israel fought a stubborn and protracted campaign in an effort to extract the best possible deal and to demonstrate for everybody's benefit that it was no pushover. Sadat again preferred the tactic of timely concession and avoided quibbling over details. As has already been shown, the first stage of the talks ended in deadlock. Kissinger was right in his judgment, conveyed to the Egyptians, that the Rabin government's domestic base was too insecure to be able to make serious decisions without prolonged deliberation (Fahmy, 1983, p. 161).

When the disengagement talks resumed in August 1975 the Israeli government, though more aware of the limits of the possible, was certainly no less painstaking in its approach. "During those 10 days [August 21-31]," Rabin recalled, "we held daylong—and occasionally nightlong—discussions and there were times when we felt we were flogging a dead horse. Five hours might be spent discussing a stretch of sand 100 meters long. It was a

supreme test of our patience, persistence, and even our physical endurance. Wisely, skillfully, patiently, Kissinger inched his way forward between Sadat's difficulties and mine, between proclamations from each side that 'this is our final concession' " (Rabin, 1979b, p. 272).

Careful comparison of the Hebrew and English versions of the above extract reveals a curious omission in the English edition. The following sentences have been deleted: "Myriads of words were aired. We split hairs for hours on end over every trifling clause" (Rabin, 1979a, p. 487). The Hebrew term for hair-splitting is the same word used for that meticulous process of textual analysis, casuistry, and dialectics — *pilpul* — traditionally used in Talmudic study. There is no point in speculating why Rabin should have preferred to avoid this reference in the English edition. What is clear, though, is that of all the features of Israeli negotiating style, this is the most characteristic.

Stress on Israel's excessive legalism should not give the impression that Egypt (or, still less, the United States) has been negligent of legal niceties. Egyptian negotiators have shown a high degree of professional competence and the ability to wage a skillful and determined campaign over the phraseology of agreements. They are certainly not in the business of making juridical gifts to the Israelis or anyone else. No, what is referred to by Israeli legalism is something over and above mere textual precision and the adroit negotiation of a favorable document. There is no virtue in technical sloppiness. Excessive legalism, rather, implies two unusual patterns of behavior: (a) the reliance on legal expedients — formulas and instruments — to achieve objectives that go beyond the realistic scope and function of international law, and (b) an obsession with words for their own sake — an exaggerated and unjustified preoccupation with semantics.

To anyone familiar with the Jewish tradition of Talmudic scholarship the Israeli approach to international law comes as no surprise. Every Talmudic text has a virtually word-by-word commentary, and every commentary itself gives rise to a host of primary, secondary, tertiary, and so on, commentaries in a theoretically infinite regression. Study entails the loving interpretation of text, painstaking cross-referencing and comparison of alternative explanations, analysis of every conceivable aspect of a problem — including the consideration of deliberately remote contingencies — culminating in a solution in which apparently contradictory views are demonstrated to be reconcilable within an overall synthesis. Among secular Jews, especially the Zionists, Talmudic study fell into disrepute for its otherworldliness, its tendency to sterile scholasticism and verbal quibbling. However, it still flourishes in hundreds of academies in Israel and the diaspora, and its methods of textual analysis are deeply ingrained in Israeli culture.

Henry Kissinger, not entirely tongue-in-cheek, has called negotiating with Israel "ordeal by exegesis." In the first place, Israeli negotiators much prefer to have a written draft to work with. They are not happy with grand conceptual speculations and generalizations. Negotiation then consists in debate over, and painstaking examination of, each term and alternative term in the draft until a final, satisfactory version is arrived at. The Talmudic heritage makes itself felt in the search for meanings behind meanings, an extreme preoccupation with remote contingencies, and what has been called "over-negotiation" — continuing to quibble beyond the point at which diminishing returns set in.

In the final analysis one wonders whether Israel's overreliance on legal instruments and formulas is not in effect a mechanism for overcoming a deep-seated mistrust and fulfilling a subjective need for reassurance. Aharon Barak, Israel's attorney general and a key participant in the Camp David talks, admitted as much when he remarked that many of the Israeli positions had no intrinsic merit but were "essentially psychological in origin" (Brzezinski, 1983, p. 269).

Had they been left alone with the Israelis at Camp David it is doubtful whether the Egyptians would have had the forbearance to keep going. Talmudic scholasticism is utterly remote from the Western-style legal training received by many Egyptian diplomats. American solicitude and tolerance were sorely needed to bridge the gap. Fortunately the American skill in conciliation and industrial mediation proved tailor-made for both Israelis and Egyptians. On the function of the intermediary — *wasta* in Arabic, *shtadlan* in Hebrew/Yiddish — Jews and Egyptians demonstrated a rare cultural compatibility.

Always ready with a new draft, alternative formulations, a slightly different turn of phrase, the United States could provide the sort of authoritative and reassuring interpretation of a text (in the form of a side letter or memorandum of understanding) without which Israel would not commit itself. (This technique had proved itself indispensable during negotiation of the 1974 and 1975 disengagement agreements.) For a shame culture, like Egypt, mediation was also vital in facilitating a difficult concession or the acceptance of a novel proposal. What would have been an intolerable blow to pride if accepted from the adversary could be agreed to with no loss of face from the intermediary. In short, American mediation and cultural interpretation were indispensable to the success of the negotiation.

Anticipating Israeli legalism and Egyptian posturing, the U. S. delegation wisely decided to discard its clients' own, improbable, texts and work with an American draft agreement on the table. Each side would react, separately, to points in the document and the Americans would then generate a fresh

formulation. President Carter would take this proposal to Sadat for quick approval or slight modification and then present it for Israeli appraisal. This method fitted in very well with Israel's favored approach. According to Carter (1982), he would spend "hours or days working on the same point."

Sometimes, in the end, the change of word or phrase would satisfy Begin, and I would merely inform Sadat. I was never far from a good dictionary and thesaurus, and on occasion the American and Israeli delegations would all be clustered around one of these books, eagerly searching for acceptable synonyms. Would the Israelis withdraw "out of" certain areas or "into" military encampments? What was meant by "autonomy," "self-rule," "devolution," "Palestinian people," "authority," "minor modifications," "refugees," "insure, ensure, or guarantee," and so forth? The Egyptians were never involved in these kinds of discussions with me. (Carter, 1982, p. 356)

Faced with what he regarded as Israeli haggling over minutiae, Sadat became increasingly restless. This was exactly the kind of negotiation most uncongenial to him and from which he had withdrawn the previous January in disgust. In his view the leaders should agree on the principles of a just peace and leave the drafting to the experts. By the eleventh day of the conference he was at breaking point and prepared to go home. Only a heartfelt appeal from the president of the United States persuaded him to stay on (Vance, 1983, p. 224).

END GAME

The closing stages of an Israeli-Egyptian negotiation can be characterized as a last ditch Israeli effort to obtain maximum specificity. Ambiguity is shunned and written commitments insisted upon. Egypt displays a greater tolerance for ambiguity where called for and may seek to avoid public embarrassment by informal understanding. What is not made as translucent and explicit as possible, Israelis argue, but left to the mercy of future Egyptian benevolence is unlikely to be honored. Wrong, argue the Egyptians: The more formal you want it, the less likely you are to get it. Trust us.

Neither side, of course, has a monopoly of virtue in the matter. Every negotiation has to be taken on its own merits in the light of circumstances, and anyway, the success or failure of an agreement will be contingent on subsequent political realities. Whereas in one case a lack of detail may dilute or obviate an obligation, simply inviting future confusion and bitterness, in another case ambiguity may serve a larger purpose by saving face or

permitting an intractable obstacle to be bypassed. There are no hard and fast rules; whether one prefers preclusive detail to constructive ambiguity is, in the final analysis, a question of judgment — and instinct.

It is at this point that cultural conditioning enters the picture. On the whole, Israelis attach a high value to semantic accuracy as an end in itself. This is both the thrust of their legal tradition and, rational or not, their means to tie down an opponent in whose reliability they have gnawing doubts. Insistence on specificity and contractual formality have also reflected the need to have as tangible and watertight an agreement as possible to reassure a skeptical public that any concessions were worthwhile.

For their part the Egyptians have less faith in the irrevocably binding powers of contract. In the words of the Arabic proverb: "Peace comes from understanding, not agreement." If there is trust, a contract is superfluous; if trust is absent, an agreement cannot help. At the same time Egypt is in its element with indirectness, the pregnant silence tacitly implying an otherwise embarrassing consent, the subtle hint that may be acceptable where the explicit statement would offend. Ambiguity and informality have thus appealed to Egypt as ways of reconciling the conflicting pulls of national expediency and loyalty to the wider Arab cause. They can conceal, or at least minimize, the shame that Arab purists will see as inherent in any deal made with the Jewish state.

All Israeli-Egyptian agreements since 1973 have had to find the middle way between obscure versus precise or implicit versus explicit formulations. The pattern was set as early as November 1973 in the negotiations for a binding cease-fire agreement after the Yom Kippur War. In essence the accommodation rested on a careful balance of advantage initially agreed upon between Kissinger and Sadat: A corridor would be opened up along the Cairo-Suez road to permit the resupply of the encircled Egyptian Third Army; although the route passed through Israeli-controlled territory, this fact would be disguised by placing the checkpoints under U.N. control; the Egyptian blockade of the Straits of Bab el-Mandeb at the entrance to the Red Sea would be lifted, provided Israel made only "moderate" use of them; and there would be an exchange of all prisoners of war.

In order to save Egyptian face it was necessary to maintain a certain fuzziness about the exact details of these arrangements. What Sadat could accept in practice, he could not agree to formally. As Kissinger understood, "too many public concessions would hurt his position with his Arab brethren." The lifting of the blockade would be unpopular, Sadat would find it highly embarrassing to acknowledge the fact of Israeli control over the Cairo-Suez road, and a detailed schedule of the resupply of the Third Army "would have brought home its plight to every Arab." If the cease-fire were to be a humiliation for Egypt, what possible chance would there be of

progressing towards a political settlement which, after all, was the ultimate prize to aim for?

All Israeli instincts militated against this imprecision. There should be a firm timetable for the exchange of prisoners. What was meant by "moderate" use of the straits? By how much and how often was the Third Army to be resupplied? Who controlled the road, Israel or the United Nations? Pleas to avoid humiliating the Egyptians fell on deaf ears. On the contrary, a badly shaken Israel had its own psychological requirement: let Egyptian dependence on Israeli grace be emphasized. Finally, public opinion had to be considered, and Israel, amidst all its sorrows, was in the run-up to an election. Private assurances would cut little ice with an electorate vigilant to any hint of a sellout.

In this kind of "dialogue of the deaf" all hinges on the presence and ingenuity of a cultural interpreter able to explain each side to the other and tender assurances the rivals themselves cannot provide. Left to their own devices the former combatants might, willy-nilly, have resumed hostilities. Hence to mitigate Israeli suspicions the United States agreed to an Israeli-American memorandum of understanding spelling out in detail the exact terms of the cease-fire. It was this authorized interpretation that gave Israel the confidence to withdraw its objections to the original accord. In the event, the memorandum of understanding was never invoked, proving, as Kissinger wryly observes, "that the parties understood each other much better" than their "raucous posturing" had suggested (1982, pp. 641-654).

As long as Kissinger's step-by-step diplomacy was under way, it was possible to resolve Israeli-Egyptian discord on the relative merits of specificity and explicitness with American reassurances. And should a problem later arise in the implementation of one of the interim accords, the United States was always there to lend a helping hand. For instance, Israeli experts were less than happy with the 1975 military annex specifying the dispositions of the Egyptian and Israeli armies in the Sinai under the terms of the second disengagement agreement. For three days they fought unsuccessfully for an exact definition of the size and structure of the units permitted in the limited-force zones. (The relevant clause simply referred to "Eight (8) standard infantry battalions.") When Israeli surveillance flights subsequently detected some technical infringements of this provision—arising from a rather flexible Egyptian interpretation of what constituted a "standard infantry battalion"—all hell broke loose in Israel, with the news soon leaking to the media. While the experts could say "we told you so," general perceptions of Egyptian unreliability were reinforced. What was an essentially trivial episode could have had unfortunate consequences for the peace process had the United States not intervened to resolve the dispute (*Yediot Ahronot*, 1979).

Once interim arrangements gave way to negotiations for a full-blown peace it became harder to span the gulf between Egyptian and Israeli sensibilities. Without exaggeration it can be said that subjective, rather than substantive, factors were the major obstacle in the path of progress in the long months between Sadat's Jerusalem visit and the Camp David summit. Two issues were the focus of dispute: the future of the Palestinians, and the question of withdrawal. True, both sides profoundly differed on the solution to these problems. But Egypt was prepared to obfuscate any disagreement in the short term in order to clear the way for bilateral negotiations on a treaty of peace; Israel was not. Thus while President Sadat strongly pressed for a rapid declaration of principles, including a general expression of readiness to solve the Palestinian problem, Prime Minister Begin preferred to meet the issue head on. Far from postponing confrontation, he insisted on premature preclusion. Where the former sought a vague, face-saving formula for the benefit of the Arab world, the latter, intolerant of the unsatisfactory ambiguity of this device, wished to preclude all future uncertainty.

It was at Ismailia in December 1977 that the breadth of the gap between the two sides became apparent. Eschewing all preliminary discussion on general principles, Begin had arrived in Egypt with a comprehensive blueprint on the future of the West Bank: the autonomy plan. At the first meeting of the Egyptian and Israeli delegations he plunged straight into detailed exposition. In vain Sadat tried to steer him round to a discussion of "big business." All that was required at this point, the *Rais* indicated, was a brief communicate of two or three lines. There was no need to go into details on behalf of the Palestinians. As Sadat had informed Israel before the conference, via the United States, he could go ahead with a bilateral peace, but only within a wider framework — a declaration of principles "formulated in general terms . . . which could give him the necessary defence against domestic and external criticism, and enable him to conduct practical negotiations . . . for a peace treaty" (Dayan, 1981, p. 98). But this was precisely what Israel was not prepared to concede.

Until the very last days of the Camp David conference the Israeli delegation continued to see the autonomy plan as the necessary condition for an agreement with Egypt. Only when failure stared it in the face did it realize, with American prompting, that fudging was the only way to bridge the gap between the two sides on the Palestinian question. (The other great issue, the principle of full withdrawal from the Sinai, was conceded.) Were an agreement to be reached at all, Dayan now recognized, major differences of opinion would either have to be left unmentioned or covered up with "vague formulae which each side could interpret in its own way." All hope of ensnaring the Egyptians in entangling detail evaporated. Ditching all his

preconceptions, Dayan accepted that the problem was "more one of words and formulae than of substance" (Dayan, 1981, pp. 166, 176).

The resultant accord—intended to provide the framework within which an Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty would be negotiated—was basically an elaboration of formulas that had been agreed upon by Sadat in January and July 1978 but rejected at the time by Israel. On the West Bank, Israel made substantial concessions and obtained few of the binding elements of the original autonomy plan. It agreed that "representatives of the Palestinian people should participate in negotiations on the resolution of the Palestinian problem in all its aspects"; and that the subsequent solution would "recognize the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people and their just requirements."

As for the other substantive issues—Jerusalem, the settlements, the future prerogatives of the Israeli army, the very nature of authority in the area—all were shrouded in a decent veil of obscurity. Sometimes the positions of both sides were included simultaneously, further adding to the ambiguity. The whole effort, in fact, had been an extraordinary waste of time: No substantive agreement had been achieved, all the principle differences remained, and even the mechanism for progress that was determined on proved to be a broken reed. If anything, Israel had conceded more than it needed to; the idea of a five-year transitional regime for the West Bank, though constructive in itself, did not square with the *Likud* government's real intention—which was to consolidate Israel's hold over the area. The Aswan formula would have served the needs of the *Likud* at lower cost, and without the complicating and embarrassing effect of American involvement.

When it was all over—and Sadat had achieved basically what he had wanted all along, only far, far too late to draw other Arab states into the peace process—there were still those on the Israeli side who remained convinced of the ingenuity of their formulations. Inclusion of the phrase "withdrawal of the Israeli armed forces" rather than something more irrevocable—say *abrogation*, *departure*, or *retreat*—was the cause of particular satisfaction. A more realistic assessment was provided by Begin's *chef de cabinet* and the chairman of the committee that had prepared the position papers for Camp David, Eliahu Ben-Elissar (1981). Looking back, he acknowledged that the very genius of the accord lay in its lack of clarity, since in this way Israel and Egypt were able to negotiate a bilateral peace within a relatively short time (p. 24).

CONCLUSION

Reasons of space have prevented the inclusion here of a comprehensive survey of Egyptian-Israeli negotiations from 1949 to the present day. But there is overwhelming evidence for the salience of intercultural incompatibility in the breakdown or deadlocking of talks, formal and informal, over the entire period. The 1949 armistice accords envisaged that Egypt and Israel would conclude a full peace in a short time. Both Prime Minister Ben Gurion and President Nasser recognized long ago that no fundamental clash of national interests immutably divided the parties. Yet it took 30 years and four more wars for this objective consonance to acquire diplomatic form. Even today the two countries find it excruciatingly difficult to reach agreement. Most recently, negotiations over the Taba dispute remained deadlocked for years, resulting in ill will and considerable damage to mutual relations.

The Taba issue, like all the others, could not be resolved by Egyptians and Israelis negotiating face-to-face. Contrasting assumptions about negotiation and profound differences in the use of verbal and nonverbal communication (which, again, could not be treated here for reasons of space) precluded understanding. Only the intervention of a skilled, committed, and sympathetic cultural interpreter after 1973, fulfilling all the requirements of mediation called for by Egyptian and Israeli cultures, has permitted the reconciliation of cross-cultural *antinomies*. But for the good offices of the United States, the two sides would have remained locked in their previous pattern of dissension.

The Egyptian-Israeli case is interesting and important not only by virtue of its wider international ramifications but also because it is a paradigm of a confrontation between cultural archetypes: high-context versus low-context, traditional versus modern, collectivist versus individualist, shame versus guilt, third world versus first world. True, the contiguity of these two highly disparate societies is something of a trick of history. Adjacent cultures usually acquire a better acquaintance with each other over the centuries; Israel and Egypt have not had time. However, this kind of incongruous diplomatic encounter is becoming increasingly frequent. The United States faces analogous difficulties in its diplomatic relations with Mexico and other, more distant but also important, nations such as India, Iran, China, Japan, and so on. Regrettably, the United States cannot, like Israel and Egypt, draw on the services of an external honest broker or cultural interpreter to help resolve its differences with unfamiliar societies. This condition only serves to give added emphasis to the need for further intensive application of the insights and lessons of the intercultural approach to its too-long-estranged sister field of international relations.

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III

COMMUNICATION, COMMUNITY, PEACE, AND DEVELOPMENT

Communication, Peace, and Development

A Communitarian Perspective

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Theories of communication, peace, and development have been dominated by a postwar debate between two dominant perspectives, which have come to be known as the modernization and dependency schools. This essay presents a third theoretical perspective, emanating from the civil rights, peace, environmentalist, and feminist movements in the first world; the current liberalizing movements and trends in the second world; and the national liberation movements in the third world. Despite their eclectic intellectual origins, these movements share certain common concerns and normative preferences focusing on the primacy of community as distinct from the primacy of freedom in the modernization paradigm (liberalism) and equality in the dependency paradigm (Marxism). Beginning with that premise, this chapter offers a communitarian theoretical perspective on communication, peace, and development that points to a path toward participatory, nonviolent, and ecologically and socially responsible forms of development. It concludes with some caveats on the totalitarian temptations inherent to the developmental process.

In the postwar period, theories and policies of communication and development have been largely dominated by two schools of thought: liberal and Marxist. The liberal theories have argued for a *modernization* paradigm that has used the nation-state as its chief unit of analysis, focused on the internal dynamics of the developmental process, and drawn conclusions that are partial to market solutions and transnational corporate penetration of third-world economies. The Marxist theorists, by contrast, have largely operated on a *dependency* paradigm that critiques the modernization theories for their failure to account for the structural factors at the national and international levels and for their procapitalist bias (Blomstrom & Hettne, 1984). The dependency paradigm has used the world capitalist system as its chief unit of analysis, focused on the center-periphery dynamics of development, and argued for a social revolution and developmental policies that aim at industrialization with the aid of the socialist, rather than the capitalist, camp.¹

This chapter attempts to provide a third perspective on communication, peace, and development theory. This perspective emerges from a long theoretical tradition critical of the processes of modernization and industrialization. Jean Jacques Rousseau, Emile Durkheim, the American Transcendentalists (Emerson, Thoreau, and Whitman), John Ruskin, Mahatma Gandhi, Leo Tolstoy, and the intellectual leaders of the current, worldwide peace, environmentalist, and Green movements may be considered among the leading theorists of this third school.² Insofar as this school tends to focus on the preservation of community as the highest value, I have chosen to label it *communitarian* in order to characterize its main tendencies. This contrasts to liberalism's focus on liberty and Marxism's preoccupation with equality. Although concerned with the preservation of individual freedom and social equality, communitarianism is most deeply disturbed about the loss of community in the modern world—replacing, in somewhat of a less sexist terminology, the concept of *fraternity* in the French Revolution's trinity of "*liberté, égalité, fraternité*."

This chapter will begin with a critique of the prevailing concepts of development, followed by some reconsiderations on communication and development policies, and conclude with a presentation of the communitarian strategy. The presentation here is, of necessity, rather terse. For longer expositions, the reader must consult some of the references, particularly those associated with a communitarian perspective.

DEVELOPMENT VERSUS DEVELOPMENTALISM

The postwar decades have been characterized by the worldwide spread of an ideology of economic growth that may be labeled as *developmentalism*. This ideology is fundamentally rooted in the 18th century idea of *progress*, which sees material development in and of itself as good and inevitable. The liberal and Marxist versions of this ideology have viewed cultural development as derivative of material progress. Material backwardness (in science, technology, levels of production, and consumption) has been viewed ipso facto as cultural backwardness. Both views tend to see the process of development essentially in terms of accumulation of capital and the mass production of consumer goods. Development policies derived from these ideological premises, whether under capitalism or communism, thus have been characterized by a kind of growth mania.

The vision of an industrial system rich in material production of goods and services lurks behind these theories and ideologies of development. In this view, sociocultural progress is seen as derivative of the economic sector, to be measured by the production and distribution of commodities. The

literature of development thus is replete with an array of economic, social, and cultural indicators that measure the progress of nations along certain preconceived targets of competition, ranging from per capita income to radio and television sets per 1,000 of population. In this sense, therefore, development indicators express the commodity fetishism characteristic of some of the advanced and highly secularized industrial societies.

The concept of development indicators owes much of its popularity to normative theories of social change. Indicators objectify a desired model of development. They tend to reveal, however, as much as to conceal the normative premises upon which much of their legitimacy rests. To select one set of development indicators as opposed to another suggests preferences, conscious or unconscious, for certain social goals as opposed to others. Indicators thus stand as intermediate variables between development theory and development policy. As such, they may be considered as powerful channels of ideological legitimation and social communication for any hegemonic project of social development.

While it is the function of development theory to clarify the theoretically possible choices, development policy makes the choices, development ideology rationalizes them (often based on specific class interests legitimated in terms of some generalized notions of common good), and development indicators communicate them. Development theory, however, has gone through considerable transformation in the last three United Nations Development Decades. Extremes of pessimism (as in Nurkse's [1953] "vicious circles of poverty" theories) have given way to extremes of optimism (as in Rostow's [1960] "stage theory of take-off into self-sustained growth"), to be in turn challenged from the left by the world system and dependency theories (Nurkse, 1953; Rostow, 1960; Baran, 1958; Frank, 1969; Wallerstein, 1974, 1979; Schiller, 1981). While liberal theories have focused primarily on the internal dynamics of modernization, Marxism has emphasized the international linkages of dependency in the processes of "development of underdevelopment."

In the light of the dramatic developments of the 1980s (the rise of the newly industrializing countries, the debt crisis facing some of them, and the revolutionary upheavals in some others), the importance of cultural and structural factors has become better known and appreciated. The more recent perspectives attempt to analyze the influences of both internal and external forces in the developmental process, while emphasizing cultural and historical specificity. In the meantime, development indicators have broadened in scope to include economic as well as social and cultural (communication) variables. The concept of qualitative as opposed to quantitative indicators has also been introduced into the literature in order to suggest the importance of historical and structural variables (Tehrani, 1981).

The concept of development is so value-laden that any examination of its derivative concepts, such as development communication indicators, must guard against any facile notions of progress. However, much of the literature of development communication is replete with the linear, one-dimensional, and commodified notions of progress. UNESCO's original set of suggested minimal standards for the mass media provides an example of such a theoretical bias (UNESCO, 1961, p. 16). These called for every country to provide at least the following media facilities per 1,000 people: 100 copies of daily newspaper(s), 50 radio sets, 20 cinema seats, and 20 television receivers. In the call for a New World Communication and Information Order, however, UNESCO's emphasis changed from quantitative to structural changes (UNESCO, 1980). Now that many of the less-developed countries (LDCs) have nearly achieved or surpassed the original UNESCO standards (albeit unevenly), it is increasingly apparent that more media facilities do not necessarily and automatically mean higher standards of economic or cultural development, improved social communication, or greater political democracy.

In the context of the LDCs where media programs are often dominated by Western imports and government propaganda, the contrary may be argued. In many instances, the big media (the national press, broadcasting, satellites, mainframe computers) are often in control of the government, and the indigenous communication networks (the temple, the church, and the mosque) as well as the small media (transistor radios, copying machines, audio and video cassette recorders, mimeographs, and traditional networks of communication) are in the possession of the grass roots organizations. Under such circumstances, dualistic systems of communication have also emerged alongside the dualistic economic, political, and cultural structures. A revolutionary social situation (as in Iran, the Philippines, Central America, and South Africa) has pitted one media system against another (Tehranian, 1979, 1981). Communication indicators that are insensitive to the small media cannot capture, let alone monitor, communication and social change. The growth in the indicators of the big media measure primarily the availability of capital, the government's commitment to the expansion of the communication infrastructure—often in pursuit of political centralization and administrative penetration—and possibly the existence of high incomes and effective demand for communication consumer products (as in the Persian Gulf states).

The processes of transnationalization of the world economy and global advertising (Barnet & Muller, 1974; Fuller, 1983) have considerably hastened the homogenization of a world culture. As Illich (1978, pp. 17-18) poignantly puts it:

Fifty years ago, most of the words heard by an American were personally spoken to him as an individual, or to somebody nearby. Only occasionally did words reach him as the undifferentiated member of a crowd—in the classroom or church, at a rally or a circus. Words were mostly like handwritten, sealed letters, and not like the junk mail that now pollutes our mail. Today, words that are directed to one person's attention have become rare. Engineered staples of images, ideas, feelings and opinion, packaged and delivered through the media, assault our sensibilities with round-the-clock regularity. Two points now become evident. One, what is occurring with language fits the pattern of an increasingly wide range of need-satisfaction relationships. Two, this replacement of convivial means by manipulative industrial ware is truly universal, and is relentlessly making the New York teacher, the Chinese commune member, the Bantu schoolboy, and the Brazilian sergeant alike.

In the third world, where the processes of development have taken place piecemeal and unevenly, the social system is often torn between a modernizing elite and a traditionalist mass. Frequently, the two sectors of the population live in separate quarters, sometimes as if in separate countries and centuries. What goes under the rubric of development often includes the processes of growth in physical output, its lopsided distribution among the traditional and modern sectors of the economy and society, and increasing dualism and alienation. In the meantime, the increasing level of division and alienation of labor in the economic sphere, bureaucratization and professionalization of power and authority in the political sphere, functionalization and atomization of human relations in the social sphere, and secularization and homogenization in the cultural sphere undermine the general sense of national and community solidarity.

As bits and watts (indicators of information and energy consumption) increase in mass production and consumption, life is impoverished under a system of modernized poverty. Whereas poverty in traditional societies is made tolerable by relative equality, the ethics of self-denial and mutual obligation, and the strong bonds of community, modernized poverty is characterized by the ethics of relentless acquisition, conspicuous consumption, and unabashed greed. Modernized poverty thus breeds atomistic mobility, status anxiety, social envy, rising expectations, frustrations, and regression. The negative internalities of dualistic modernity (such as time-consuming acceleration, sick-making health care, stupefying education, counter-communicative mass communication, and information-void news) outpace the positive externalities of growth and development.

TABLE 9.1 Contradictory Perspectives on Communication and Development Goals

Communication and development goals as viewed from the top/center	Communication and development goals as viewed from the bottom/periphery
National security and power	Group/individual choice and freedom
Social and political mobilization	Social mobility and political access/circulation
National unity and identity	Subnational unity and identity
Economic growth	Distributive justice
Political socialization	Political participation
Property and business rights	Public and consumer rights
Education/professional competence	Education/professional opportunities
Information control	Information access
Communication surveillance	Communication privacy
Government authority	Citizen power
Central authority and control	Regional and local autonomy
Cultural and artistic direction (sometimes censorship)	Cultural and artistic creativity (sometimes subversion)

COMMUNICATION AND DEVELOPMENT RECONSIDERED

Given this global power of developmentalism as an ideological drive, can the concepts of *communication* and *development* have any alternative meanings? Under the prevailing ideology, development has come to be identified all too frequently with economic growth and its measurements of increases in material output in time. Communication has come to be identified all too synonymously with mass communication and its ideological apparatus of persuasion and manipulation. Any task of theoretical reconstruction has to begin, therefore, with a reexamination of the normative and historical contents of the two concepts.

The processes of social communication and development are complex processes that appear radically different from the perspectives of the top and bottom, or center and periphery, of a social system. Table 9.1 attempts to capture some of these contradictory perspectives on developmental goals and the ensuing noise, dissonance, and distortion in public communication (Tehrani, 1979).

Conflicts of interest and perception are thus at the very center of the developmental process; they reflect themselves in the competing ideologies and communication strategies (top-down vs. bottom-up) of development. Table 9.2 attempts to reduce these processes to three fundamental and contradictory ones, viewed from top-down, bottom-up, and democratic perspectives.

TABLE 9.2 Contradictory Processes and Perspectives in Development

DIMENSIONS	GENERATORS	DETERRENTS	CRISES
	Top-Down Views	Bottom-Up Views	Democratic Views
Economic	Accumulation	Concentration	Distribution: Equality
Political	Mobilization	Repression	Participation: Freedom
Sociocultural	Differentiation	Domination	Integration: Community

- (2) Political mobilization takes place primarily through increasing levels of physical, social, and psychic mobility characteristic of the processes of industrialization and urbanization. Physical mobility mainly involves the movement from rural to urban areas. Social mobility includes both horizontal mobility (movement from traditional to modern professions) and vertical mobility (movement up and down the social and economic hierarchy). Psychic mobility involves the increasing demand for cognitive flexibility and adaptation in the modern world, requiring greater learning capacity, multiple identities, and the ability to empathize with others. But political mobilization also entails militancy on the part of the disenfranchised groups and classes in society. This, in turn, often produces increasing levels of political repression by the regime in power unless channels and institutions of political participation (e.g., political parties, labor unions, voluntary associations) also develop at a speed commensurate with the rate of capital accumulation.
- (3) Sociocultural differentiation occurs as a result of increasing levels of division of labor, professionalization, and social stratification along caste, ethnicity, class, and status lines. But this also means that some leading elites (the entrepreneurs, the military, the party leaders, and the sociocultural groups associated with them) begin to exercise new forms of social and cultural domination. In the meantime, the traditional ties of community have broken down and been replaced by the less organic and more tenuous ties in the new urban and commercial environments. The social and psychological dislocations of this process produce a national integration crisis focused on the competing interests, authorities, and identities that reflect the economic, political, and cultural struggles in the developmental process.
- (4) It is argued here, therefore, that only through the processes of equitable income distribution, political participation, and national integration can society regain the solidarity it often loses through the dislocating and alienating processes of development. In this model of development, as represented by Table 9.2 and Figure 9.1, positive and negative feedback loops operate in multiple directions to produce a series of developmental crises centered on conflicts of values (interests, authorities, and identities). If the three conflicting forces of economic concentration and distribution, political repression and participation, and sociocultural domination and integration are not peacefully resolved, a developmental deadlock inevitably occurs. This deadlock often

leads to political instability, economic stagnation, sociocultural decay, physical violence, and possibly a social revolution.

Under the historical conditions in which the rates of accumulation have been generally faster than the rates of mobilization (as often was the case in the Western historical experience), the social and political contradictions of development have been largely absorbed and integrated within the emerging economic, political, and cultural institutions of modern industrial society. But wherever the rates of mobilization have outpaced the rates of accumulation and integration, the ensuing imbalances have produced revolutionary upheavals.

The quickening of worldwide accumulation, achieved through the extraordinary power and reach of the transnational corporations and the modern bureaucratic state, have coincided with an even faster tempo of mobilization achieved through accelerating communication revolutions (mobility, literacy, and media exposure). This combination has created serious imbalances in the third world, between market demands and supplies, political claims and opportunities, and cultural homogenization and differentiation. In the face of the temptations of a new age of high mass consumption promised by global advertising and "channels of desire" (Ewen & Ewen, 1982), a number of distinctly different strategies have presented themselves to the developing countries.

Table 9.3 attempts to provide a typology of these strategies and policies, focusing on "internal development policies" and "external communication policies." The table also provides some examples of countries typifying a variety of combinations of strategies. A full discussion of this table is beyond the length of this short chapter; for a full discussion of the strategies and their historical examples, the reader may refer to Chapter 9 of *Technologies of Power* (Tehrani, 1990). However, the central concepts are simple enough to understand. The three communication strategies of assimilation, dissociation, and selective participation refer to the fundamental options that have historically faced the LDCs vis-à-vis the world system. They can either open their doors to the economic, political, and cultural influences of the outside world (which means assimilation in the dominant world system), or close them (which means dissociation), or pick and choose (which refers to selective participation). The table largely identifies the emerging strategies of high accumulation with capitalism, high repression with totalitarianism, high mobilization with communism, and high integration with communitarianism. Table 9.4 provides some more-concrete examples of what the development strategies of high accumulation, high mobilization, or high integration might mean in terms of development and communication policies.

TABLE 9.3 Alternative Communication and Development Strategies: A Matrix of Policies

INTERNAL DEVELOPMENT POLICIES	EXTERNAL COMMUNICATION POLICIES:			
	High Accumulation	High Mobilization	High Integration	High Repression
Assimilation	Iran (Shah) India (Gandhi II & III) Philippines (Marcos) Egypt (Sadat) Turkey (Ataturk) Indonesia (Suharto)	Philippines (Aquino) USSR (1917-1927) PRC (1949-1956, 1966-1976) Vietnam	India (Gandhi I) Burma Albania Japan (Tokugawa)	S. Africa Iraq (Hussain) Iran (Ayatollah)
Dissociation	USSR (Stalin) PRC (1956-1966)			
Selective Participation	Saudi Arabia PRC (1976-present) NICs Japan (Meiji) Egypt (Mubarak) Pakistan (Zia)	Algeria Indonesia (Sukarno) Malaysia Egypt (Nasser) Pakistan (Bhutto I & II) Iran (Bazargan)	Tanzania	Spain (Franco)

KEY:

INDIA: Gandhi I refers to Mahatma Gandhi, Gandhi II refers to Indira Gandhi, and Gandhi III refers to Rajiv Gandhi.

PRC (PEOPLES' REPUBLIC OF CHINA): 1949-1956 refers to the early revolutionary period; 1956-1966 refers to the Great Leap Forward; 1966-1976 refers to the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution; 1976-present refers to the Modernization Period.

NICs (NEWLY INDUSTRIALIZING COUNTRIES) refers to S. Korea, Singapore, Taiwan, and Hong Kong.

PAKISTAN: Bhutto I & II refers to Zulfaghar Ali Bhutto and his daughter, Benazir Bhutto.

USSR: 1917-1927 refers to the periods of War Communism and New Economic Policy before the rise of Stalin and Stalinism.

TABLE 9.4 Alternative Communication and Development Strategies: The Main Policies

	DEVELOPMENT	COMMUNICATION
HIGH ACCUMULATION	Heavy Industry	Telecom Infrastructure
HIGH MOBILIZATION	Material Incentives	Ideological Exhortation
HIGH INTEGRATION	Intrinsic Needs	Dialogical Communication

THE COMMUNITARIAN STRATEGY

The particular strategy labeled here as *communitarian* is based on the proposition that there is a profound linkage between communication, peace, democracy, and authentic development. This linkage may be conceptualized as in Table 9.5. The matrix in this table juxtaposes two sets of continua, ranging from *repressive development/negative peace* to *participatory development/positive peace*, and from *corporate democracy/vertical communication* to *direct democracy/horizontal communication*. It is hypothesized here that repressive development often goes with the conditions of negative peace, in which the whole population or a significant portion of it is kept under constant exploitation, surveillance, and control (as in the southern states in the United States under conditions of segregation or in South Africa under the conditions of apartheid). It is further hypothesized that participatory forms of development often accompany positive peace, in which voluntary social cooperation takes the place of repression, social control, and social conflict. It is also argued that corporate concepts of democracy, in which one sector of the population (e.g., the Aryan race or the proletariat) is more privileged than others, often correlate positively with hierarchical communication systems along the party or bureaucratic lines. By contrast, concepts of direct democracy often go with horizontal systems of communication in which direct participation by citizens preempts the distortions of representative or corporate, democratic forms.

Out of this matrix, we obtain the contemporary world's four main social systems and strategies of development (Moore, 1967). The capitalist democratic systems typically follow a high-accumulation strategy of development, in which repression of certain sectors of the population (e.g., the working class, the blacks, the ethnics) is accompanied by partially repressive political institutions. The communist democratic systems, by contrast, typically follow a high-mobilization strategy of development in which the working class, the peasantry, and the revolutionary intelligentsia are privileged to participate in party and government structures that are ultimately organized hierarchically. The totalitarian counter-democratic systems often represent historical backlashes against threats from the left; they combine

TABLE 9.5 Peace, Development, Dialogue, and Democracy: Social Systems and Strategies

	REPRESSIVE DEVELOPMENT: NEGATIVE PEACE	PARTICIPATORY DEVELOPMENT: POSITIVE PEACE
CORPORATE/ COLLECTIVIST DEMOCRACY: VERTICAL COMMUNICATION FLOWS	Totalitarianism: High Repression	Communism: High Mobilization
REPRESENTATIVE/ DIRECT DEMOCRACY: HORIZONTAL COMMUNICATION	Capitalism: High Accumulation	Communitarianism: High Integration

some features of capitalism (exploitation and racism) with some others of communism (bureaucracy and repression) without possessing their redeeming democratic features (pluralism and egalitarianism). In contrast to traditional tyrannies, however, totalitarian systems are based on mass and populist support for national projects of internal repression and external expansion. Communitarian democracies—as yet unborn—represent the aspirations of some of the current democratic movements—e.g. the Green Party in West Germany and the Sarvodaya Movement in Sri Lanka—which are attempting to combine participatory development and positive peace with pluralist democracy and horizontal communication. These movements typically propose a high-integration strategy of development in which ecology, peace, nonviolence, social justice, direct democracy, and devolution of power are central goals.

Figure 9.2 attempts to depict the three development strategies of high accumulation, high mobilization, and high integration vis-à-vis the reality of cyclical historical patterns. The high-accumulation strategy, typical of capitalist patterns of development, often leads to an uneven distribution of income among regions, classes, and occupational groups. It leads, therefore, to cycles of boom and bust characterized by periods of high accumulation followed by periods of high mobilization. Ineffective demand, decline in investment opportunities, a falling rate of profit, economic recession, and




FIGURE 9.2. Development strategies and historical cycles

unemployment often result in social mobilization and political agitation for government regulation and income redistribution. Social reform, often combined with massive government spending on civilian and defense projects, can lift the economy out of its slumber (witness the U.S. economy following the Great Depression and during the war and postwar periods). This takes the economy back to a new high-accumulation cycle.

Although this pattern of development is illustrated most dramatically by the capitalist cycles of boom and bust, the cyclical patterns do not appear to be unique to the capitalist economies. Witness China (see Table 9.4). The Chinese Communist regime seems to have gone through four distinct development cycles in the following five periods: (1) From 1949 to 1958, revolutionary high mobilization was virtually in effect in order to consolidate the power of the new communist regime. This period was also characterized by close affiliation with the Soviet Union and a rejection of the West. (2) From 1958 to 1960, the Great Leap Forward inaugurated a high-accumulation strategy in order to achieve China's industrialization ambitions. Relations with the Soviet Union deteriorated, in 1960, with the open rupture of the Sino-Soviet ideological disputes and the withdrawal of Russian technicians and economic assistance. (3) From 1965-1968, the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution was set into motion by Mao as a measure of renewing revolutionary enthusiasm and purging the bureaucratic elements from the party and the government. This high-mobilization strategy brought millions of young peasants from the countryside into the cities and disrupted the course of China's modernization in industry and agricul-

ture. (4) Following the death of Mao and Premier Chou En-lai in 1976, a power struggle between the radicals (the so-called Gang of Four) and moderates led to the ascendancy of the latter group led by Den Xiaoping. This continuing stage, known as The Modernization Period, is characterized by high-accumulation development strategies domestically and selective participation in the international capitalist world. (5) Since 1986, there have been strong signs of a reversal of modernization policies towards greater austerity and appeals to patriotic motivation and lesser market incentives. The announcement of a retrenchment policy by Premier Li Peng, in March 1989, may be considered as the clearest sign yet of this new cyclical turn (Schidlovsky, 1989).

The communitarian, high-integration strategies clearly attempt to strike a middle course, by maintaining accumulation and mobilization in balance. This is easier said than done. The nature of the developmental process imposes a certain measure of disequilibria. However, as Hirschman (1958) has persuasively argued, these disequilibria may be considered as positive if policymakers use them to sail against the prevailing winds and correct excessive concentrations of wealth or disarray in productive forces. The communitarian strategy would aim at such a balancing act. But the history of communitarian philosophies of development demonstrates that their aspirations are often swept away by historical forces beyond their control. Witness independent India. While modern India's soul appears to belong to Mahatma Gandhi's emphasis on "small is beautiful," its flesh is drawn to Rajiv Gandhi's development strategy of "big is better."

Figure 9.3 presents the same model in terms of a conceptual map of the political spectrum in the modern world. Instead of the conventional half-circle showing the spectrum from right to left, the map proposes a full circle that juxtaposes four distinct political polarities, labeled here by their symbolic colors in modern politics—the Blues, Reds, Greens, and Blacks. The first three represent the democratic strategies of development, while the last suggests the totalitarian, counter-democratic route symbolized by the Black-shirts of Italian fascism. The Blues—the capitalist democratic liberals (both classical and Keynesian)—historically have considered freedom (including freedom of expression and assembly, property rights, and free enterprise) as their axial principle. Historically, they have come to power through the bourgeois democratic revolutions of the modern world under the leadership of a rising industrial bourgeoisie in alliance with all of the social classes opposed to the traditional ruling classes of monarchies and landlords. That is a page out of Marxian analysis. To take a page out of Freudian analysis, the capitalist democratic route to development might be considered to represent the ego-rationality of the modern world calling for science, tech-




FIGURE 9.3. A conceptual map of modern political ideologies

nology, and an efficient allocation of resources through the rationality of the hidden hand—the market mechanism.

By their dual emphasis on social equality and state planning, the communists—the Reds—represent the opposite polarity. Although most communist countries today are reconsidering the role of state planning by a shift to the market mechanism (witness China and Eastern Europe), the principle of state control has not been overthrown. The state, in turn, is considered to be a representative of the working class as manifested by the Communist Party. That is a page out of Marx and Lenin. To take a page out of Freud, the communist strategy of development can be seen as the alter ego of the modern rationality of science, technology, and state planning as opposed to the market mechanism. For the less-developed countries, communism's chief attraction lies in the promise that it would accomplish industrialization without capitalist class domination and the vagaries of the market. In other

words, communism has promised to deliver what capitalism offers without its inequities and imbalances.

The communitarians, never fully in power anywhere, have been represented in a variety of populist, counter-modernist, democratic, and utopian movements calling for the primacy of community, ecology, peace, and participatory democracy. As such, they have served as the nagging conscience of the modern world—a superego in Freudian terms—reminding it of the heavy costs of industrialization in the destruction of traditional communities and ecological balance. Their sources of political leadership and social support have come primarily from the intelligentsia, feminists, and the professional middle class—too narrow a constituency so far to have achieved parliamentary power except in some of the advanced industrial countries such as West Germany, where the Green Party currently holds some 10% of the *Bundestag* seats. But even in Germany, the Greens are divided between the fundamentalist Greens who see their role primarily in terms of deconstructing and obstructing the structures of industrial power, and the pragmatic Greens who propose to assume power through political alliances that may require some measure of compromise of their principles.

The Blacks, the totalitarian regimes typified by Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy, and racist South Africa, represent the id forces of aggression and domination unleashed by class, ethnic, and racial hatreds of the modern world. Their main sources of social support have historically come from the propertied classes, who stand to lose in the face of a threat from the left, in alliance with the growing lower middle class caught in the status anxieties of sinking to the bottom or rising to the respectability of the middle class. An "escape from freedom" and its burdens of anxiety and choice characterize the social psychology of such groups in society (Fromm, 1941). The so-called southern white trash in the United States or the petty bourgeoisie in Europe provide the best known examples of such class formations. Internal repression of the left and the lower classes along with an expansionist, imperialist policy abroad is often employed as a hegemonic policy to create employment and chauvinist loyalty.

These are the four polarities of this conceptual map. Other political groups and ideological tendencies fall somewhere in between them. As the examples of socialists, pragmatic and fundamentalist Greens, and left and right populists demonstrate, it should not be difficult to place different ideological and political groups on this map.

CONCLUSION

This chapter has critiqued the dominant perspectives on communication and development, provided a theoretical framework for a comparative un-

derstanding of alternative strategies, and argued for a communitarian strategy. A communitarian strategy is based on a set of principles that include the primacy of community, nonviolence, ecology, participatory democracy, economic self-reliance, social responsibility, cultural pluralism, and spiritual freedom. Although the communitarian strategy may be critiqued for its absence of historical precedence and lack of a detailed socioeconomic plan of action, there is now a sufficient body of literature and historical evidence to suggest that it is a viable communication and development policy option (Tehrani, 1990, chap. 10). This does not, however, render it immune to the totalitarian temptations characteristic of the modern world. The Iranian revolution, perhaps the modern world's most nonviolent, communitarian social upheaval during its first year, provides a tragic example (Tehrani, 1980; Mortimer, 1982).

Advocacy of a communitarian strategy does not therefore require theoretical conceit. The road to the modern world is an inherently dangerous one. Modern society is faced with the temptation of selling its soul to the devil in return for progress and prosperity. But without a soul, progress and prosperity have historically proved to be conducive to wars of aggression, ecological disaster, and psychological dislocation. Thus, modernity has proved to be a mixed blessing. It has liberated man from material poverty, but it also has enslaved him to spiritual poverty. A communitarian strategy attempts to strike a balance between the requirements for capital accumulation and sociopolitical mobilization by focusing on those values that unite rather than divide, empower rather than disable, and create the conditions of social harmony rather than those of social friction.

In its attempt to ban poverty and enhance community, a communitarian strategy is faced with a dual choice—to critique or to seek power, to become a political party or to remain a social movement. Those theoretical and practical choices are currently debated among the Greens everywhere. Even if the communitarians are transformed into a party in power—improbable as that seems now—the movement must continue independently to critique those in power. The recipe for freedom from the ideological pretensions of power is ideological deconstruction.

NOTES

1. For a lively debate between the Marxist and communitarian theorists, see Addo (1985), particularly Chapters 7 and 8.
2. Some of the leading theorists of this school include Freire (1972); Schumacher (1973, 1977); Illich (1971a, b, 1973, 1974); Galtung (1980, 1984); Ariyaratne (1986); and Hettne (1983). See also Feather (1980), Ferguson (1981), and Sale (1980).

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International Organization and Integration Theory

The Case of the International Telecommunication Union

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The academic study of international relations was characterized, during the 1940s and the 1950s, by the use of the state as the basic unit of analysis. Then newly independent developing countries asserting themselves as active members of the international system brought international institutions to the center of the analytical framework.

The International Telecommunication Union (ITU), the oldest international body, has not been unaffected by the post-World War II geopolitical redistribution of power. Established by a small club of Western industrialized nations at a time when third-world issues were a moot question, this 120-year-old institution came to accept in the 1980s what it vehemently refused to consider only 40 years ago, namely, that it is no longer concerned solely with technical coordination matters, but is solidly engaged in assistance activities to the developing countries.

This chapter assesses the appropriateness of the conceptual framework offered by the dominant theory of integration—functionalism—in explaining the longevity, centrality, and stability of the ITU in a changing world.

INTRODUCTION

During the 1940s and the 1950s, political scientists tended to describe world politics as a Hobbesian situation in which states are locked into patterns of fundamental conflict. The academic study of international relations, therefore, was characterized by the use of the state as the basic unit of analysis, and the dominant school of thought was the power of "realist" school (Morgenthau, 1960). The role of emerging actors—the international organizations—was marginalized.

This conventional analysis has been undermined by decolonization. The newly independent developing countries have asserted themselves as active members of the international system. The realization that international insti-

tutions might become important modes in networks of interdependence led to the formulation of new conceptual frameworks of analysis. International organization theories emerged as part of the broader field of international relations, but distinct from conventional organizational theories.

The tremendous range of the international institutions that today tap the real world in so many of its facets may provide evidence that state actors are neither the only actors nor necessarily the most important ones to be considered in analyzing the intertwined network of world transactions.¹ Transnational interactions not controlled by central foreign policy organs of governments are no longer ignored. To the contrary, they are often regarded as of crucial importance in the world integration process (Keohane & Nye, 1978, p. 366).

Developing countries have emphasized the work of the United Nations more than have the established, industrialized countries. Through the forum of the U.N. General Assembly, developing countries have articulated the life-and-death importance of accelerating their economic and social development. They have called for the expansion of financial and technical assistance programs. In joining the various U.N. specialized agencies, those countries have changed the priorities of these agencies' agendas to the point where about 80% of all U.N. resources and 90% of U.N. personnel are devoted at present to improving human welfare in the third world. It is, then, no surprise that the largest body of international organization research focuses on the United Nations system.

Whereas a number of U.N. agencies have been the subject of theoretical attention, the specialized agency in charge of telecommunication matters — the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) — has rarely been the center of scholarly curiosity. This paper attempts to remedy that situation by examining the internal dynamics of the ITU in light of international organization theory.

THE CASE STUDY

The International Telecommunication Union has not been left unaffected by the post-World War II geopolitical redistribution of power. It was naturally called upon to assist the developing countries in the establishment of their telecommunication infrastructure. Compared with that of other international organizations, however, the expansion of the mandate of the ITU toward addressing the specific needs of its third world constituency has been remarkable. Unlike the ITU, nearly all of the other specialized agencies were created after World War II when the process of decolonization began.² To those organizations, development assistance was directly or indirectly enshrined in their respective charters.

Established in 1865 by a small group of 20 European countries interested solely in coordinating the technical operations of their telegraph, and, later, their telephone and radio-communication systems, the then International Telegraph Union was born in an era immune to preoccupations with development assistance. No such concern was reflected in the basic instrument of the ITU and, in particular, in its first Convention, which was adopted in 1932 when the International Telegraph Union and the International Radiotelegraph Union merged into the modern International Telecommunication Union.

In view of the fact that to survive, an international organization, like a living organism, has to adjust to a changing environment, one might have expected that the ITU, because of its historical mandate, would not have survived the new geopolitical environment caused by the newly independent nations' assertion of their power within international forums. Such was not the case, however. Not only is the ITU today the oldest international organization but, with 161 member states, it has the largest membership, larger indeed than the United Nations itself. Moreover, owing to technological progress and to the importance of telecommunication networks in the national and worldwide economies, the ITU is increasingly asserting its centrality. The longevity of the ITU is unique in the annals of international organizations.

This longevity, however, would not have occurred without the acceptance by the technologically advanced countries of the development assistance agenda imposed upon the organization by the third world countries that now compose the Union's majority. The industrialized nations' acceptance (be it reluctant) of this expanded agenda is remarkable and should not be taken for granted. After all, no state is forced to join an organization whose mandate they disagree with, and states can always terminate their membership as well. Not every international body is universal in scope, and some nations have actually withdrawn from existing organizations.³

It is nothing short of a Copernican revolution that this 120-year-old institution, established by a small club of Western industrialized nations at a time when third world issues were a moot question, came to accept in the 1980s what it vehemently refused to consider only 40 years ago, namely, that it is no longer concerned solely with technical coordination matters, but is solidly engaged in assistance activities to the developing countries.

Surprisingly enough, the uniqueness of the ITU has not generated the attention one might have expected from students of international organizations. Is the ITU a global actor in its own right or does it merely provide an arena for the political maneuvering of national interests? How well has the international organization done in creating for itself some degree of autonomy from member states? Is national sovereignty eroded through ITU's task

expansion? Has the ITU been able to take challenges and turn them into opportunities for organizational expansion? By attempting to find answers to these questions, this paper will assess the appropriateness of the conceptual framework offered by the dominant theory of integration—functionalism—in explaining the longevity and stability of the ITU in a changing world.

THE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK—FUNCTIONALISM

McCormick (1982, pp. 533–535) has defined three major roles international organizations can play in the operation of international politics: as instrument of national policy, as systemic modifier of state behavior, and as autonomous international actor.

The first role has probably been the most widely used one for analyzing the linkage between international organizations and international politics. In this role, international organizations are seen primarily as means that states use to obtain their self-defined goals. In this context, organizations are another tool of statecraft—along with the traditional military, economic, and diplomatic ones—that nations possess. These kinds of analyses stem largely from the realist tradition in the study of international relations. Political realism—which portrays international politics as fundamentally a state-to-state phenomenon—implies a limited role for international institutions. These organizations are rarely used by states, but when they are used, they are only used to achieve national goals.

While such efforts have been useful in understanding the interrelationships between states and the international organizations, they are not sufficient for assessing the dynamics of global politics today. As smaller or weaker states increasingly appear to influence (and control) the outcomes of international institutions, it is necessary to move beyond these previous analyses to examine the activities of those states within international organizations.

In this second role, international organizations are seen as serving an intermediary role between states and seeking to moderate their conflicts and facilitate their cooperation. While the states remain the predominant actors in the international system, they are not wholly independent of the influence of international organizations and international organization process. Unlike in the earlier conception, the thrust of research within this second orientation seeks to ascertain the impact of the organization upon state behavior and not to assess the effect of the states upon the international organizations. Organizations may be able to evoke systemic moderation by providing incentives and opportunities for interstate politicking and by encouraging cooperative

behavior. This outcome will be obtained by altering perceptions and norms between states which, in turn, will produce policy restraints upon the states. Assuming this description of the role of international organizations is valid, it is necessary to specify some of the kinds of organizations that are likely to be successful in producing these moderating influences in international politics.

The third perspective emphasizes the independence of international organizations in international politics — as actors beyond the nation-state system. How well have international organizations done in creating for themselves some degree of autonomy from the nation states, and, more generally, how far has international integration progressed? A principal way of evaluating the autonomy of international organizations has been to focus on their internal operations. Specifically, the goal has been to determine the extent to which organizational development has occurred and to ascertain how far decision-making independence has progressed. A greater assessment of the issue areas that have been the focus of organizational independence is now required. That is, over what kinds of issues have these international organizations gained control? And what is the degree of this control? One also needs to focus on the extent to which states have complied with international organization decisions.

That the ITU not only survived numerous regional and global conflicts, but prospered, seems to suggest that the organization has succeeded in creating for itself a large degree of autonomy from member nations, and might fit in McCormick's third conceptual category. The corollary is that the ITU has been able to engineer a high degree of integration of its member states into a global network of interdependence.

The analysis of the process of integration⁴ has been pioneered by Mitrani (1966, 1975) in his formulation of the theory of functionalism, which became the dominant paradigm for examining the integrative function of international organizations. The functionalist approach emerged after World War II as a major alternative to the more widely held and persuasive approach of political realism. In contrast to approaches based on *realpolitik*, which elevate the nation-state to the position of supreme international actor, and which view conditions of war and peace as dependent on the distribution and nature of military capability among nations, functionalism, in its initial formulation, specified a course of developments that would eventually spell doom for the nation-state. In its conceptualization of the process that would lead to the replacement of national-interest politics, the functionalist approach essentially ignored considerations of state power and political influence as having any analytical significance for what was to be explained.

The essential starting point, according to Mitrani, was to concentrate in the first instance upon the particular task, problem, or function, and to

attempt to exclude from this analysis the distorting element of ideology, dogma, or philosophical system. Mitrani was convinced that it was possible to discover a kind of irreducible set of relations between things, which were distinguishable from relations suggested by a constitution, or a dogma, and which, if left to themselves, would suggest the ideal geographical extent in which the problem could be tackled, and the most appropriate administrative arrangements. Hence the oft-quoted functionalist dictum that "form follows function."

Functionalism postulates that cooperation must begin in "low politics" issue areas, which can be "decoupled" from the more symbolically and ideologically charged "high politics" issue areas. Cooperation in low politics issue areas could be achieved by granting to administrative experts a mandate with sufficient authority to negotiate, formulate, and implement new policies. It was assumed that such a low politics problem-solutions process would lead to utilitarian advantages for more and more separate segments within the states involved. That, in turn, would create cross-cutting ties decreasing the ability of the political elites of the states to mobilize all their societal resources for the purpose of adopting power-politics responses to demands for changes in the environment. According to the thesis that form follows function, the political structural transformation that would result from a classical functional approach would be the creation of a global-in-scope cobweb of functional ties based on a perceived superiority of utilitarian advantages, which would undermine the centralized coercive power available to state authorities.

Functionalism implies that the values of specialists, seeking to achieve their functional purposes efficiently, are compatible with the values of the consumers of their specialized activities. By confining decision making to relevant technical considerations, nonrational behavior—that is, decision making seeking personal, party, or other sectional gains—is reduced, if not eliminated. Political decision making at any systems level, then, would be confined to its limited field—that is, the allocation of resources among functional institutions operating at the particular system level (Burton, 1975, p. 243).

The role of the state is no longer to protect and to defend certain interests once labelled "national interests." It is to assist in the process of adjustment to change, which is an increasingly demanding one in the modern, complex, and rapidly altering world society. It is argued that the growth of functional international organizations would erode the basis for identification with the nation-state by bringing together individuals from different nations into a more neutral international context.

The major tenet of functionalism, and the one most criticized, is the distinction between political and nonpolitical areas. It states the possibility

that the experience of integration in low politics areas could release a dynamics that made integration in other areas more likely, and eventually modified high politics itself.

How powerful is the functionalist paradigm in explaining the institutional dynamics of the ITU and its centrality in the world telecommunication arena at a time when, owing to third world pressures, the institutional mandate extends beyond purely technical parameters? In order to answer this question, an examination of the factors accounting for the organization's longevity is needed.

The first factor relates to the ITU's basic instrument. The flexibility of a convention, unlike the relative stability and rigidity of a constitution, has enabled the ITU, by allowing evolutionary changes in the composition of its organs, to modify its agenda so as to integrate the new demands of the third world constituency for development assistance.

The second factor relates to the ITU's work program. The developed countries rely increasingly on globally integrated digital communication technology, the management of which is made possible by ITU-initiated standardization procedures. This situation has led those countries to accommodate third world pressures for development assistance in an effort to maintain the cohesion of an international arrangement, the disruption of which would have severe consequence for the technologically advanced countries.

The third factor relates to the ITU's domain of jurisdiction. Thus far, the unique features of telecommunication have guaranteed the longevity of the ITU because the protection of a nation's telecommunication system is directly tied to the need for collective agreements regarding the allocation of radio frequencies and satellite orbit allotment.

ITU'S BASIC INSTRUMENT

To shed light on the unique features of the International Telecommunication Convention of the ITU, a comparison can be made with the Charter of the United Nations.⁵

Both instruments state the principles of universal representation and of "one country, one vote." Both the Convention and the Charter can be revised by their supreme organs — the Plenipotentiary Conference, for the ITU, and the General Assembly, for the United Nations. The modality for revision, however, is what fundamentally differentiates the ITU from the United Nations. The ITU Convention can be amended by a simple majority, whereas modification of the U.N. Charter requires a two-thirds majority, including the five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council. Any

one of the permanent members can block an amendment even though it may be ratified by all other members of the United Nations.

The veto power granted to the five permanent members has serious repercussions in the balance of power between states. The Charter maintains *in eternum* the five major powers (the Soviet Union, the United States, Great Britain, France, China) as permanent members. They can veto proposals to admit new members to the United Nations.

The Basic Provisions of the ITU Convention contain a clause permitting a member to withdraw from the Union through denouncing the Convention by simple notification through diplomatic channels to the Secretary-General. In contrast, no formal right of withdrawing from the organization has been given in the U.N. Charter.⁶

The ITU Convention, by "fully recognizing the sovereign right of each nation to regulate its communications," is actually nonbinding, as it allows for Reservations to its Final Protocol.⁷

The provision for Reservations is a unique feature that distinguishes the ITU Convention from the U.N. Charter, in which no reservation is made with regard to the fundamental provisions concerning the purpose of the Charter. Consequently, when a member does not honor a U.N. Charter provision, it finds itself in breach of contract by negating the "principle of the binding force of agreements," a situation that may possibly lead to an institutional crisis. Through a blend of obligatory requirements and convenient escape clauses, the ITU Convention does not allow this situation to occur.

Another basic difference between the ITU Convention and the U.N. Charter relates to the financing mechanisms. ITU members are free to choose any class of contribution to defray the Union's budget, though a Resolution invites members to select a class of contribution "most in keeping with their economic resources." The U.N. contributory system is supervised by an 18-member Committee on Contributions, which assesses each country's contribution on a pro rata basis according to a formula that adjusts national income (using a 10-year average) upward or downward according to per capita income but with the provision that no contributor shall pay less than 0.01% or more than 25% of the total.⁸ This financing scheme gives undue influence to the major powers. The top 10 contributors to the current U.N. budget account for nearly 78% of the total. They account for less than 50% of the ITU budget.

To a large degree, the ITU's behavior conforms to the principle of congruity, according to which a group's attitude is in some state of equilibrium with its environment. If and when some of the environmental elements are altered, an inconsistency is introduced into the prevailing structure (Tannenbaum, 1968). In other words, the structural and

organizational dynamics of the ITU seem to obey the principle articulated by the 19th century French chemist Le Chatelier, which states that if a system in equilibrium is subjected to a constraint whereby the equilibrium is modified, change takes place, if possible, which practically annuls the constraint.

By allowing for constant modification, the ITU's Convention tends to reflect the preoccupations, needs, and demands of the majority of the organization's constituency. But the majority, as is true in nearly all world bodies, shifted from the industrialized countries to the developing countries during the late 1960s.⁹ The powerful Western European industrialized nations, which in the late 19th century created an organization responsive to their needs, had to cohabit in the first half of the 20th century with their Eastern European counterparts whose political agenda was different.

During these years, the emerging nations born in the wake of decolonization tried unsuccessfully to direct the attention of the ITU toward their specific *underdeveloped* situation (the terminology used at the time). At the end of the 1960s and in the early 1970s, the balance of power within the Union shifted in favor of the developing countries, both Eastern and Western, to be on the defensive and relentlessly fight the proposed amendments to the Convention aimed at changing the initial purpose of the ITU. But to a great extent, the developing countries have achieved much of their original agenda.

The industrialized countries have been pushing for the replacement of the current Convention by a more rigid Charter, which would better protect their interests by slowing down changes. Understandably, the third world has reacted negatively. It is worth quoting at some length the statement made by ITU's Secretary-General Mili (from Tunisia) at the Plenary meeting of the 1973 Plenipotentiary:

If we want the ITU to retain its youthful character despite its advanced age, it is essential that its fundamental instrument should be revised and amended regularly to allow mainly for two new factors:

(1) *The large-scale advent of the developing countries to the international arena.* In the past 10 years, the ITU has been enriched by the accession of a large number of new Members. To provide the necessary assistance to these new Members, our organization is developing apace. This is therefore not the time to fix a rigid pattern by means of a permanent basic text, when this evolution has not yet run its course. I am convinced that the period of 5 or 6 years to come will entail adjustment which will have to be made to the Convention at the next Plenipotentiary Conference. I am also certain that this development will persist for a long time to come, at least until the developing countries have reached the level of the industrially developed countries. You will agree with me that this is not for tomorrow. In short, it is in the interest of

the developing countries, for the time being, not to have a permanent instrument for the union.

(2) *The explosion in telecommunication media.* Over the past 10 years, telecommunication satellites and high-capacity coaxial cables have revolutionized telecommunication media. This revolution is still in its infancy and it is essential that the ITU's basic Act should be able to match these developments. Since these new media concern mainly the industrially developed countries, it is not in their interests either, that the Union should be equipped with a permanent instrument. (ITU Doc. 152, PC 1973, pp. 2-3)

In its essence, the ITU Convention is a more flexible instrument than the U.N. Charter as it allows for a continuous process of adjustment to the changing political and technological environment. Development assistance issues, which under the more rigid institutional framework of a Charter might have severely shaken the structure of an organization historically unprepared to tackle them, at the ITU have been addressed through an on-going modification of the organization's purposes and organs.

ITU'S WORK PROGRAM

As the information sector has come to occupy more than half of the work force of the industrialized nations, the relationship between computer/telecommunication technologies and economic progress has become widely recognized (Porat, 1977). Sovereign states and international enterprises are more than ever dependent upon a secure global web of transmission channels. World markets have superseded domestic markets in the strategy of the major telecommunication equipment manufacturers and service providers. It is of the utmost importance that standards, as well as radio-frequency allocations, be developed in time for the emerging new digital communication services, so that interworking between installations for basic services can be safeguarded, and efficient communication between facilities for different kinds of public and specialized services can be guaranteed.

Work in these domains is conducted within the International Consultative Committees (CCIs), permanent organs of the ITU. The history of developing countries' involvement in the CCIs is an unhappy one. One of the most important characteristics of participation in the work of the CCIs is the predominance of the developed nations, which is visible in the attendance of plenary assemblies, but more striking in the working groups.

Many reasons have been given for the failure of the developing countries to respond to the work of the CCIs. Coddington and Rutkowski (1982) articulate two:

First, the developing countries lack the expertise necessary to participate effectively at a high technical level. As a result, the study groups consist essentially of delegates from advanced countries, more interested with the mainstream of the committees' work, which is agreement-making for application of new technology. Second, the developing countries lack the finances needed for participation. They cannot afford to send delegates to the study group meetings, especially in view of the fact that there are so many to attend, nor can they spare the competent personnel at home to follow developments in the committees. The situation has created a vicious circle: without participation by developing countries, the study groups and committees have found it difficult to identify satisfactorily questions and problems of specific concern to these countries. (pp. 102-103)

More recently, expressions of dissatisfaction have been leveled against the CCIs by the developing countries regarding their work program and decision-making process. According to this criticism, the CCIs pay insufficient attention to the problems and interests of the ITU's third world constituency. This criticism is two pronged. First, the charge is made that the subjects considered are disproportionately those that primarily concern the developed states. Secondly, it is alleged that the Recommendations pay insufficient attention to the interests of the developing countries. Often Recommendations simply "register" the *de facto* state of affairs in industrialized countries (Jacobson, 1971, pp. 60-61).

In the 1960s and 1970s, a specialized CCI, the International Telegraph and Telephone Consultative Committee (CCITT), had begun to assume jurisdiction over all telecommunication matters except those narrowly related to radiocommunication.¹⁰ In view of the advances in telematics, supported by the increasing digitalization of transmission systems, the 1980 CCITT Plenary Assembly reorganized the work program of its study groups so as to direct their attention more forcefully to the emerging Integrated Services Digital Networks (ISDNs). Although the terms telegraph and telephone constitute the CCITT's name, today telegraph and telephone matters are no longer central to this body's work agenda (Rutkowski, 1985, p. 20). It has since become the paramount ITU organ, engaging in by far the most important and greatest volume of work.

More than any other telecommunication system, the development of sophisticated all-digital integrated networks is almost exclusively the province of the Western industrialized countries because the networks require a highly developed telephone base, which developing countries do not have.¹¹ These latter countries are increasingly alienated from the work of the CCITT, an organ that has constantly been called upon (so far unsuccessfully) to raise its level of commitment to technical cooperation.

The CCIs are becoming as important to developed countries as the push for ITU-sponsored technical cooperation is for developing countries. At the 1982 Nairobi Plenipotentiary Conference, the spokespersons for the third world made clear that for them it was important to have better representation and more technical assistance from the CCIs. Some developing countries suggested that there might be a case for cutting back on budgetary allocations for the CCIs to make available more funds for technical assistance, which is of more immediate relevance to the majority of members (Solomon, 1983, p. 244).

What is barely acceptable to developing countries is that, on the one hand, the CCI work, so critical to developing countries, is integrally part of the ITU budget, and as this work expands, so will ITU budgetary allocations. On the other hand, allocations for ITU technical assistance, of critical importance to developing countries, come from the shrinking United Nations Development Program (UNDP) budget, and the prospect for ITU's contributing to this budget appears slim because the largest contributors, the industrialized countries, are so far unwilling to increase the ITU income. In short, third world countries were reluctant to allow CCI work to expand while their urgent needs are not being adequately addressed.

Some have argued that "this approach, if pushed too far, could alter the whole nature of the ITU. . . . [The technologically advanced countries] might conclude that the ITU does not reflect their own interests, and alternative arrangements might appear preferable" (Solomon, 1983, p. 244). A search for an alternative forum, however, will probably not happen. Too much work has already been done in CCIs to dismiss these forums, and it is probably too late to consider an alternative to the present organizations. The cost of shifting to other international bodies, or of establishing new technical forums, is increasing as time goes by.

The increasing acceptance by the developed countries of the technical cooperation agenda imposed upon the Union by the third world constituency stems from an imperative to maintain the operational capability of the ITU. As the stake of the industrialized countries in worldwide telecommunication networks increases, there increases as well the cost for those countries to break up the institutional framework that makes their network operations possible. It is in light of this situation that one understands Resolutions 19 and 20, adopted by the International Telecommunication Convention at Nairobi in 1982 (proposed by the United Kingdom, and cosponsored by the United States, Japan, and the Federal Republic of Germany), which established the special Voluntary Program to promote greater technical cooperation through the ITU and the high-level Independent Commission for Worldwide Telecommunication Development (Solomon, 1984, p. 216).

These two initiatives—unthinkable a decade ago because they were perceived as a move away from technical matters—that were directed at responding to the concerns of the developing countries should be interpreted as the bargaining chips that the industrialized countries put on the negotiation table in a move to secure a research agenda for the CCIs that was relevant to them.

ITU'S DOMAIN OF JURISDICTION

In his examination of international organizations, Goodspeed (1959) attributes cooperative efforts in technical fields such as telecommunication to their physical characteristic of "transcending purely national frontiers" (p. 4). Beginning with telegraphy, then telephony, radiocommunication, and digital networks born out of the marriage of computer and telecommunication technologies, the transmission of information is transborder in character.

For several reasons, states could hardly have confined their communications within their own boundaries. Commerce is a major one. A nation that engages in trade and seeks to enjoy the benefits of specialization requires an ability to communicate across state borders. States also have political relations with one another which can be facilitated by communications. Even adversaries can find it helpful to communicate. When communications must cross borders, however, only international collaboration can assure that they will reach their destinations.

Standardization of operations is of great importance to telecommunication operators and customers in both the developed and the developing world.¹² Interdependence between telecommunication systems worldwide is a prerequisite for the orderly development of global telecommunication systems (Naslund, 1983).

Even the simple telegraph required substantial cooperation. An efficient system required at least a measure of agreement on the standardization of equipment, operating procedures, and, to a lesser extent, administrative procedures, including rates for services. More-complex technology requires correspondingly more-elaborate agreements. The obvious benefits to be gained from international collaboration have generally been compelling, and starting with the 1849 treaty between Austria and Prussia providing for the linking of their telegraph lines, international cooperative arrangements have closely followed technological developments.

The need for international cooperation became more important when wireless communication came into use. Radiocommunication uses a scarce resource, the electromagnetic spectrum, the use of which calls for international coordination (Segal, 1983). Even a nation's domestic radio commu-

nications can have international ramifications. The physical properties of radio make it difficult to confine transmissions within political boundaries. If the right technical and atmospheric conditions exist, radio waves originating in one country can be received, not just in neighboring jurisdictions, but also across the world. Harmful interference can be averted or minimized only through careful coordination of the power, direction, and timing of transmissions on the same or adjacent frequencies. It is well recognized that unless users of radio as a means of national, as well as international, communication coordinate their operations, their activities would be greatly diminished and, in some circumstances, totally destroyed (Chen, 1959, p. 147).

The failure or inability of any nation to conform to complex international standards will deprive it of important benefits and may impede other nations from taking full advantage of the new technology as well.

As nations become more dependent upon telecommunication, they will be less able to ignore situations that render their services unusable. Similarly, as their level of financial commitment to telecommunication facilities and services increases, nations will be less willing to risk actions that would diminish the return on investment.

Clearly, the incentives for international cooperation before conflicts arise can only be expected to become stronger. Such cooperation is most likely to exist when it is in a nation's self-interest. If, for example, a member nation desires international recognition and protection of its frequency assignments, it must adhere to international standards. Catering to its member's self-interests is one of the ITU's greatest strengths that distinguishes it from other international organizations. As a nation's stake in advanced telecommunication systems increases, its willingness to prevent conflict will permeate other areas of interest to the ITU community, such as accommodating developing countries' requests for assistance programs (Gregg, 1982).

From time to time it has been suggested that the ITU needs to become more active in the conflict-resolution process, ostensibly because the higher stakes involved in contemporary telecommunication conflicts warrant it (Leive, 1970, pp. 313-315). One way to evaluate the need for such change is to examine the history of conflict resolution in the ITU, with particular emphasis on arbitration, currently the strongest available measure for settlement of disputes between ITU members. In the past, the arbitration procedures have been largely ignored, with members preferring to resolve their disputes through bilateral negotiation.¹³ Most important, the reluctance of nations to resort to binding forms of conflict resolution administered by an ITU organ in the past does not appear either to have diminished the organization's effectiveness or to have adversely affected world telecommunication order.

The desire for self-preservation and the recognition that order in the world community is essential if vital resources are to benefit all humanity have created pressures for cooperation and mutual problem solving. Equitable and efficient management of the environment and of national resources and the orderly development of international telecommunication systems are vital to the national interests of all parties. The context within which international decision making occurs is therefore characterized by world tensions at one level, and pressures for self-preservation and collective agreement at another.

In the final analysis, the success of any international endeavor requires the voluntary cooperation of the sovereign nations involved. Realistically, such cooperation is most likely to exist when it is in a nation's self-interest. Voluntary compliance is most likely to be attained if the organization has a worldwide domain of jurisdiction rather than one loosely defined as international. The ITU survives because the coordination of telecommunication services can only be worldwide. This situation has compelled the industrialized countries, which rely heavily on communication systems, to accommodate developing countries' pressure for development in an effort to maintain the resource allocation capability of the ITU.

THE ITU AND FUNCTIONALISM

Conventional functionalist theory stresses that agencies should meet the criteria of being *technical* and *functionally specific* and *essential* (Haas, 1964; Claude, 1964). An agency is technical when there is a body of sophisticated professional or scientific knowledge that is necessary to the conduct of its work. It is functionally specific when its work relates to one specialized area of public policy, and it is essential when states can best organize the performance of certain tasks internationally. According to this theory, organizations having such characteristics should not be much affected by world political cleavage. The ITU, with its task of securing international agreements on the use of radio frequencies and standards for equipment, is such an organization. Indeed, the ITU's institutional structure has been affected less than others by world political cleavages. Concurring with Jacobson's (1974) own investigation, the three factors emerging out of the present study, which account for the centrality of the ITU, partially confirm the functionalist paradigm.

The ITU was originally designed as a technical and universal organization rather than a political organization with a restricted membership. There was a strong initial notion within the ITU that technical decisions can and should be taken on technical grounds and that it will be possible for experts to agree on technical issues.

In reality, of course, the distinction between technical and nontechnical issues is often far from obvious. This ambiguity is reflected in the dissatisfaction surfacing in the industrialized nations during the 1960s, when the developing countries started to urge the ITU to involve itself in technical assistance.

Developed countries voiced their concern at the ITU's becoming "politicized"; that is, they perceived that controversial issues not always relevant to the agency's work were being introduced by nations to further their political interests. An idea developed that economic and social programs were nonpolitical in nature, and that the specialized agencies should not, therefore, be politicized. To the extent that the specialized agencies are thought of in functionalist terms, it is not surprising that dissatisfaction with their performance is often expressed in charges of politicization. Those who see politicization as an organizational defect are likely to accuse "irresponsible states" of distorting the purposes of a specialized agency by attempting to place inappropriate controversial items on the agenda, and development assistance to the third world was seen as such.

An alternative view considers politicization as an indicator of forces bearing on the organization, that is, as a function of the environment within which the institution operates and of the problems that it addresses. International organizations should and do reflect the realities of the international system. Politicization can be viewed as part of a planetary bargaining process in which the third world nations negotiate with the developed nations regarding the relative importance of various global problems. One could view the confrontations as part of a continuing process to "widen the circle of international decision making" or to "integrate dissatisfied powers into the central management of the international system" (Lyons, Baldwin, & McNemar, 1977, p. 85).

Technical cooperation to developing countries is no longer perceived by the earlier opponents as an irrelevant issue. The ITU is no longer a club of like-minded countries preoccupied exclusively with technical coordination and standardization of operating procedures. Functionalism is not fully adequate, however, at explaining why the developed countries have come to accommodate the demands of their less-endowed counterparts.

Much of the rationale underlying the functionalist approach is implicitly grounded in a social-psychological framework of national and international attitude and image formation. It is argued that the integrative process engineered by international organizations is attributable to the erosion of the basis for identification with the nation-state by bringing together individuals from different nations into a more neutral international context (Wolf, 1973, pp. 368-369).

Functionalism assumes that people learn to think in nonnational terms because of a pattern of technical cooperation. At first, it is only the experts and managers who learn. They become habituated to consulting with their opposite numbers from other nations about technical problems, and eventually they come to see all problems from the perspective of humanity as a whole. Thus, the answer to maximizing the learning process lies in extending the range of participation in practical problem solving. In the end, others besides experts, managers, and civil servants will participate in and undergo the same process, particularly by way of greatly increased work and responsibility on the part of international voluntary groups (Haas, 1964, p. 13).

The increasing significance of the ITU as an integrative agent in worldwide telecommunication, however, is not primarily the result of a functionalist learning process. The three key factors accounting for the ITU's centrality—the basic instrument, the work program, and the domain of jurisdiction—call for a redefinition and considerable strengthening of the concept of *essentiality*, much beyond the conventional functionalist understanding of it, if one wishes to make sense of the dynamics at work in the ITU.

The reprioritized concept of essentiality integrates the notion of inevitability. All nations are *compelled* to work telecommunication arrangements through the ITU whether or not they learn to collaborate with each other. The very nature of telecommunication makes it imperative for countries to join the ITU if they want to protect their national interests. The strength of the ITU is to cater to the self-interest of its members. In that, the ITU is unique among the other international institutions. The promotion of internationalism is not the main engine to problem solving. The industrialized countries' acceptance of developing countries' demands has more to do with disaster-prevention strategies—the maintenance of the institutional status quo critical to heavy telecommunication operators—rather than being the result of a convergence of views.

The explanatory power of the functionalist approach is limited, as Wolf (1973) notes, by its lack of consideration of the following provisions:

1. International organizations vary in the degree to which their major activities are politically controversial and do not necessarily emerge "naturally" from a consensus among members on the definition of a mutual problem.
2. The contexts and constituencies of international organizations vary in the amount of control [that] they exercise over the definition of a problem for the organization or over its activities.
3. International organizations vary in the extent to which their membership is composed of different types of groups having different, perhaps opposing, sets of interests.

4. International organizations vary by type of sociological structure, ranging in differentiation from low to high number of functional units, and in authority from hierarchical to participatory and horizontal. (pp. 368-369)

The new states that have come to constitute the majority in the ITU were not attracted by functionalism. They were interested in building, rather than in breaking down, national sovereignty, and they looked to international organizations to effect redistribution so as to facilitate their development, something about which functionalism has little to say. Furthermore, individuals became disillusioned with functionalism when its promised benefits with respect to peace and security failed to materialize. Nor were younger recruits to international organization, reading the historical record of functionalist activities and noting its ineffectiveness in broader issues, attracted to its teleological goal.

Cox and Jacobson contend that the ideology that has supplanted functionalism for general purposes is developmentalism. In all of the agencies, one can find some persons—and more frequently large numbers of them—who are dedicated to the notion of development. Developmentalism, though, is a value commitment rather than a carefully articulated, coherent ideology. It is not relevant, as was functionalism, to the transformation of the international system by strengthening authorities other than those of nation-states. It is a pledge to do something for the poorer parts of humanity, a pledge to which both the United States and the Soviet Union could subscribe, albeit for their own reasons, and one warmly welcomed by the majority of member states, the recipients of the proffered assistance. It is a pledge, moreover, to attain a tangible goal: progress toward development can be measured and actually achieved. Consequently, the doctrine is infinitely more satisfying to individual participants than functionalism is (Jacobson, 1974).

Developmentalism in many respects contradicts, implicitly if not explicitly, the political values underlying functionalism. Developmentalism stresses the coordination and coherence of economic policy at the national level, whereas functionalism seeks to stimulate sectoral interests and their transnational linkages. Developmentalism leads to stress upon centralization of policy control and action at the international level, whereas functionalism favors the autonomous growth of sectoral international agencies. Developmentalism stresses the primacy of the general interest of the collectivity in development, whereas functionalism places a higher value upon the freedom of individuals and of associations distinct from the collectivity.

ITU AS A COMMUNICATION NETWORK

One can view the ITU with regard to how far it involves the effective policy-making processes of governments rather than how independent of states it has become. This view leads towards a fuller understanding of the role of international organizations in international relations, though their role does not appear to conform to the ultimate goal of functionalism.

In this perspective, international organizations are sensitive communication networks within which the power holders in world affairs have been responsive to signals from the less powerful without abandoning the control of action to them. International organizations facilitate the orderly management of intergovernmental relations without significantly changing the structure of power that governs these relations, at least in the short term and somewhat beyond. Over their longer history, the greatest potential for change from international organizations may lie in the opportunity that they give the less powerful to influence the climate of opinion and the accepted values according to which action is determined (Claude, 1966).

Thus, the ITU can be seen as a medium for gaining widespread acceptance of the obligation on the part of the wealthier and more powerful to give technical assistance to the poorer and weaker; and it may be a means of giving the less powerful majority of countries a greater collective voice in the management of world telecommunications, to the extent that this majority is able to take advantage of the available communications networks by aggregating persuasive views.

At times the industrialized countries have criticized their developing counterparts for substituting rhetoric for concrete propositions in ITU general assemblies, and thus misusing the organization's forums. This situation takes a new meaning in light of Claude's (1967) contention that "its [the United Nation's] debating society aspect is not to be deplored and dismissed as evidence of a 'slump' but . . . deserves to be examined for evidence of the functional adaptation and innovation that it may represent" (p. 25).

Claude's thesis is that the function of collective legitimization is one of the most significant elements in the pattern of political activity that the United Nations has evolved in response to the set of limitations and possibilities posed by the political realities of our time. Collective legitimization has been thrust upon the organization by member states. It is an answer, not to the question of what the United Nations can *do*, but to the question of how it can be *used*.

Referring to the ITU, collective legitimization suggests that it is an agency capable of bestowing politically weighty approval and disapproval upon projects and policies. One may question whether proclamations of approval or disapproval by the Union, deficient as they typically are in both formal

legal significance and effective supportive power, are really important. The answer is that statesmen, by so obviously attaching importance to them, have made them important. They take collective legitimacy seriously as a factor in international politics.

A major campaign has been waged in the United Nations to delegitimize colonialism, to invalidate the claim of colonial powers to legitimate possession of overseas territories—in short, to revoke their sovereignty over colonies. The ex-colonial states have not confined themselves to using the United Nations, or the ITU for that matter, for legitimization of the campaign for definitive liquidation of the colonial system. In the telecommunication sphere, they have undertaken, in concert with other developing countries, to use the organization to secure the establishment and general acceptance of the doctrine that they have a right to receive, and advanced states have a duty to provide, assistance in promoting telecommunication development.

CONCLUSION

The strength of the integration literature rests on its attempt to analyze the politics of interdependence. Its chief weaknesses derive from its strong teleological orientation. Realists in the tradition of Morgenthau (1960) have portrayed a world in which states, acting from self-interest, struggle for "power and peace." In such a world, the mind may safely come to rest with the proposition that the role of international institutions is a minor one limited by the rare congruence of such interests.

However, in a world of complex issues imperfectly linked, in which coalitions are formed transnationally and transgovernmentally, the potential role of international institutions is greatly increased. The role of the ITU as the central node in the global telecommunication network is a case in point. In particular, international secretariats staffed with knowledgeable individuals may have the opportunity to place themselves at the center of crucial communication networks and, therefore, to be influential as negotiators and brokers without having significant tangible sources of power.

The interest in integration theories reflects both the persistence and the transformation of the kind of idealism that originally pervaded, guided, and, at times, distorted the study of international organizations. It has come to be understood that integration of nation-states in a world system, whatever the modalities of this process, may be the most important function performed by global international organizations. Of all the international organizations, the ITU, because of its unique characteristics—the basic instrument, the work program, and the domain of jurisdiction—best exemplifies this process.

1. There are today 300 international governmental organizations (IGOs), 3,000 international nongovernmental organizations (INGOs), and a similar number of business international nongovernmental organizations (BINGOs).
2. Other pre-World War II organizations are the International Labor Organization (ILO), a holdover of the 1920 League of Nations, and the Universal Postal Union (UPU), created in 1873.
3. The United States temporarily withdrew from the International Labor Organization (ILO) in the mid-1970s, and the United States and Great Britain pulled out of the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) in 1985.
4. Considerable confusion continues to persist among scholars about the use of the term *integration*. Some scholars define it as a process, others as a terminal condition—the “condition of being integrated”—and still others as a combination of the two. In practice, scholars often use the word interchangeably for all three senses. Deutsch defines *integration* in terms of turning “previously separate units into components of a coherent system.” Elsewhere, however, he stresses the condition of a secure community (Deutsch, 1971, p. 58). For Haas, *integration* is “a process for the creation of political communities defined in institutional or attitudinal terms” (Haas, 1964, p. 29). Galtung defines *integration* as “a process whereby two or more actors form a new actor” (Galtung, 1968, p. 39).
5. Information on the ITU Convention is based on Coddling and Rutkowski (1982, pp. 203-222). Discussion of the U.N. Charter relies on Waters (1967) and Hill (1978).
6. However, by stating that “coercion will not be brought to bear on a member wishing to withdraw,” the Charter implies a recognition of the right to withdraw at one’s own discretion.
7. The standard formula states: “The delegation of _____ reserves for its government the right: (1) not to accept any financial measure which might lead to an increase in its contributory share in defraying Union expenses; (2) to take any action it deems necessary to protect its telecommunication services should any member fail to observe the terms of the International Telecommunication Convention.”
8. Until the 1970s the United States paid considerably more. In 1946, it contributed nearly 40% of the U.N. regular budget. In 1970, after a series of gradual decreases, which lowered the U.S. contribution to 31.5%, a Commission recommended a reduction to a level not to exceed 25%.
9. There are exceptions. The OECD, whose membership is restricted to the developed countries, has obviously not been affected by this shift. The OECD was an outgrowth of efforts by the United States to help rebuild Western European economies after World War II and to promote economic cooperation among the industrialized democracies.
10. The ITU Radio Regulations define *radio* as the propagation of electromagnetic waves in space without artificial guide (Chapter 1, Article 1).
11. It is worth noting that in the later 1970s, whereas the private commercial firms had a majority participation in only 2 of the 11 study groups of the CCIR, those firms represented a majority in all the 18 study groups of the CCITT (Coddling & Rutkowski, 1982, p. 102).
12. In the history of multilateral treaty making, the International Telegraph Conventions of the previous century emerge as unusual instruments. Rights and obligations appearing in them were not limited to states alone, but extended to legal and natural persons. Upon acceptance of certain obligations, private telegraph enterprises, for example, were

admitted to the advantages of the Telegraph Convention and Regulations. Today's involvement of private telecommunication agencies in the work of the ITU follows the early practice of the Telegraph Union (Glazer, 1962, p. 307).

13. Of the few cases in which resort to arbitration was attempted, none involved harmful interference. The one significant reported arbitration case under the ITU procedures involved a 1935 dispute over suspension of telegraph services. See discussion of the "Affaire de la Société Radio-Orient (France v. Egypt)" (Coddington, 1952, pp. 309-311).

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The Alternative Media and the Overthrow of the Marcos Regime

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Mass communication research over the last half century has focused primarily on the mainstream media and their effects on large audiences. On the other hand, the alternative media with their relatively small audiences have received scant attention. Although the mainstream media have been criticized for being supportive of the status quo, most studies of social change have been confined to the mainstream media. Using the 1986 uprising in the Philippines, this paper examines the role of the alternative media in social conflict. It suggests that type of audience, instead of simply audience size, could make an important difference. In the Philippines, the audience of the alternative media included opinion leaders in key segments of the population. In time, these leaders constituted a counterestablishment in the opposition coalition that consisted of peasants, workers, college students and faculty, businessmen, the hierarchy of the predominant religion, and, in the final days, even some of the highest-ranking military officers of the regime. The opposition used folk media, print and radio, and certain new communication technologies as alternative media.

Over the last half century, mass communication researchers have focused primarily on the mainstream media and their effects on large audiences. In comparison, they have given scant attention to the alternative media, with their relatively small following. This lack of interest is apparent even in studies of social change, which seems to be inconsistent with the criticism that the mainstream media tend to reinforce the established order and resist unfamiliar points of view. As Lazarsfeld and Merton (1948, p. 107) said, the mainstream media "not only continue to affirm the status quo but . . . fail to raise essential questions about the structure of society."

Using the overthrow of the Marcos regime in the Philippines in 1986 as a point of departure, this paper suggests that the alternative media can be a major participant in social change. Under certain conditions, the type of audience, instead of simply audience size, can make an important difference. For a number of years prior to the uprising, the audience for the alternative media in the Philippines was much smaller than that of the

mainstream media. However, it included many opinion leaders from key segments of the population. In time, these leaders constituted a counter-establishment that challenged the legitimacy of the Marcos regime. As in Iran a few years earlier, the government controlled nearly all major means of communication. In spite of repressive measures, however, an array of alternative media managed to present a diversity of reportage and opinion. In contrast, the mainstream media became increasingly irrelevant and marginal in the unfolding of events.

MAINSTREAM AND ALTERNATIVE MEDIA

The term *mainstream media* refers to those communication channels whose point of view is consistent with the majority of the mass media over time. They usually reflect the dominant values and traditions of a social system. But this is not always the case, as shown by the variance between certain beliefs held by the Catholic majority in Poland and the officially sanctioned mainstream press (Curry, 1984; Downing, 1984). When the mainstream media differ from the dominant values of a system for an extended period of time, these values may be expressed through other channels, including the alternative media. The failure of the mainstream media to reflect those values and traditions in Philippine society appears to have contributed to their eventual rejection.

The *alternative media* consist of those channels whose points of view differ from the mainstream media over time. Since they present a diversity of reporting and interpretation, the alternative media may also differ from one another. Both the mainstream and alternative media may take any form along the communication technology continuum. Traditional channels represent one end of this continuum, while new media technologies extend the boundary at the other extreme. In between these extremes are ordinary print and broadcast media.

Traditional channels include folk media, various forms of public assembly, and religious services. Dramatizations, including puppetry and shadow plays, pictures, songs, and dances are among the oldest forms of folk media. Public assembly includes mass gatherings, parades, and processions. In some religious traditions, prayer meetings include social commentary or a discussion of current issues (Fathi, 1979).

Outside of their countries of origin, certain mass media may also function as alternative sources of information on a number of issues, particularly if their content differs from the mainstream media in other countries on those issues. They include specific content from publications such as transnational

newsweeklies and prestige newspapers (Cooper, 1984; Merrill, 1968; Pool, 1970) as well as short-wave radio and satellite television broadcasts. Selected content from the domestic media of one country may also be used in another to fulfill this alternative function. In some settings, dissident journalists working in the mainstream media could also provide alternative information. However, their visibility invites reprisals within their own media organization, such as suspension or expulsion. Time and again, the South African regime has exercised broad powers to remove dissident journalists from positions in the mainstream media (Hachten & Giffard, 1984; Woods, 1987).

The extent of government control of the media usually depends on the conditions of social conflict. Where prohibited, the alternative media may be published or broadcast in defiance of government regulations, although this condition is not necessary to qualify as alternative media (Curry, 1982; Woods, 1987). Unlike ordinary print and broadcast media, traditional and newer forms of mass communication are less subject to government censorship and control. As a result, the alternative media in authoritarian countries are often found at the extremes of the communication technology continuum.

Gandhi's nonviolent campaign for India's independence utilized many traditional forms of mass communication. He staged "pseudo-events" (Boorstin, 1961) on a massive scale in order to dramatize the problems of British rule. His 200-mile march to make salt from seawater, in defiance of colonial law, involved thousands of participants along the way (Bakshi, 1981). Gandhi also wore simple, handspun cotton clothing, which had been displaced by foreign imports, as a nationalist symbol. These gestures not only stoked India's pride but also created support from other countries. In each skillful exercise of civil disobedience, Gandhi made certain that journalists, photographers, and newsreel cameramen were present in order to tell his side of the story (Lapping, 1985, pp. 40-45). In Indonesia, the armed struggle for independence was complemented by efforts on the cultural front. Rebels employed the centuries-old art of shadow puppets in order to explain independence to a population kept illiterate for nearly 350 years. When the Dutch surrendered Indonesia to the Japanese in 1942, less than 8% of its people could read and write (Gonzalez & Priyono, 1988).

Like traditional media, the new media can elude government control more easily than can the mainstream media. For example, originals for photocopying do not require telltale lead typesetting or the production of printing plates. A typewriter or manuscript will do, as *samizdat* publishers have discovered in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union (Curry, 1984; Downing, 1984). In the Iranian revolution, speeches by the Ayatollah Khomeini were transmitted from exile in France by phone, and then distributed to adherents

within Iran on audiocassettes. Rebels effectively combined these new media with traditional channels of mass communication, such as Islamic prayer meetings and the bazaar (Fathi, 1979; Mowlana, 1979).

During periods of social conflict, certain stories in the foreign media may help confer legitimacy (cf. Lazarsfeld and Merton, 1948) on some leaders by reporting their opinions and activities. They helped establish Bishop Desmond Tutu in South Africa and Lech Walesa in Poland as rallying points for the opposition. As Gandhi discovered in South Africa and India, foreign media coverage can help shape world opinion and exert pressure on an unpopular regime (Lapping, 1985, pp. 40-45). The same reasoning may have partly motivated the governments of Israel and South Africa to ban or censor foreign media coverage of their strife-torn areas from time to time.

Whenever the alternative media are present during periods of social conflict, they seem to carry a wider range of opinion and reportage than do the mainstream media. As a result, their content tends to differ not only from the mainstream media but also from each other (Gitlin, 1980; Kessler, 1984).

OPPOSITION MEDIA

Over the last few years, researchers have examined some alternative communication channels that are opposed to the "dominant capitalist media" in Latin America (Mattelart, 1980; Portales, 1981). These channels contest right-wing political and economic authoritarianism and are often described in instrumental terms. Reyes Matta (1986, p. 190) called them a means toward democracy and the participation of "the oppressed sectors of society at the national level, and the dominated countries at the international level." How these objectives may be achieved is still a matter of debate. Some theorists suggest various participatory forms of mass communication (De la Luz Hurtado, 1985; Portales, 1981; Trejo Dalarbre, 1975); the use of popular correspondents by a highly centralized press (Simpson Grinberg, 1986); and state control of the mass media (Mattelart, 1980), among other proposals. Compared to the framework in this paper, these perspectives seem to emphasize opposition instead of diversity, and the criticism of mass media systems in capitalist societies. In contrast, this paper examines the role of the alternative media across all types of societies, regardless of political valence, and all other viewpoints outside the mainstream, including the opposition.

CONSERVATISM IN THE MAINSTREAM MEDIA

Following Lazarsfeld and Merton (1948), a number of researchers have provided other explanations for, as well as evidence of, the conservative

orientation of the mainstream media, even in those settings where press freedom may be exercised. Gans (1979) said that news reporting in these media typically cautions against social disorder. Whenever discontinuities occur, they provide instructions by certain designated officials on how to restore the previous state of affairs. Similarly, Bagdikian (1983) said that reliance by mainstream media journalists on those identified as "certifying authorities" within a social system may bias reportage in favor of the established order. Rosengren, Arvidsson, and Sturesson (1978) said that the mainstream media typically criticize cases of social deviance by contrasting them with norms and values that they assume to be shared by the community at large. By focusing on these cases of deviance, Wright (1960) said the mainstream media also help enforce social control over individuals by emphasizing their unacceptability. In their studies of mass media companies, Bagdikian (1983) and Tuchman (1978) suggested another reason for the conservative orientation of the mainstream media. They claimed that as "big businesses," the media have an active interest in preserving their privileged position in society. As a result, they tend to downplay or ignore those activities and points of view that may raise questions about their own status. Tichenor, Donohue, and Olien (1980) claimed that the mainstream media are integrated in the larger social system in which they operate instead of being independent agents. As such, they tend to support the existing structural arrangements and exercise of power.

Social control of the press may be viewed along a continuum, with varying degrees of openness to the flow of information within a social system. At one end of this hypothetical continuum is the complete control of the mass media by the state, and the absence of any control is at the other, an ideal often expressed as "the marketplace of ideas." While there is no society with a completely free flow of information, researchers seem to agree that there are important qualitative and quantitative differences among the various systems in managing information in terms of value consensus, control mechanisms, and types of contested information (Converse, 1985; Curry, 1982; Hachten, 1981; Siebert, Peterson, & Schramm, 1956; Weaver, Buddendaum, & Fair, 1985).

Conservatism in the mainstream media becomes more problematic in those settings where little or no press freedom exists, as in authoritarian countries. In practice, press freedom in those countries depends to a large extent on the amount and type of government control, which may be applied directly or indirectly. These measures may range from cooptation to violence (Curry & Dassin, 1982; Rosenblum, 1979).

If the mainstream media are conservative to begin with, as some researchers argue, they may be expected to become even more so under restrictive conditions. As a result, the question of where ideas of social change in mass

communication originate assumes some importance. The historical record suggests that the alternative media may be a major source of these ideas.

AGENDA SETTING

In his study of the U.S. press during the Vietnam War, Gitlin (1980) noted the difficulty of obtaining mainstream media coverage for ideas and causes that were contrary to the stated government position, particularly in the early stages of U.S. military involvement. In comparison, the alternative media presented a wide range of reportage and opinion, from the extreme left to the far right. As the human cost of the war escalated, however, the mainstream media eventually considered positions similar to those that had appeared earlier in the alternative media, such as negotiating with North Vietnam and withdrawal.

The ability of the alternative media to contribute to the press and public agendas during the Vietnam War does not seem to be an isolated event. Their history in the United States suggests that they often have preceded the mainstream media in discussing alternatives toward resolving social conflicts, particularly those with little or no precedence. In her overview of the dissident press in the United States, Kessler (1984) showed how the feminist media campaigned for women's rights, including the right to vote; how the black press called for the implementation of civil rights; and how the labor press demanded unionization and employment benefits. Before their appearance in the mainstream media, however, debate on these issues had already begun in the alternative media. But presenting alternative news and opinion may require a high price. Aside from being actively resisted or ignored by the mainstream media, the alternative media were often held in ridicule and subjected to persecution or violence by opposing interests. In the feminist, civil rights, and labor campaigns, it was not uncommon for many alternative media to fail financially as a result of various pressures before these issues were finally resolved, often many years afterwards.

AUDIENCE SIZE

Research on the mass media over the last half century has been concerned mainly with their effects on large audiences. But audience size is not necessarily the most important measure of social influence in every case. As studies of the prestige or elite press have shown, even newspapers with small audiences can have considerable impact (Cooper, 1984; Merrill, 1968; Pool, 1970). The type of audiences attending to and utilizing these media may be

more important than their absolute number. Oftentimes, elite newspapers are not necessarily those with the largest circulation in their own countries. However, they apparently influence certain opinion leaders in both public and private sectors, including those working in the other media.

A number of social revolutions have shown that the alternative media can help mobilize important segments in society. Almost 10 years prior to the Bolshevik revolution, Lenin (1970) and others smuggled *Iskra* (Spark) from abroad to their supporters in Russia. While limited to a few cities because of its own inadequate resources and the suppression by the Czarist regime, it apparently reached many of the would-be leaders in the revolution. Similarly, the Philippine revolution against Spain in 1896 was fueled by two alternative newspapers, *La Solidaridad* (Solidarity) and *Kalayaan* (Liberty). While their circulation was confined to a small group of highly educated nationalists, these readers eventually constituted the core of the independence movement. *La Solidaridad* was published in Spain and smuggled back to the Philippines. While *Kalayaan* was published illegally in the country, it carried a Japanese dateline to mislead authorities about its actual origin. The discovery of the *Kalayaan* printing press by the colonial government was one of the immediate causes of the nationalist revolt (Agoncillo, 1956).

OPINION LEADERSHIP

The concept of opinion leadership was originally formulated in relation to the two-step theory of communication (Katz & Lazarsfeld, 1955; Lazarsfeld, Berelson & Gaudet, 1948). In the original model, opinion leaders learned about certain issues in the mass media which they communicated, in turn, to their followers. Later studies showed, however, that even so-called followers had access to these media, and the process of opinion leadership was somewhat more complex than originally envisioned. As revised by diffusion research (Katz, 1957; Rogers, 1983; Rogers & Kincaid, 1981), *opinion leadership* refers to a quality ascribed to certain individuals by others based on the following: (1) the personification of certain values, (2) knowledgeability or competence in an area or across areas, and (3) strategic location within a social network. Opinion leaders also share many attributes of their followers.

The coalition that brought down the Marcos regime consisted of organizations that were originally oriented toward various causes. Peasant and labor organizations were initially concerned only with work-related issues. Student and faculty associations were organized around questions of academic freedom as well as providing more equitable access to education. Businessmen and professionals had industry and trade concerns. Members

of religious organizations, such as Catholic clerics and nuns, were initially involved with social work as well as assistance to political detainees and human rights victims. Opinion leaders in each of these segments led similar others. Toward the end, Corazon Aquino became the rallying point for this coalition and its voice for an alternative vision of society.

A number of observers have contrasted Aquino's qualities as a presidential candidate with those values represented by the incumbent (Buss, 1987; Komisar, 1987). To many Filipinos, she was not simply the widow of the main opposition leader but personified those who were wronged by the dictatorship. In spite of her initial characterization as "a simple housewife," her experience in *realpolitik* was part of her everyday life. She grew up in a family that held many political offices. After attending college in the United States, she married Benigno Aquino, who rose to national prominence as a politician. The imprisonment of her husband by the regime and his subsequent exile and murder also gave others an insight into her character and leadership. During the election campaign, she turned the regime's criticism that she had no political experience into her advantage, by saying that unlike her opponent, she had "no experience in the killings, the corruption, and the favoritism" that had brought her country "into the abyss" (Buss, 1987, p. 32).

Within their own circles, other opposition leaders shared these qualities to some extent. They included prominent opposition politicians, businessmen, church leaders, college faculty, and student organizers. Many of them were also victimized by the regime. Their educational and professional qualifications as well as their political experience gave them the credentials to lead others in their formal and informal social networks. Over the years, the abuses of the regime unified what began as a loose coalition of shared interests into a counterestablishment. The Communist underground and front organizations had their share of opinion leaders as well, but serious ideological differences with the other opposition groups prevented their rapprochement (Borja, 1987; Chapman, 1987).

The coalition first tested its strength in 1984 by fielding candidates for the parliament and organizing a vote count independent of the government. In spite of widespread fraud and violence, it had partial success and enabled some opposition politicians to take office. In November 1985, Marcos scheduled a "snap" presidential election for February 1986, to demonstrate that he had the mandate of the people. Some organizations in the emerging coalition decided to work for Aquino's campaign while others volunteered with the National Movement for Free Elections (NAMFREL), a citizen vote count organization.

In her study of social revolutions, Skocpol (1979, p. 32) said that the formation of a counterestablishment representing key segments of society

could hasten the overthrow of a regime. She explained that "what matters most is the support or acquiescence . . . of the politically powerful and mobilized groups, invariably the regime's own cadres." This argument also finds support in the *dominant coalition* theory (Coleman, 1975; Cyert & March, 1963), which states that at any point in time, different coalitions in a social system combine on the basis of shared interests. The composition of these coalitions tends to shift over time, as shared interests change, with the dominant coalition exercising more power. In the Philippines, the dominant coalition apparently shifted over a period of 20 years from regime support or acquiescence to direct opposition.

THE MARKETPLACE OF IDEAS

Prior to the uprising, the main function of the alternative media in the Philippines was to provide a diversity of reporting and opinion. As a result, they broadened the range of ideas for public discussion. Contrary to popular accounts (Bain, 1986; Neumann, 1983; Pearce, 1986), their role was not simply contesting the official version of events nor presenting the "truth." After all, truth in journalism, as in social science, is ultimately unknowable. The presentation of two sides of a news story does not guarantee balance nor objectivity in reporting. Even in authoritarian countries, the government version of events is not necessarily untrue. As McCombs and Gilbert (1986, p. 13) said, "The news is not cut from whole cloth." All descriptions of reality are limited by the observer's point of view, and all news reporting shares in that contingency. Instead, the main issue is whether a meaningful diversity of news and interpretation is available, on which the public could make some approximation of the "truth." In communication, this diversity is often referred to as "the marketplace of ideas." Authoritarian regimes often try to limit the discussion of alternatives by suppressing the freedom of expression and assembly. Herman (1985, p. 135) said that the marketplace of ideas is rendered meaningless "if only a subset of issues or facts is made available to the general population, whether by official or tacit censorship," or "if issues, facts, and views that deviate from an established view are confined to the fringes of the media and do not reach the bulk of the population." Between 1972 and 1986, the Marcos regime tried to marginalize news reporting and interpretation by: (1) replacing the ownership and management of the mainstream media with its supporters, (2) censoring media content, (3) adopting additional legislation as necessary to control the media, (4) harrasing the alternative media as well as those dissident journalists still working in the mainstream media, and (5) rewarding compliance with patronage and bribery. Following the declaration of martial law in 1972, Marcos closed down all print and broadcast media

facilities in the Philippines, which was known until that time as having "the freest press in Asia." Only those media that were openly supportive of the regime prior to martial law and those reorganized as the government saw fit were allowed to reopen. In most cases, the management of these media was turned over to Marcos supporters without compensation to the previous owners. By the time the regime finished reorganizing the mass media, all major national and local newspapers were under the control of its supporters. In addition to three national radio and television networks owned by Marcos relatives or business associates, another network was operated by the government. The few exceptions were those media with very small or specialized audiences, which were often cited by the government as evidence of its claims to press freedom.

RESOURCE MOBILIZATION

In their resource mobilization thesis, McCarthy and Zald (1977) said that discontent with the existing social order is almost always present. How discontent is converted into critical resources, such as adherents and funding, requires organization and planning. In this task, communication plays a major role. The initial years following the declaration of martial law were characterized by an absence of organized opposition, except for the Communist underground. The Marcos regime achieved a virtual monopoly of power by systematically dismantling democratic institutions, beginning with the legislative and judiciary branches of government. The free press, which traditionally had functioned as the fourth estate in the Philippines, was converted into an ally. Many dissident journalists were imprisoned, tortured, and murdered. Some fled underground, while others were forced into exile.

These repressive measures did not stop attempts at organizing opposition to the regime, although at great cost. As discussed earlier, it began with narrowly focused causes, such as the restoration of academic freedom in schools, work-related issues among peasants and workers, reform of economic policies among businessmen, and assistance to human rights victims by the church. Even dissent among those military officers who triggered the uprising was partly a reaction to cronyism and unprofessional conduct by officers personally loyal to Marcos. Using the phone and alternative radio, their leaders convinced a majority of the armed forces stationed around the country to abandon the regime. As this interest group joined the opposition coalition, Marcos was gradually deprived of the means to suppress the rebellion. Without its help, civil war may have followed (Johnson, 1987).

Hirschman (1970) has suggested three possible responses under conditions of social conflict: exit, voice, and loyalty. In the early years of martial law, the Catholic church tried to work with the regime in securing social and economic reforms. As these "loyalty" attempts failed, the church hierarchy began edging toward "voice" strategies by making itself heard on the important issues of the day. Hirschman (1970, p. 30) defined *voice* as "any attempt at all to change, rather than escape from, an objectionable state of affairs." From time to time, letters from the prelate, Jaime Cardinal Sin, or the council of bishops were read from pulpits all over the country. The Philippines is the only predominantly Christian country in Asia, a carryover from its Spanish past. Catholics represent 85% of the population, while Protestants comprise another 10%. Thus, any action taken by the Catholic hierarchy is not regarded lightly (Mercado, 1986). After the violent 1986 elections, the Catholic church decided on the "exit" strategy by abandoning any attempt at compromise. Similarly, other cause-oriented organizations gradually changed their conflict strategy from appeasement to confrontation (Johnson, 1987; Simons, 1987).

Even before the declaration of martial law in 1972, the Communist underground and front organizations had their own alternative media. The extent to which they gathered support during the Marcos years may be measured by their area of operations. From a small group operating in 2 provinces in 1972, the Communists had extended their influence to 62 out of 73 provinces by 1986 (Chapman, 1987, p. 14). Their decision not to participate in the emerging opposition coalition and the 1986 uprising, however, excluded them from any power sharing that followed.

The alternative media outside of the Communist opposition began in 1977 with a newspaper called *We Forum*. It was founded by Jose Burgos, who was well known for investigative journalism prior to martial law. After it published a series of articles disputing Marcos's claims as a war hero, the paper was shut down by the government, which arrested Burgos and charged him with sedition. As soon as human rights and press organizations around the world secured his release, Burgos started another newspaper called *Ang Pahayagang Malaya* (The Free Newspaper). In spite of constant threats, lawsuits, and financial pressures, *Malaya* managed to continue publishing (Burgos, 1986). In time, other dissident journalists began their own newspapers and magazines, including *Veritas* (Truth), a newspaper sponsored by the Catholic church. Some dissident journalists also found their voice in the mainstream media (Lent, 1986; Neumann, 1983).

Following Benigno Aquino's assassination in 1983, the Catholic church radio station, known as Radio *Veritas* (Truth), switched from mainly religious programming toward news and opinion. It reported the government's investigation and acquittal of all military personnel implicated in the crime.

It covered the 1984 parliamentary elections, the 1986 presidential campaign, and the regime's attempts at electoral fraud and violence in both. For about 3 years, Radio *Veritas* was one of the few alternative radio stations out of more than 300 around the country. After Marcos loyalists destroyed the *Veritas* radio transmitter on the 2nd day of the uprising, it relied on a back-up transmitter until that also failed a few hours later. With *Veritas* silenced, the opposition lost its ability to coordinate defense at the barricades. Crowds drifted aimlessly, not knowing where the next attack would be coming. Hours later, opposition groups resumed broadcasting from a radio station the government had previously shut down. They called the clandestine station Radio *Bandido* (Bandit). Until the capture of the government TV network by rebel soldiers 1/2 day later, opposition leaders relied mainly on *Bandido* to ask for support. By chance, Marcos loyalists failed to locate *Bandido*, although it was only a few miles away from the presidential palace.

TRADITIONAL MEDIA

Some members of the opposition employed the alternative media in the Philippines almost from the start of martial law in 1972. Following Gandhi, the Philippine opposition relied on various traditional media to stage massive pseudo-events. Marches and demonstrations increased over time in spite of tear gas, beatings, and bullets. During marches, empty walls were transformed into outdoor signs, with painted slogans and posters against the regime. Banners and placards protested various abuses, while effigies of Marcos and Uncle Sam were burned, since the United States was widely perceived as supporting the regime. The Marcos effigies invariably sported Adolf Hitler's moustache, as did hundreds of his promotional color posters, which the opposition turned against him. While in prison, Benigno Aquino organized the first noise barrage. At the appointed time, towns and cities across the country were filled with the noise of people banging their pots and pans, or honking vehicle horns in protest. With the help of the foreign media, this sound was heard around the world.

Songs and dramatizations originally written in protest of Spanish and American colonial rule were revived as the opposition redefined authoritarianism in terms of the Marcos dictatorship. *Bayan Ko* (My Country), a song that protested the loss of freedom, became the unofficial anthem of the opposition. Student, peasant, and labor organizations also used dramatizations of social problems as teaching tools in streets and factories, followed by a discussion by players and viewers.

The opposition coalition called itself *Lakas ng Bayan* (People Power). Its abbreviation, *Laban*, also meant "fight" in the Filipino language. Its emblem

was made with an outstretched thumb and forefinger, forming the letter *L*. In time, this hand sign became as familiar as the yellow color of the opposition. Yellow ribbons and banners welcomed Benigno Aquino from exile, but he was assassinated by the military moments after he arrived. The color was inspired by the American song "Tie a Yellow Ribbon 'round the Old Oak Tree," which is about a man coming home after years in prison. Earlier, the same song was used by the families of U.S. Embassy hostages in Iran to welcome them home.

As the government resorted to more violence, even funeral processions of slain opposition leaders, including dissident journalists, provided opportunities to express grievance. In the last 3 years of the regime, 33 journalists were murdered, with some tortured beforehand (Burgos, 1986; IPI Report Staff, 1986). Benigno Aquino's funeral procession drew one of the largest crowds in Philippine history, with thousands of people in attendance as it wound around the streets of Manila. Even more listened to the Radio *Veritas* newscast of the event. Aquino's death seemed to have the opposite effect than the regime intended. Instead of frightening people into submission, it only served to remind them of how desperate the government had become.

After repeated failures by the Catholic church to obtain social and economic reforms through "critical collaboration," it adopted a more adversarial position toward the government. As in the struggle against the Shah (Fathi, 1979; Mowlana, 1979), the pulpit became an alternative channel through which the clergy criticized the regime. Letters from Cardinal Sin and the council of bishops were read from time to time in parishes across the country. In the end, their condemnation of the regime's attempt to defraud the people of their vote put the church hierarchy on collision course with the government.

NEW MEDIA

During the election campaign, supporters of Corazon Aquino relied on a wide array of new media, such as photocopiers, and audio- and videotapes, to inform voters across the country about her position on various issues (Aquino, 1986; Simons, 1987). These channels became necessary since the mainstream media refused to cover her election campaign and rejected advertisements from her supporters. A few advertisements were finally allowed during the closing days of the campaign.

NAMFREL reported some locally certified returns by computer modem from various points nationwide. Others were flown in by small planes lent by participating companies. Poll watchers kept in touch by using single sideband transceivers. Until the government stopped the count, these channels successfully circumvented attempts at electoral fraud. During the

uprising, some NAMFREL volunteers kept watch day and night at key points around the capital, using their transceivers to warn the barricades about loyalist troop movements. Their reports were passed on to Radio *Bandido*, which asked its listeners to stand in the line of attack (personal interview with Dr. Benjamin Lozare).

FOREIGN MEDIA

Some stories in the foreign media functioned as alternative sources of information on specific topics. Their reports on government corruption, human rights violations, and other abuses were photocopied or videotaped and then circulated by opposition groups (Aquino, 1986). While only a small segment of the population could afford to subscribe to these media, those who did included opinion leaders who shared them with many others.

The foreign media also borrowed themes from the alternative media. Following *We Forum*, the *New York Times* wrote its own series based on declassified, but never released, U.S. findings that Marcos's heroic claims were fictional. The *San Jose Mercury* series on Marcos's hidden wealth abroad won a Pulitzer Prize. The *Village Voice* also documented Marcos's extensive U.S. properties. Because of their origin, the Marcos regime could not respond to these reports with its usual strong-arm methods. In addition, the stature of the elite press, such as the *New York Times*, *The Wall Street Journal* and the *Washington Post*, lent these revelations authority. TV reports on the same topics from U.S. networks were videotaped and sent from abroad. Other Filipinos could access a much closer source of foreign reporting by tapping into the U.S. Armed Forces TV station for Clark and Subic bases.

DISCUSSION

Many opinion leaders in the Philippine opposition coalition were considered by their followers as knowledgeable in the practice of *realpolitik* and human rights (Johnson, 1987; Mercado, 1986). Their higher education, active participation in politics, and access to certain scarce resources seemed to qualify them for their roles. As incumbents of important offices in business, education, the predominant religion, and the military, they also had formal and informal networks of supporters. Their final stand in the barricades demanded considerable management skills. They avoided provocation in a series of intense confrontations with loyalist troops. They also maintained order and discipline within the rebel ranks. By keeping the front lines peaceful and conciliatory, they made it possible for loyalist troops to

withdraw without losing face or to switch sides on the basis of shared values. While forbearance was a credit to both sides, a single act of anger from the rebels could have started a bloodbath and led to a different outcome.

Since a majority of Filipinos profess to share those values found in Christianity, its symbols apparently struck a resonant chord among civilians and the military. Many faced the oncoming tanks and troop carriers literally armed with prayer. They held their Bibles, rosaries, and religious statues over their heads as they pleaded with loyalist soldiers to switch sides. As the tanks ground to a halt, they made small peace offerings of flowers, rosaries, cigarettes, food, or drink. The flower brigade, made up of schoolchildren and young women, was patterned after the 1968 uprising in Czechoslovakia (Mercado, 1986). Not everyone supported the opposition. Others remained loyal to the regime until the end. The next two largest Christian churches actively campaigned to neutralize the efforts of the Catholic hierarchy (Clad & Rabecs, 1987). The mainstream print and broadcast media also supported official policies and actions.

The opinion leaders in the opposition coalition eventually constituted a counterestablishment that rallied key segments of society. In the end, it even included some of the regime's highest-ranking military officers. As posited in McCarthy and Zald's (1977) resource mobilization theory, these opinion leaders organized critical resources with the help of the alternative media, including adherents, funding, and outside support. Only the Soviet Union recognized Marcos as the election winner.

The audience perception that some alternative media were closer to the "truth" than the mainstream media apparently contributed to their credibility. This perception did not always mirror reality. During the uprising, some members of the opposition used the alternative media to counter Marcos's claims with disinformation in order to demoralize his supporters and encourage their own (Johnson, 1987). Unlike the election campaign that preceded it, there was almost no bloodshed in the last days of the regime. Instead, the decisive battles were fought in the war of words and images between the mainstream and the alternative media.

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Citizen Power in U.S. Foreign Policy A Strategy to Communicate Consensus

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A strategy of citizen influence in U.S. foreign policy requires divisions of labor between citizens and officials, allowing concentrations on what each does best. A procedural key to strategy is building consensus on broad issue-areas at the intentions stage of policy-making, where citizens enjoy greater strength and competence, leaving officials with relative autonomy to make action decisions. The Congress and media, with other institutions, can play significant linking roles as citizen advocates and surrogates, especially in determining postures that reflect popular intentions and anticipate official actions. Leadership at all levels, public and private, has substantive responsibilities for promoting public understanding of stated or implied models of causality in foreign affairs. Often these models rest upon official assumptions that are interrelated across issues by popular priorities and result in the overall directions foreign policies are headed. Using these criteria and dividing the labor by stages, citizens can monitor and discipline official performance and policy impacts consistent with consensus.

It is now part of American folk wisdom that TV coverage of public affairs can shape both popular attitudes and political outcomes of public events. Some examples include the Vietnam War, African famines, and visits exchanged by top leaders, as well as gavel-to-gavel broadcasts of congressional hearings from Army-McCarthy through Watergate to the Iran-Contra affair. But these were isolated happenings. Congressional initiatives and media treatments of them were often opportunistic, and almost accidental. They show how citizens can influence public policies, without confirming that they can and will do it in the future.

This paper offers concepts and a deliberate strategy to guide citizen power aimed at influencing foreign policy. Part of a larger project, it is limited mainly to some communication and cultural aspects of citizen influence. Even this is not intended as a thorough study of public opinion or effects on policy-making. Rather, the paper offers a plausible strategy of foreign policy influence through citizen power that is removed from the point of policy action and not dependent on physical assets. Aside from the inclusion of

some examples of such influence, no effort has been made here to establish systematically how influence processes work or to measure their effects. Only through experimental use by citizen groups will the worth of the strategy be tested.

PART I: AN IDEAL PICTURE

Power at Home and Abroad

In public affairs, as in industry, power is the energy to get things done. Power produces results through others, in situations where their compliance cannot be assumed. Inside a community, where power is clothed with authority, compliance is more likely to be voluntary. Domestic policies thus depend heavily on citizen support. In foreign affairs, on the other hand, power is generally thought to demand the use of physical resources—force or money—as inducements to get others to do what is desired. Physical assets are readily accumulated, stored, and deployed by authorities whose acts are not directly influenced by constituents.

Citizen power, by contrast, is a resource that does not depend upon either wealth or coercion, though it may be allied with one or both. While most power is routinized and lodged in institutions, citizens remain its ultimate source; without popular support all institutions (including governments) decay, losing authenticity and legitimacy. The base of governmental legitimacy is consensus, or general agreement on two aspects of policy. In foreign policy the internal process of *how* issues are decided determines where citizen power can influence *what* is done abroad. Both aspects are essential to citizen power in foreign affairs.

For these reasons, power works differently at home and abroad. Citizen power dominates domestic affairs where physical power is restricted or even ruled out in most democracies, as for example in buying votes or cracking heads to win public office. Popular interventions are normal, especially in the domestic legislative process, but they are less promising in foreign affairs where the Congress itself is at a disadvantage. Foreign policy affects only foreigners directly, moreover, but is felt indirectly by citizens at home. Even the results it produces abroad become known at home through intermediaries, many of them with interests potentially in conflict with objective reporting.

More important, citizen power tends to be called upon in foreign policy mainly negatively, to reinforce the uses of physical power, as in wartime "morale," or to exclude particular options the public is thought to reject. Popular support is regarded indispensable at certain times, such as when fighting wars, concluding peace, creating new institutions, or signing arms

control treaties, and on critical issues, such as the Vietnam War, covert intelligence operations, and the Iran-Contra affair. At least tacit public approval is actively sought, and wholesale disapproval is avoided.

Physical forms of power, either economic or military, can promote short-run, national advantage, but each also runs the risk of sacrificing long-range, constructive solutions. One reason is that force or money can produce different kinds of alienation or resistance in those at whom they are directed (Etzioni, 1968, pp. 361-364; Galbraith, 1983, pp. 72-80). Physical power thus tends to intensify whatever initial conceptions of others may exist. It serves as a self-fulfilling prophesy, in which those defined as friends remain friends, and enemies become enemies.

The response of citizens to the use of physical power abroad is often to deplore it, calling instead for more use of diplomacy. *Diplomacy* is conceived broadly as all transactions, private and public, formal and informal, to minimize conflict between cultures (Rossow, 1962, p. 563). But diplomacy does not represent only citizen influence. Its scope can be seen in the characterization of diplomacy as a neutral tool, responsive to all forms of power. It still needs attention, however, as the only means by which constructive ends of citizen power can be pursued.

Questioning citizens' commitment to influencing foreign policy is premature, if the nature of political efficacy is recognized. More than on skill or organizing, efficacy depends on a sense of empowerment that is gained from experiencing success in local participation, going beyond merely voting (Pateman, 1970, pp. 45-46). Before concluding that public apathy is beyond remedy, therefore, conditions have to be created that are favorable for exercising citizen influence and for reversing past frustration.

Citizen Power

An essentially positive and optimistic view of community underlies citizen power. In it, shared values and beliefs sustain bonds independent of physical resources. Talcott Parsons defined *power* as "the capacity of a social system to mobilize resources to attain collectivistic goals." More explicitly rejecting violence as a failure of power, Hannah Arendt says that "Power corresponds to the human ability not just to act but to act in concert." Its basis is the formation of a common will . . . aimed at agreement" (Parsons & Arendt quoted in Habermas, 1983, p. 172).

The idea of power as repression is also firmly discarded by Foucault as "a wholly negative, narrow, skeletal conception." Modern conditions permit a "new 'economy' of power," or take-off, using more efficient and much less wasteful methods (Rabinow, 1984, pp. 60-61). These positive views also reenlist the state as an instrument to bring about social change, a test of which is the "purpose and intent, drawn from values and goals, of leaders,

high and low, resulting in policy decision and real, intended change." Crucial to policy-making and leadership is "influence over popular attitudes and behavior." "Power is *intended* social causation," without use of coercion (Burns, 1978, pp. 415-417, 433).

More broadly, communication and information-processing methods and systems are coupled with visions of potential citizen power in detailed proposals of the late 1960s for popular control of social policy. Here the advice of Etzioni (1968) and Sackman (1971) is transferred to foreign policy. Etzioni outlined an active society having a key capacity for consensus-building (pp. 471-472), including the use of media to strengthen shared national values (Etzioni, 1977-1978, p. 616). Sackman (1971) proposed future mass information utilities that could perhaps have "potentially revolutionary consequences for . . . the individual and society" (p. 6). As Sackman stated, "in a democracy information power ultimately resides in the public. Social change via real-time information systems is thus self-change" (pp. 248-252). Popular energy thus released enables systems to regulate social change. Though policymakers pay close attention to public opinion as it affects their tenure, its potential as a systematic, ongoing indicator of consensus as a guide to policy-making has hardly been explored.

Against assumptions of distributive (or win-lose) conceptions, there can thus be an aggregative (win-win) view of power. "Where the former presupposes conflict, the latter presupposes agreement." Such power is a "capacity of a group to achieve common objectives: the more the consensus concerning these objectives within the group, the greater its power to achieve them" (Nardin, 1973, p. 85). The principle of "bimodal symmetry of organization" says that from the degree of consensus within an organization, or from its "internal exercise of power comes the ability of the organization to impose its will externally" (Galbraith, 1983, p. 57). In general, internal consensus enhances ability to make external agreements.

General agreement exists on the process of decision making in foreign affairs, as laid out in the U.S. Constitution. When it works, no one complains. Dissatisfaction with the content of policies emerging from the process, however, has led to demands for change and to activities seeking to bring it about. Evidence of gaps between official policies and citizen preferences can be seen in opinion polls. They also reflect divergence between expert and popular attitudes and beliefs, that is, a lack of foreign policy consensus (Yankelovich & Harman, 1988, pp. 3-9).

Because of these gaps, a strategy of citizen influence on foreign policy has to aim at bringing the content of policies into line with popular preferences by producing consensus on large issue-areas between citizens and government. Changing the process of policy-making, including a leadership role in shaping consensus, may be a means to promote the end of issue-consensus.

Since the need for and possibility of citizen participation are not widely accepted, however, especially among professionals, the existence of citizen power must first be recognized by all.

Norms and Consensus

Consensus is built more easily within cultures, of course, than among people who differ from one another. This is the base for modern nationalism, ideally collecting under one government (state) the populations that are most nearly uniform in culture (nation) to create nation-states. The significance of culture, and of the state and other structures of society that maintain or undermine culture, is that they rest upon values and beliefs that are more or less integrated into shared belief systems.

Attitudes and opinions are less basic and more transitory than values and beliefs. They are therefore less well rooted in belief systems, but more relevant to current policy issues. Values and attitudes tend to be more emotional, while beliefs and opinions try to be rational. Each of these elements influences cultural norms, which are of course at the center of normative, or citizen, power.

But norms are only one way of regulating human behavior, the other two being ethics and law. No differences at all restrict the kinds of behavior any of the three can command, but the sanctions that induce compliance are distinct (Morgenthau, 1978, pp. 232-233). Respect for human life, for example, is an ethical principle that is accepted by most human beings. It is first of all an **internal control**, sanctioned by conscience. At the same time it can be a norm—that is, conduct that is both accepted and expected in most societies, the **breach** of which causes peers to ostracize offenders. Law also prohibits killing or injury in most nation-states and is enforced by physical penalties.

Internationally, the same differences prevail, but only norms are reliable. In the covert U.S. mining of Nicaraguan harbors, for example, neither legal nor ethical control was effective. Ethical controls usually come into play in foreign policy only through acts of national whistle-blowers, defectors, or resigning officials. Though some individuals may have resisted the mining, as suggested in the Iran-Contra hearings, others could be found to do it. When Nicaragua sought legal redress, Washington disputed the World Court jurisdiction and Nicaragua had no effective appeal.

Reliance on ethics (conscience) or law (punishment) in foreign affairs can thus yield uncertainty. Norms (and "social" ostracism among nation-states) can be effective, however, as demonstrated in the Nicaraguan case by these facts: (1) the mining was done covertly, indicating that the U.S. government did not take responsibility for it; (2) it was discontinued (and widely

denounced) after it was revealed; and (3) the United States later spoke self-righteously and acted strongly against mining of the Persian Gulf (Sofaer, 1987), despite Iran's legal claim to belligerent rights against Iraq, which the United States could not assert against Nicaragua.

Norms are easily confused with ethics or morality, which have substantial influence within cultures but are less potent from one to another. "Thinking clearly about norms," means including and excluding enough to "delineate the boundaries of ethics and foreign policy." Moralizing leadership tends to pursue "single moral goals," which are not necessarily valid beyond the group from which they spring. Such moralizing is no cure for world problems, and it may be a source of issues. To be truly moral, national leaders would have to "accept the contending interests of some 150 other nation-states" as well as their own (Thompson, 1980, pp. 2, 15-21).

The difference between international and domestic affairs, therefore, is not that there is no morality among states. It is rather that there are many moralities, some of them competing, and no one of them can be assumed to influence the conduct of others. Norms defined as practices that shape mutual expectations, but not necessarily reduced to law or other rules of required behavior, on the other hand, can promote order with help from citizen power in foreign policy (Nardin, 1983, pp. 42, 182-185, 225-232, 305-306).

Citizen Responses

The first great shift in U.S. foreign policy consensus moved from isolationism before World War II to postwar internationalism. It did not necessarily polarize American opinion, however, as the isolationism never had mass sources, but was "a protest movement with a specific ethnic, regional, and ideological base" (Schneider, 1974-1975, pp. 89-90).

The second great shift in foreign policy came out of the Vietnam War. This change was evident by 1971, when about one quarter of people polled favored unconditional withdrawal from the war. The shift was almost identical for all party affiliations, but it was strongest in the West and among young adults and nonwhites (Cantril & Roll, 1971, pp. 37-39).

Such differences cannot be explained solely by hawk-dove distinctions, which depend upon willingness to use force for policy purposes. More significant were sources of opinion guidance, which seemed to produce three mentalities: "partisans" taking their cues from political party leaders, "followers" listening to the country's leaders, and "believers" basing their positions on preestablished ideologies (Mueller, 1972, pp. 10, 16).

By the mid-1970s, things had gone so badly that many Americans saw government—at least in Washington, D.C.—as the enemy. Each party in

turn elected a president (Jimmy Carter and Ronald Reagan) on platforms that were antigovernment, after earlier nominating unsuccessful candidates (Barry Goldwater and George McGovern) opposed by their party machines. What had looked in the mid-1970s like a possible "populist majority based partly on foreign policy" actually occurred with Reagan's election in 1980 (Schneider, 1987, pp. 44-45, 1974-1975, pp. 119-120).

These events were results of successive presidents' failure to meet "institutional expectations of peace, prosperity, and integrity." After the mid-1960s "public opinion shifted from a consensual to a divisive set of concerns and thereby dissolved the favorable context in which Eisenhower and Kennedy had operated" (Ostrom & Simon, 1985, pp. 353-358). Nor did the old split adequately describe the full range of possibilities. People who favored "detachment" (Ullman, 1975-1976, pp. 110-112) were labeled neo-isolationist in the mid-1970s. For some people, they reflected a "quietist idealism . . . renouncing *action* in the world, while hoping to improve it by a stern refusal to recognize what one did not like" (Hoffmann, 1978, p. 220).

Before the 1970s all our presidents had thus been able to ignore both internal and external pressures on their foreign policies; thereafter they had to become more sensitive to both (Rosenau, 1981, pp. 162-163). Neo-isolationist tendencies in the 1970s, however, were not ideological as the pacifism and isolationism of the 1920-1930s had been. They showed "very simply an inability to understand the reasoning behind our involvements in distant events" (Schneider, 1974-1975, p. 92; see also Hughes, 1985-1986, p. 26). Purpose, in other words, was either not clear or not communicated.

In later studies the Vietnam War proved to be a watershed of opinion on foreign affairs. Before Vietnam the well-educated provided a central core of support for activist foreign policy. By the mid-1970s, however, increases in educational levels did not enlarge "followership" of foreign policy. Instead, Vietnam had split the educated elites, on whom political leaders had most depended for support of activist foreign policies.

Rather than staying with parties, the better-educated called themselves independents and divided evenly along ideological lines. Less-educated people, on the other hand, retained more of their partisan loyalties. Yet "there is still a large 'center' of opinion which refuses to be polarized" and parties competed amidst a "massive alienation of the electorate" (Schneider, 1974-1975; see also Holsti & Rosenau, 1984, pp. 153, 160).

A few persistent tendencies, or streams of opinion, in U.S. foreign policy are detected by most writers. A leadership sample showed that the "post-Vietnam period has been marked . . . by lack of consensus on fundamental beliefs about the international system, the proper American role in it, and appropriate strategies for pursuing the national interest." The leaders' re-

sponses suggested three ways of thinking, which in rough order of size were: post-Cold War internationalism, semi-isolationism, and Cold War internationalism (Holsti & Rosenau, 1983, pp. 197-198).

Even after domestic and personal concerns for a time reclaimed first place in opinion polls, as in the 1970s, attention to global problems revived as particular issues arose. Many car and truck bumpers carried stickers against the Ayatollah in 1979-1981, hunger in Africa attracted new donors, the nuclear freeze issue recruited otherwise inactive people, and call-in shows on radio brought comments about Qaddafi and Oliver North. Much of this was only political theater, but people's energies were engaged.

These effects were reactions, moreover, not only to events themselves but also to official U.S. responses, which were often merely mechanical, knee-jerk reactions that applied economic and military power to symptoms, without regard to deeper causes: repression in Eastern Europe, communism in Southeast Asia, superpower interventions in Afghanistan and Central America, civil justice in southern Africa, and others. The problems arose without regard to the party in office; the standard ways of responding were characteristics of the policy-making culture, which was little changed from one administration to the next.

Two institutions, the Congress and mass media, are leading surrogates of citizen power. Their roles are shared in part with the executive branch and private institutions. When citizens, media, or the Congress are assertive in probing foreign policies, however, the executive branch objects to such outside interference. Warnings are regularly issued that "the president's hands must not be tied" in foreign affairs. Efforts of the Congress to micromanage policy are particularly provocative to the executive branch. All the controversy only confirms the gaps between popular and official perceptions.

Citizen Influence Strategy

The trench warfare of fighting against actions of the federal executive branch becomes exhausting and disheartening from time to time, even for the most activist citizens. For it is tactical combat on the terrain of least popular advantage. An alternative is to use a strategy that takes advantage of citizens' greatest resources, well behind the fighting front, perhaps in logistics but certainly in "farms and factories" of foreign policy. Not only citizens but also officials would benefit from such a division of labor. Citizen forays into the front lines from their unprepared positions in the rear might still be needed, but only in emergencies like the taxi drivers' defense of Paris in World War I.

A more deliberate, long-range strategy to use citizen power in foreign policy would thus focus official and private activities first on different stages of policy-making. Out of consensus, the area of maximum citizen strength, (a) *intentions* would emerge on broad issue-areas of foreign policy, and (b) *actions* would be taken by central institutions (usually government), while citizens and officials would meet (for example, in the Congress) in order to create (c) *postures* that both reflect popular intentions and anticipate actions.

The results should be such that everyone outside the executive branch can support them and avoid constantly interfering in the stage of actions. So that the means adopted are in line with the agreed-upon ends, the two need to be related by three criteria: (a) *assumptions* embodied in causal models that are understood, at least implicitly, by both officials and citizens; (b) *priorities* that express popular desires, often across two or more otherwise noncomparable values; and, as a result of these two, (c) *directions* expressing a total sense of policy choices in issue-areas (such as containment versus detente, trade versus aid, outer space cooperation versus competition).

A framework of practical arrangements is thereby created within which citizen power can impact world events. The strategic task to be remembered is simple: to transform internal *resources* of citizen power (in two or more countries) into external *applications* capable of impacting world events. The range of paths by which this can happen extends from the conventional (official-formal) path to the most innovative (private-consensual). The former acts through customary channels of domestic politics and foreign policy, but neglects the direct inputs of citizens; the latter would ignore the state to act through transnational channels that are not yet equal to the task.

Of more interest are the two remaining paths. One is the recently fashionable "citizen diplomacy" (private-informal), which relies upon nonofficial initiatives of limited impact and cannot take full advantage of consensus or citizen power. The other, the focus of this paper, is official-consensual. It combines elements of the first two. First, it builds consensus at home and abroad from citizen bases in individual states. Second, intentions thus generated are thus presented to national authorities for adoption and implementation as official policies. Citizen power, at a minimum, then monitors and disciplines official postures and acts.

PART II: SOME POSSIBLE OBJECTIONS

At several points in this ideal picture of citizen power critics may find flaws that go beyond such differences of outlook as citizen-expert gaps.

Four kinds are discussed: (a) social change, (b) political realities, (c) mass media, and (d) official practices.

Social Change

The passing of traditional societies, and the widespread celebration of individualism, over the centuries has raised fears about loss of community and subjection to new kinds of controls or, some would say, forms of manipulation. Concern over atomization of societies came to be expressed in the idea of the "mass society," where an individual's lack of identity increases opportunities for political manipulation. A complex of intervening bonds and ties is needed not only to reduce tendencies to make masses of people too easily available for casual mobilization but also to facilitate a two-step flow of communications on public affairs (Barber, 1972, pp. 149-154).

Consensus-building does not depend only upon either community structures or shared cultures. Trade-offs occur between consensus and values, and between consensus and control: "The fewer the societal bonds and links, the greater the 'load' consensus-building must carry (for the same level of activeness)." When two parties seek agreement, not only the substance of their goals is important but also the process, such as the degree to which the goals themselves can be modified in the interaction (Etzioni, 1968, p. 468). These principles apply both within and among countries, whether democratic or authoritarian.

The idea of consensus confronts the critiques of modern, mass society. Interactive capacities, for example, can substitute in part for community cohesion. American society, "is something more than a jungle of disparate special interests." It does not fit the current postindustrial model, but includes the "body of common agreement . . . 'consensus,' without which it is believed that no democratic system can survive" (Schattschneider, 1975, p. 23).

Basic units of society such as the family, village, and others did not vanish, moreover, but were transformed without destroying mediating structures between society-wide elites and citizens. To say that citizen power is central to understanding society does not mean that "other elements—especially goals and values, knowledge and commitment—are less important." Instead, it can be viewed as "mobilization of societal energy in the service of societal goals" (Etzioni, 1968, pp. 319, 432-436).

Political Realities

Is consensus a real tool with practical uses? Or does greater good flow mostly from adversarial dissent? Early research showed that while some

consensus may exist among elites, it does not everywhere extend to the general public. Consensus can be high for the general public at two extremes — very general principles (such as free speech) and concrete interests (such as economic equality) — while in the large middle areas it remains the property of elites. Widely shared consensus at the general level of rules of the game, however, is little more than legitimization of elitism in government (McClosky, 1964, pp. 362-371).

Consensus in American politics can thus be understood in two different, contradictory senses. A conservative version values stability over responsiveness to change. It would allow mass participation only indirectly, through elites and elections, and promote consensus mainly on procedural rules. A participatory version would encourage more direct roles for the general public, permitting them to advocate substantive solutions to specific issues.

Neither version of consensus, moreover, is ideally suited to real problems that have had various outcomes in U.S. history:

- (1) *Negotiated* consensus through elite compromise (making the Constitution; 1950s domestic and foreign policies).
- (2) *Deadlocks* and splits resulting in policy failures (Civil War; U.S. foreign relations between World Wars I and II).
- (3) *Imposed* consensus when one coalition overcomes another (1930s New Deal-business; 1940-1941 intervention-isolation).
- (4) *Hyperconsensus*, or unquestioned dominance of an orthodox policy among almost all elites (1920s U.S. economic policies; foreign policy of 1960s leading to Vietnam). (Barton, 1980, p. 6)

Mass Media

In the first half of this century, the drama or unreality of news coverage grew at a rising rate until much "of what we read and see and hear, has come to consist of pseudo-events. We expect more of them and we are given more of them," until we are flooded with pseudo-events in public affairs programming (Boorstin, 1973, p. 12).

Even if media manipulation is admitted, estimates of its effects vary. Especially in America, social conditioning as the main instrument of modern power tends to replace traditional power sources. "Speeches, newspaper publicity and advertising, radio and, above all, television commercials, are of central importance in the modern political campaign." Media persuasion is thought to be decisive but it may simply be self-immunizing. Resort to the media comes to represent the purpose it is intended to serve, producing an "illusion of power" without its reality (Galbraith, 1983, pp. 148-149).

Media dramas are nonetheless taken by officials as reflecting popular opinion, or creating it. Hence the mass media have a role as a surrogate for citizens on a level with that of Congress, attesting to the potential, if not the performance, of communication techniques. Television, as the main source of political news for most people, has affected the governing process by (a) focusing on personalities rather than issues, (b) compressing time for making decisions, (c) reducing practical options open to policymakers, and (d) diverting energies of both executives and legislators from policy substance to public relations. For the general public, however, TV is a factor that intensifies, rather than transforms, people's original conceptions of American government (Ranney, 1983, chaps. 5 and 6).

Worrying about media manipulation of public opinion, however, is like cursing the age of the motor car. Whether or how much good follows from media technologies are questions less significant than living with, and regulating, what cannot be reversed. Citizens must become more TV-literate, for example, in order to cope with an environment that is irretrievably communication-rich. The media weapon can be misused, but it cannot be ignored, for it is already an integral part of American culture, both general and political.

Official Practices

Closely related to manipulation of opinion is ideology, which governments like to employ as a cheap substitute for consensus. An ideology is a political belief system, but not all political beliefs are necessarily formal enough to be called ideological. Ideology relates to values and beliefs as a supermarket does to a bulk-foods store. Various ideologies are prepackaged and precooked, ready to be popped into shopping carts. Like any belief system, they are a useful shorthand for citizens (Best, 1973, pp. 14-15, 43).

The essential difference between ideologies and other systems of ideas is that an ideology "shapes beliefs that move people into action" (Macridis, 1986, p. 3), or is so intended. Ideologies are in fact prescribed caricatures of belief systems, which function as economizing devices, or as "ideas that are no longer thought" (Sartori, 1972, p. 62). In foreign affairs, therefore, they have the same disadvantages as moralities tied to national values.

Consensus, by contrast, requires official response to popular demands. Unresponsive systems tend to produce alienation as "an expression of the objective conditions" that make a person feel subject to "forces beyond his understanding or control." Consensus can be inauthentic if it "*provides the appearance of responsiveness while the underlying condition is alienating*" (Etzioni, 1968, pp. 618-619; also pp. 7-8, 504). Dissent is then in order.

At the height of the Vietnam War a pioneering study was made in the U.S. State Department of influence attempts by the public. Officials were trying to manage opinion so that any accountability to voters was "for all practical purposes neutralized." Such a manipulation was supplemented, however, "by a much more subjective . . . responsiveness" when officials adapted to public preferences and sought to modify them. In this interactive process, long-range responsiveness tends to balance short-run resistance to popular influence (Cohen, 1973, pp. 187; see also pp. 205-208).

The main defenses of bureaucrats against outside influence attempts are nevertheless so well mastered as to minimize outsider impacts on tactical, or day-to-day, policy decisions. Citizens may win longer-term influence by deliberate strategies. Official reaction to Vietnam protests, for example, was generally irrational and unpredictable, but their diversity helped ensure that "all, at one time or another, reached their targets" (Small, 1987, p. 185). The explanation may be that officials observed a growing consensus.

While the antiwar movement of the 1960s thus did not reverse public tolerance of the war until about mid-1967, opinion by then had "established a ceiling in the minds of the top political leaders . . . beyond which U.S. war actions could not go without potentially disastrous domestic political consequences" (Gurtov and Maghroori, 1984, pp. 185-186).

CONCLUSIONS

Flaws in the ideal picture of citizen power in foreign affairs may alter, without eliminating, prospects for enhanced citizen participation and influence in foreign policy. If social change has weakened traditional cultures as bases for consensus, renewed awareness of subnational communities and of transnational interests has also reduced exclusively national biases. If political elitism takes policy-making out of the hands of citizens, popular power and will to upset the results also have expanded. If the mass media manipulate attitudes and opinions, citizen influence can still turn values and beliefs to policy advantage. And if official practices ignore popular consensus, citizen power can prevail when clear strategies are pursued with determination.

To get results, or at least to test the proposed strategies, requires initiatives from leaders and organizations, at all levels and probably on a large scale. Citizens and officials will need to observe the divisions of labor and areas of focus suggested. Being a modification of political culture, if not also of larger habits of thought and feeling, this kind of experiment might succeed only after a generation. Its inclusion in educational curricula, both formal

and informal, for adults as well as in-school populations, could accelerate the process. Another substantial aid would be any inclinations in the Congress and/or mass media to observe the guidelines proposed. All parties to the foreign policy discourse might pursue these aims:

(1) *Recognize stages of policy-making.* Knowing the kinds of decisions to be made at the point citizens enter the discussion, as well as those already made or not yet timely, has a lot to do with effective influence strategy. It is not true that an issue cannot be shifted from one stage to another, but it will probably be more difficult to go against expectations of proper timing. If most of the population is already agreed (on a consensus) that "we have to help overcome famine in Ethiopia," it may be useless to reopen questions of *whether* to do so (intention). The timely decision is *how much* help can be given (postures) and then *how* it can be provided (actions). Each stage offers some advantages and some disadvantages to different participants in the policymaking process, but the general public usually is strongest toward the intentions end of the process, while authorities (both official and expert) have more credibility as the point of action is approached. The two can meet more equally at the formulation of postures, often in lawmaking and funding.

(2) *Articulate consensus and intentions.* Citizens who share the prevailing consensus on an issue-area of foreign policy would do well to state and restate it as a reminder of legitimate ends to be pursued through decisions on postures and actions. These ends are articulated as intentions in order for citizens to exercise social control over the decision makers and the implementors of policies. Knowing and recalling exactly what is included in consensus, regardless of the stage of policy-making involved, is a way of preserving popular support for a policy or program as it is put into effect. Keeping shared intentions in view also helps to prevent opponents, for example, from defeating strategy through tactics, as can easily happen when proposals are made for postures that are too expensive or actions that are inappropriate to the intentions.

(3) *Identify sources and indicators of consensus.* Values, beliefs, attitudes, and opinions—each has a role to play in consensus building and policy-making. The more basic sources, values and beliefs, can be articulated as a part of authenticating consensus, or of revising it when needed. To interpret attitudes and opinions, the more derivative indicators of consensus, the indicators need to be related to values and beliefs, on the one hand, and to policy issues, on the other. Apparent contradictions between the two can mean that a pollster has asked an action question that citizens answer in terms of their values.

(4) *Distinguish emotional and factual elements.* Foreign policy consensus and intentions may vary in their balance of evaluative (mainly emotional)

and objective (largely factual) components. Beliefs and opinions tend (or pretend) to rest on logical, cause-and-effect arguments that can be reinforced or demolished by experts who have more detailed information than citizens do. Values and attitudes, on the other hand, rest upon more emotional bases that cannot be confirmed or refuted objectively. Citizens are more exclusively responsible for determining what their values are and how they are ranked. Knowing whether a policy in dispute is the result of feeling more than thinking makes a difference to citizen influence on policy decisions.

(5) *Monitor the whole policy process.* While divisions of labor may give citizens and officials, as well as their mediators, different roles in each stage of policy-making, additional criteria are needed to ensure that citizen intentions are respected in determining postures and actions. These criteria also presume divisions of labor, but without reducing the need for citizen understanding of what is happening. While the *assumptions* criterion gives a leading role to government, it does not relieve officials of fully divulging the information on which their policy preferences are based. The *priorities* criterion makes sure that issues vital to citizens get preferred treatment in time, attention, and other resources. The *directions* in which policies point should reflect both the citizens' views of what should be done and the experts' judgments of what can be done. Clear models of expected cause and effect relationships allow citizens to evaluate the total substance of policies with economy of effort.

(6) *Adopt a long-range view of citizen influence.* Any strategy requires time for its realization, and especially one of citizen influence on foreign policy (regarded by some as a contradiction of terms). Citizen groups will still make tactical choices of their own and monitor tactical decisions of government, but citizen power cannot be expected to change policies overnight. Tactics of policy advocacy groups should especially not contradict strategies based on issue-consensus. And to maintain citizen power, the tactics of citizen groups have to enlarge, rather than contract, the constituencies that support particular intentions, priorities, and directions of foreign policy. What turns on an in-group may be just what turns off outsiders. If today's actions of government are objectionable to citizen activists, yet are approved in opinion polls, alternatives need to be considered.

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EPILOGUE

Addressing the Communication Dimension of Diplomacy and Negotiation *The Intellectual Agenda*

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As an endpiece, this discussion is a commentary on factors that will need to be taken into account as the insights of communication theory and concepts are put to use to achieve greater understanding of diplomatic and negotiation processes. Priority emphasis is placed on the ability of both specialists and practitioners to engage in critical analyses of international communication activities as they are in progress, whether or not a more precise research effort is contemplated. The paper also urges that the communication dimension be legitimized as a normal and proper part of the study of international affairs.

The fundamental question raised in this volume is what part the communications field, as a discipline, can play in understanding the international relations process. That it has a part to play should be obvious. Any aspect of international diplomacy, negotiation, or even routine citizen involvement that is directed toward problem solving in today's interdependent world is an exercise in communication. This is implicit in the connotation of the words that are used in discussions about international affairs. Ambassadors, envoys, and attachés are transmitters of messages; being a diplomat implies a certain style of communication and persuasion. Negotiators are designated communicators; negotiating teams multiply the channels and levels by which communication takes place. International trade representatives engage in bargaining—communication again. Diplomats—and others—discuss the international process in terms of "sending a message," or "maintaining credibility," and they enter into symbolic actions, from wreath-laying ceremonies to official visits, that send signals. Purposeful communication is conducted by news leaks, "putting a spin" on press statements, or even by initiating a cultural exchange. Sometimes calculated silence itself becomes international communication.

Under these circumstances, it is reasonable to ask why, with all the total attention paid to studying international relations processes, has so little analytical effort been expended on understanding the communication

dimension, which is at the heart of it all. Why has this factor so routinely been taken for granted, as though it required no special understanding? And, especially, why has so little of our intellectual agenda been directed toward that which might be unique in the *international* and *intercultural* nature of the foreign affairs dialogue?

While an entire fraternity of defense specialists and scientists command high-priority resources to assure that multiple warheads do what they are supposed to do, only passing attention is given to be sure that communication processes accomplish what they are supposed to in the diplomatic and negotiation side of international relations.

It is recognized that in *domestic* public affairs, communication analysis has, in fact, become something of an applied science, especially in political campaign strategy, in public opinion polling, and in the way that political leaders have learned to exercise communication control in the art of governance. Whatever the social merit and social consequences of this development on the domestic scene, it is to the point of this discussion to emphasize that no equivalent has been made in the international arena to at least avoid the pitfalls of miscommunication and misperception. Aside from efforts to make psychological warfare more effective, and occasional application to propaganda or to international advertising, the ever-expanding stream of *international* communication receives little consideration as a distinct communication phenomenon with distinct qualities and consequences. Even the "public diplomacy" calculated to support national interests and foreign policy objectives that is pursued by government information agencies (e.g., the United States Information Agency) and radio voices such as the Voice of America, the British Broadcasting Company, Radio Moscow, and Radio Havana apparently operate more on the basis of practitioners' art than on an applied communication science that takes the international aspect of their endeavors directly into account.

In sum, this volume's contributors are concerned with the degree to which analytical approaches developed in the communication field can be applied to the volume's title *Communicating for Peace: Diplomacy and Negotiation*. That is, have scholars arrived at an applied science capability to support the communication dimension of problem solving in a peaceful, cooperative world system? When managing conflict resolution is a matter of understanding the international communication processes that are involved, what communication science resources are available? In terms of an intellectual agenda, where does the communication field in its present state of the art stand as a resource to constitute an applied science when the communication problem to be met is international and is cast in the context of managing the complications and conflicts that arise in a more interconnected and interdependent world?

My own vantage point in offering observations in this regard is that of a former career U.S. Foreign Service officer who, by having entered the service with a behavioral science background in sociology and cultural anthropology, combined routine diplomatic assignments with Foreign Service Institute assignments directing area studies that were intended to enhance professional competence in bridging mind-sets and communication styles.

The preceding chapters in this volume seem to indicate that the issue is being well joined. The literature that applies in one way or another is extensive, as has been shown in the resources cited. Certainly enough progress has been made that an applied focus on international diplomacy and negotiation is viable. Yet the tentative nature of the current stage is indicated somewhat by the fact that much of the application demonstrated here consists of taking research findings and conceptual approaches that have been developed for other purposes and extending them to the international affairs arena to see if they will strike responsive chords. From a practitioner's perspective, it appears to be a matter of answers looking for questions rather than the other way around, as though theories and concepts were looking for application in order to validate the concepts themselves. This is appropriate and valuable at this stage, but as the applied science matures, a balance is to be sought in which the international communication problems that are to be understood are themselves carefully delineated in step with the search for applicable analytical resources.

It would follow that the next challenge is to consider the special nature of the communication process in diplomacy and negotiation, and determine aspects that are unique precisely because they are international.

Hence, the next section of this paper proposes several points regarding what is "international" about international negotiation. In what way has that communication task become special by the fact that communication necessarily crosses cultural borders and those of national experience and circumstances?

COMMUNICATION PROBLEMS POSED IN DIPLOMACY AND NEGOTIATION

In general, *diplomacy* and *negotiation* encompass a much broader range of both issues addressed and people involved than these terms often connote. The inclination when looking for illustrative cases to try out theory and concepts is to focus on the most prominent recorded instances of diplomatic and negotiation communication. For example, one may start with the Cuban missile crisis, arms negotiations, or tension reduction in the Middle East, as

has been done in the chapters here. This practice is valid enough, but it means that the most difficult and complicated problems are taken on first. In looking for logical progression for an applied science, the reality is that the diplomacy-and-negotiation universe is very broad, and it already reaches considerable complexity in many important but less-publicized arenas, as Fred Casmir illustrates in relation to cultural agreements. Starting with these may constitute a more pragmatic strategy.

There is a communication dimension to be considered across a wide range of situations in which international affairs are to be conducted. I recall negotiating officially with a very provincial police officer across a hotel room bed occupied by a deceased American, the victim of a heart attack. Which of us was going to take possession of the man's valuables and personal effects? It was a very cross-cultural encounter. And I also recall during a United Nations General Assembly session trying to persuade a friendly ambassador over drinks in the delegates' lounge to in fact vote with the U.S. position, as his government had agreed, rather than abstain, as he was personally inclined. That was cross-cultural too. These are not war-and-peace issues, but they are samples of international problem solving, and they may be more typical of the mainline work load of diplomacy and negotiation.

Conducting international affairs includes making security arrangements for visiting dignitaries, agreeing on arrangements to deliver disaster relief goods, negotiating terms for a loan agreement, cooperating on drug traffic enforcement, and deciding on the program for a good will naval visit. The list is endless, and must include diplomacy and negotiation pursued in nongovernmental activities. Note that the Georgetown University School of Foreign Service includes a program in International Business Diplomacy.

The point is that for the fruits of communication theory and concept to be most germane, the regular and repetitive aspects of negotiation communication that are intrinsic in the international dialogue need to be identified and addressed. In any case, the intellectual agenda should include more ground-work at the routine level before prescribing for the most newsworthy diplomatic or negotiation events. A mature science of international communication must apply across the board.

Several prevailing features of the practitioners' reality stand out to suggest the areas in which an applied communication science would be indicated. One might start with factors that come into play even before encounters with counterparts begin. In his chapter in this volume, William Gudykunst noted the need to distinguish between interpersonal and intergroup communication. In the case of the diplomat, the intergroup aspect is not only especially germane, but often overlooked. Two facets stand out. First, note communication behavior as a representative of a group. Many diplomats sense that they are working 24 hours a day in that everything they do is, in effect, done

as a representative of their nation; there is no escape from that role. However, it is probably more typical that most negotiators enter into their negotiation activities with less of a sense that they are point representatives for a whole nation than that they are representatives of a given department, bureau, concerned interest group, or, in the business world, corporation or even a department within a corporation. At times they may feel that they have to take on the representation personae of more than one group at a time, which complicates communication behavior enormously.

Whatever the case, diplomats and negotiators communicate with an acute sense of their reference group or groups, and this poses one of the heaviest demands on their performance. One might add to William Gudykunst's emphasis on the anxiety factor the point that for these practitioners, the greatest anxiety probably will be generated in the context of relations with the group or groups being represented rather than in the ambiguity and uncertainty experienced in facing negotiation counterparts. Further, the priority given to attending to this portion of total anxiety might explain why lower priority is typically given to coping with the unfamiliar aspects of counterpart communication behavior. In sum, the diplomat or negotiator never quite escapes the dynamics of groupthink even when a continent away from the group.

While the above is a significant point, it might not be as amenable to communication analysis as another salient factor encountered in the group-to-group nature of much international problem solving. This is the matter of how groups themselves come to perceive (a) the issue at hand, (b) themselves and the other party, and (c) the desirable outcome of the negotiation. (Grant Hilliker notes in his chapter that this includes citizen perceptions of issues when they are inclined to be activist about them.) Thus, that which has to be resolved in diplomacy and negotiation is essentially the conflicting senses of objectives, values, beliefs, emotionally laden concerns, and priorities of the groups represented. This in itself poses a heavy agenda for an applied communication science proposing to address the subject of communicating for peace. This emphasis on group perceptions is not new, and may require only basic mention in the context of this volume because much has been accomplished already in understanding the part played by images, stereotypes, effects of propaganda, the sense of social distance or of identity, attributions of motive, misperceptions, and related themes. The chapter by Herbert Blumberg also covers much of this aspect.

What does deserve new emphasis on the intellectual agenda, as is increasingly evident from current negotiation and diplomacy, is the impact of today's explosion in international media, information, and news flow on the way that groups are predisposed to respond to international issues and steps toward resolving them. The consequence of international television news

alone constitutes a highly significant factor because it not only becomes a key source of information and image, both for groups represented and for their representatives, but also a part of the negotiation process itself, as in the case of international terrorism. Hernando Gonzalez's discussion of the roles played by the alternative media in the Philippine case demonstrates the potential of this ever-more-salient element in public affairs. Unfortunately, the media technology that produces consequences for international interaction has progressed much faster than has our ability to study or understand its repercussions in the system.

It has long been conventional academic wisdom that preparation for work in international affairs requires study of subjects such as international relations theory, history of diplomacy, comparative politics, and international law. It would be argued by many practitioners that while all that is helpful, it is absolutely essential to be prepared to understand how news is gathered, processed, and consumed, because this consideration has more to do with the outcome of much international negotiation than does a point of international law or a precedent in international practice.

Perhaps most to the point is the need to understand how this international flow of communication differs in nature from domestic flows. In the international case, a new overlay of factors comes into play to determine how media-carried messages are coded, selected, interpreted, and assigned significance, and therefore how messages impact on the international communication process in unanticipated ways. What is known of this phenomenon tends to be episodic impressions. The resources that would be required for an applied science of international media communication would be substantial. But from the point of view of those who feel its consequences, this factor must stand as a high-priority item in the intellectual agenda.

Returning to factors that affect communication in the negotiation process itself, several articles in this volume point to contrasts in cognitive and reasoning styles. This essential element is often unrecognized by many negotiators themselves, but it is considered a crucial consideration by the more experienced and thoughtful. Note the chapters by Gregg Walker and Raymond Cohen. They present cases in which negotiators seem to be operating on differing wavelengths; contrasting cognitive and reasoning styles help provide the explanation. It is to be stressed that most of the communicating that goes on in international problem and conflict resolution involves abstract subjects and abstract solutions. Therefore, the objective is to understand the mind-sets of counterparts as they process abstract ideas in order to know how they approach issues at hand and, ultimately, how they try to justify positions, cite evidence, explain, refute, and persuade. This understanding is at the heart of the negotiation process, but it is a facet of communication that is not easily brought onto a conscious level by negotia-

tors because patterns of logic and reasoning are learned out of awareness and practiced as normal habit. Its effects in the course of routine negotiations are rarely appreciated.

Yet those with long experience in dealing in the U.S.-USSR dialogue, for example, do expect that the two sides will not reason by the same standard design. They expect that the French or the Latin Americans will not either. Part of their skill as negotiators is to be effective in just such circumstances. It is part of their professionalism to recognize this variable, and to understand that it poses a communication barrier that will not be crossed simply by expert translation and interpretation services as one goes from the reasoning milieu of one language to another.

The significance of this factor has increased enormously as negotiators from non-Western cultures—for example Japan, Korea, or China—have come to play more significant parts in international affairs, and thus reflect the logic and persuasion styles of their own cultures and of groups they represent. They can be expected to do this even when they communicate in English or other Western languages. It can be noted in the chapter by Richard Holt, Hui-Ching Chang, and David Steingard that mediation itself is subject to differing implicit assumptions by which the mediating role is assumed. Currently more attention to the importance of the way that information and ideas are processed has resulted from the need of corporation managers to mesh American and Japanese communication gears to negotiate and plan mutual endeavors as well as bargain for their respective advantages. This situation has stimulated a productive inquiry by both sides into cognitive and decision-making modes, but this is an aspect of our subject that is in its infancy, despite its centrality in international affairs.

Keeping this underlying factor in mind and moving on to direct communication behavior, where does the subfield of cross-cultural communication fit into our intellectual agenda? It is recognized that cultural conditioning does affect styles of confrontation, debate, interpersonal interaction, and habits of social behavior, which in turn affect negotiation. Formal diplomacy has long since tried to address a common concern for bridging this gulf by superimposing something of an international culture of diplomacy and protocol for the purposes of standardizing ways of relating to one another throughout the diplomatic community. Much of this survives, and has been incorporated into a still-larger and more encompassing overlay of an international culture that derives from the kind of international association that goes with commerce, technology, travel, and multinational organizations of many varieties.

Many readers will be familiar with the content of the cross-cultural communication field and the very broad range of cross-cultural encounters to which it is addressed. In general, application to diplomacy and organized

negotiation has been rather tentative except in the U.S.-Japan case. As applied, the field scatters its efforts from the need to sensitize practitioners to the very fact that culture might be a factor, to coping with visible behavior and nonverbal communication, and, less frequently, to the level of decision making and reasoning mentioned above. Among the disciplines that might be involved in promoting the field, communication departments have taken the lead in encouraging study and research, while other disciplines that would seem to have a vested disciplinary interest in joining the inquiry — cultural anthropology, social psychology, and sociology, for example — have been less directly forthcoming. In any case, the question remains regarding priorities for the agenda here.

From the practitioner's perspective, effectiveness in negotiation is normally a matter of *sustained* interaction. It follows that attention to cultural factors that affect trust and confidence, appreciation for differing modes of role behavior, comprehension of status and authority — in short, the considerations that need to be bridged to sustain interpersonal working relationships — are of primary interest to those who conduct diplomacy and negotiate. Here the discussion by Fred Casmir is to the point. His emphasis on developing ongoing relationships is a reminder that after one has learned to cope with all the behavioral habits that cultures may pose as "noise" impediments to communication, it is those deeper and less obvious elements that determine whether or not dialogue can be sustained that assume the greater importance. Here the contribution of Stella Ting-Toomey and Mark Cole regarding the negotiating consequences of dignity, or face, also is to the point. This is a different order of inquiry from ones prescribing how closely people will stand in conversation or how late they will be in arriving for meetings.

This discussion is not meant to discourage the momentum being achieved in cross-cultural orientation and training. It is simply saying that in defining an intellectual agenda for diplomacy and negotiation, an emphasis on the patterned assumptions and thought patterns that lie behind observed behavior is more promising.

THE INTELLECTUAL AGENDA: CAPACITY FOR CRITICAL ANALYSIS

The purpose of this volume might be well served by raising the question here as to how adequately the communication field supplies the conceptual resources for *critical analysis* when communication factors in the diplomatic and negotiation process are to be addressed. In the same way that capacity for critical analysis stands as a goal for higher education in general and for

scientific inquiry specifically, has a stage now been reached in applied communication science that allows those who deal with international-problem-solving processes to state with some confidence what the critical factors are, where the judicious evaluation has to be made, what key elements come together to achieve the critical mass for effective communication?

The value of an applied science is in part the ability to analyze cause and effect, or the interplay of multiple factors, to know with some precision how things work. But an applied science is also in part a perspective that leads the observer to ask the right questions, to move, in the present context, with assurance into an examination and evaluation of the critical facets of a negotiation or diplomatic process. And this perspective should be transmittable in some degree to practitioners as well as to more specialized analysts.

It seems reasonable to point out here that while the state of the science allows one to engage in critical analyses of what is important in such applications as domestic conflict resolution or problem solving and negotiation where a single base culture and its implicit assumptions prevail, or where group differences still can be seen as variations on the main cultural base, in international application there is much less of an intellectual foundation for engaging in critical analysis. When a consistent cultural base cannot be counted upon to supply common basic assumptions; when common sense is not in fact common; when substantial differences exist in images, expectations, definitions of situation, or styles of interacting or attributing motive, there is much less to rely on to be sure that key communication considerations and crucial factors are identified and managed.

Thus, from my perspective—operating somewhere between international practice as a matter of career experience and social science inquiry as a matter of training—I tend to place more importance at this stage on our ability to think clearly and ask the right questions about what is going on in the communication dimension of international affairs than on trying too hard and too soon to scientifically lay to rest exactly what happened in a given diplomatic encounter, or to prove the applicability of a limited-variable model for the model's sake. An adequate analytical frame of reference is needed first. As international involvement accelerates, and with it the need to manage interdependence in so many aspects of human affairs, few practitioners are prepared to look at an ongoing diplomatic or negotiation problem and engage in a productive critical analysis of the various elements in play and their relative significance and effect.

The difficulty posed for the intellectual agenda for communication theory and concept may be somewhat the same as it is for other social sciences. That is, what is to be the *balance* in progress as a field advances between emphasizing a micro as against a macro approach, or between empirical analysis of specific and concrete events and developing a framework of

concepts and regularities that allow more effective — although not as empirically satisfying — treatment of the more abstract or general aspects of problems being addressed?

It appears that the trend in several of the social sciences, including international relations theory, has been to retreat to the micro level, where a specific problem can be examined, preferably in empirical and quantitative terms, as with the survey questionnaire; where results can provide a certain methodological gratification; where the investigator cannot be faulted for idle speculation; and where the "contribution" to the field is a solid, although small, piece of data and analysis. The hope is that all the work done in such separate investigations will add up to a theory for the field, that the literature will show cumulative results. At this stage, at least from the practitioner's vantage point in the international studies field, this approach is not convincing.

The overall intellectual question then becomes that posed by William Gudykunst in reviewing diplomatic communication theory. What do scholars usefully know about analyzing the communication dimension of international interaction? Is there a sufficient theoretical frame of reference that, on the one hand, can serve as a guide to selection of microlevel analyses so that they do in fact add up, and, on the other, enable one to start with a real, multidimensional problem situation, such as posed by Fred Casmir in his UNESCO negotiations, and engage in the kind of critical analysis that enhances on-the-spot comprehension of the communication factors that will be most significant?

LEGITIMIZING THE INQUIRY

Whatever one's judgment on the above question regarding the state of communication science as it addresses "communicating for peace," both these chapters and evidence in the denouement of international relations affairs demonstrate that the communication dimension is an essential and vital variable. The collective ability to understand things international will not achieve a reliable stature until the communication dimension is included in the proper study of the international process.

The standard intellectual approach to scientific application is found in the caveat that *everything else being equal*, then x will affect y in the following manner, or according to the following formula. Then a practical applied science has to ask, what is going on in the variables where everything else is not equal? And in many traditional international relations studies and research problems, it is precisely in the communication dimension that everything else is *not* equal, and where the unknown or underestimated variable is

so substantial that the rest of the equation has little meaning, or the results have little reliability.

The intellectual agenda then includes assessing the effectiveness of our present preparation to take international communication into account in both the communication and international relations disciplines. This is another case where in practical affairs and in applied science, problems do not come defined in single-discipline terms, but are inherently multidisciplinary in nature. Certainly the practitioner becomes impatient with single-discipline analyses and senses them to be irrelevant.

The utopia might then be seen as the situation in which no one pretends to expertise in international affairs without a command of the communication dimension, where no international studies program in higher education will be without it, when professionals will consider attention to critical analysis in communication factors a normal part of their professional mission. It would be the condition in which it is considered just as legitimate and routine to pursue study of the state of communication relations between members of the international community as to study the state of trade relations or security agreements.

At the least, the foregoing chapters contribute toward that perspective.

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
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